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Abstract
This cumulative dissertation covers four papers on the management and governance of family 
firms. The first paper provides a systematic review of the literature on family-related determi-
nants of the board of directors’ tasks, composition and processes in family firms. The review 
clusters and synthesizes the literature into six major determinants, details the methods used, 
and provides recommendations for future research in the field. The second paper develops a 
contingency approach to board task needs of family firms. The paper identifies five contingency 
factors and demonstrates how board task needs typically evolve over the ownership stages of 
family businesses. The third paper constitutes a qualitative empirical study on the role of board 
control in controlling owner family businesses. Based on a multiple case study approach, the stu-
dy shows that controlling owners frequently use board control as a self-governing mechanism 
to mitigate self-control problems. Additionally, the study provides insights on favorable board 
processes and board composition in the controlling owner setting. Overall, the dissertation un-
derlines the importance of factoring in the influence of family firm heterogeneity on the board 
of directors. The fourth paper concludes the dissertation with a teaching case study on a small 
family firm that is exposed to the threat of a disruptive innovation in its industry.
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1 Introduction  
 Research Objective 1.1
Family ownership is among the most common forms of ownership in economies 
worldwide. In a study of 13 Western European countries, Faccio and Lang (2002) 
demonstrated that, on average, almost half of the firms (44.3%) are family con-
trolled. In some countries, such as Germany, family firms are even more prevalent 
(64.6 %). In particular, among small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), family 
ownership is strongly pronounced. Since the beginning of the 21st century, scholar-
ly interest in family business research has steadily increased in response to the 
widespread empirical presence of family ownership (Siebels & zu Knyphausen-
Aufseß, 2012).  
Scholars recognize that family firms differ significantly from their non-family coun-
terparts (Sharma, Chrisman, & Gersick, 2012). Family firms often benefit from a 
strong sense of identity and unity that facilitates a long-term perspective of the 
business for the owners. On the other hand, the entanglement of family and busi-
ness roles can pose additional challenges such as nepotism and intra-family con-
flicts (Kets de Vries, 1993; Lane, Astrachan, Keyt, & McMillan, 2006). Moreover, 
family firms are often motivated by and committed to non-financial goals that can 
lead to different behavior than that of non-family firms. For example, the socio-
emotional wealth perspective highlights the additional value that family members 
seek through family control and influence, identification with the firm, social ties, 
emotional attachment, and dynastic succession (Berrone, Cruz, & Gomez-Mejia, 
2012). In summary, the concentration of ownership and the frequent overlap be-
tween ownership and management roles create unique governance settings for 
these firms (Lubatkin, Schulze, Ling, & Dino, 2005).  
Over the past few decades, multiple studies have investigated governance in fami-
ly firms, particularly with respect to the board of directors (Bammens, Voordeckers, 
& Van Gils, 2011). The board of directors constitutes the major formal governance 
mechanism of family businesses (Siebels & zu Knyphausen-Aufseß, 2012). De-
pending on the legal context, boards are found not only in large, publicly traded 
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corporations but also in family SMEs. Early research in the field mainly targeted 
the differences between family and non-family firms. For instance, the risk of con-
flicts among family members was argued to demand additional board tasks, such 
as mediation, to balance the interests of family owners. Outside directors were 
deemed particularly suitable to fulfill this task and support the continuity and suc-
cess of the family firm through their objective viewpoints (Mathile, 1988; Ward, 
1988; Whisler, 1988). Many of these early writings were strongly driven by per-
sonal practitioner experiences and less by rigorous scientific approaches. In the 
new millennium, boards gained increasing attention with multiple studies investi-
gating the performance implications of boards (Bammens et al., 2011). For in-
stance, Anderson and Reeb (2004) found that a greater fraction of independent 
directors increases firm performance in family firms. However, the empirical results 
are partly inconclusive. Klein, Shapiro, and Young (2005), for instance, found a 
negative relationship between board independence and firm performance. The 
differing results have frequently been attributed to family firm heterogeneity, that 
is, firms summarized under the family business label differ significantly (Sharma et 
al., 2012). Therefore, recent work in the field has focused on the differences be-
tween different types of family firms, for example, based on different management 
and ownership constellations (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2013; Nordqvist, Sharma, 
& Chirico, 2014). Multiple authors have called for further academic work in this 
direction to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of the boards and to 
address the limitations of applying wholesale recommendations for all family firms 
(Bammens et al., 2011; Siebels & zu Knyphausen-Aufseß, 2012). The objective of 
the dissertation is to contribute to these research attempts by providing new theo-
retical and empirical insights on the influence of family firm heterogeneity on the 
board of directors. 
To fulfill this objective, the dissertation employs a mixed approach, that is, each of 
the research papers on the board of directors of this dissertation employs a differ-
ent research approach (see Figure 1). The first paper provides a systematic litera-
ture review on the determinants of the board in family firms. The review clusters 
and synthesizes existing knowledge, details the methods used, and outlines pos-
Introduction 
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sible avenues for future research. The aim is to provide a comprehensive and 
structured overview on existing literature and set the basis for the two subsequent 
papers. The second paper is a conceptual work and responds to the identified ne-
cessity for a dynamic contingency perspective on the board task needs of family 
firms. We develop a conceptual model that links the ownership stages in family 
firms to the contingency factors and board task needs. We demonstrate that the 
tasks of the board typically evolve over the ownership stages of the family busi-
ness and provide theoretical insights on differences in board task needs among 
family firms. The third paper employs an empirical research method to provide ev-
idence on a specific type of family firm, the controlling owner family business, 
which is characterized by consolidated ownership and management in a single 
individual. Using a multiple case study approach, the empirical study examines the 
role of board control tasks in mitigating self-control problems of controlling owners 
and develops several propositions on favorable board processes and composi-
tions. Thereby, the paper aims to counteract prevailing skepticism on the benefits 
of board control for controlling owner family firms (Nordqvist et al., 2014). 
Figure 1: Structure of the dissertation 
 
Determinants of Boards in 
Family Firms: A Systematic 
Literature Review
2. Systematic Literature 
Review
3. Conceptual Paper 4. Empirical Paper 5. Teaching Case
The Board of Directors in 
Family Firms: One Size 
Fits Forever?
Self-Control Through 
Board Control: Formalized 
Governance in Controlling 
Owner Family Businesses
Teaching Case Study ATB: 
Digital Disruption in the 
Manufacturing Industry
1. Introduction
6. Conclusion
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In addition to the three abovementioned research papers on the board of directors, 
the fourth paper provides a teaching case study on the management of a family 
SME. The teaching case study complements the dissertation by providing a direct 
contribution to management education in the field of family SMEs. The case cen-
ters on a small manufacturer who faces disruptive innovation in its industry and 
discusses possible strategic alternatives. The aim of the teaching case study is to 
provide students with practical insights into the effect of disruptive innovation and 
an analysis of business models in the context of prevailing resource constraints. 
 Summary of the Research Papers 1.2
In the following section, the content of each research paper shall be outlined in 
more detail and further information on the publication status and on the contribu-
tion of the co-authors shall be given. 
Determinants of Boards in Family Firms: A Systematic Literature Review 
The first paper is a systematic literature review of the family-related determinants 
of family firms’ boards of directors. The single-author paper compiles the determi-
nants identified in previous literature, outlines the methods used in previous stud-
ies, and specifies areas that deserve attention in future research.  
The review follows the guidelines for systematic literature reviews developed by 
Tranfield, Denyer, and Smart (2003). The review process applied keyword search-
es in six databases and a cross-referencing analysis based on preliminary results. 
Overall, 20 relevant papers were identified. The results show that the majority of 
the papers employed a quantitative research approach, often based on data re-
ceived through surveys from single respondents. I compiled and summarized the 
results of the 20 studies according to six main clusters of determinants: genera-
tional stage, family culture, family power, family experience, CEO family stakes, 
and director kinship ties. For each cluster, I aggregated the findings on the rela-
tionships between determinants and board dimensions. Based on the existing find-
ings, I suggest that future work in the field should focus on the dynamic evolution 
of the board over time, extend the use of alternative theories in addition to agency 
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theory, and broaden the scope of the research methods. Qualitative studies are 
particularly recommended to allow for greater focus on contextual factors. 
Compared to broader literature reviews in the field (Bammens et al., 2011; Siebels 
& zu Knyphausen-Aufseß, 2012), the paper contributes to family business re-
search by focusing on the determinants that differentiate family firms from each 
other. Hence, the review substantiates earlier attempts to address the heterogene-
ity of family firms in board research (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004). Moreover, the re-
view clusters and synthesizes the main results, detailing the sources of the heter-
ogeneity, which is to be the focus of future studies. Finally, the paper contributes 
to the field by outlining areas for future research that will enhance knowledge in 
the field. 
The manuscript has been published as HHL Working Paper No. 156 in July 2016, 
and can be retrieved from HHL’s website (www.hhl.de/publications). The results 
were previously presented at a joint research colloquium in Nürnberg in July 2015. 
The two-day colloquium with professors and research associates of HHL, Universi-
ty of Erlangen-Nürnberg, University of Passau, and University of Marburg included 
in-depth feedback and discussion on the paper. All steps of writing the literature 
review, including the search and analysis of relevant literature, the structuring of 
the results, and the drafting of the manuscript, were conducted under single au-
thorship by the author of this dissertation. 
The Board of Directors in Family Firms: One Size Fits Forever? 
The second paper is a conceptual examination of the board task needs of family 
firms. The paper develops a dynamic contingency approach to board task needs 
and predicts the typical evolution of the board task needs over the ownership 
stages. Stephan Stubner co-authored the paper. 
To develop the conceptual model, we identify five contingency factors, namely ex-
ternal ownership, a family’s shared vision, goal alignment, family experience, and 
non-family management. The factors encompass the multitude of possible rela-
tionships among and between family owners and family managers. For each of the 
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contingency factors, we develop propositions concerning their effect on the need 
for board control, board mediation, and board advice. Moreover, we demonstrate 
that the contingency factors typically change over the ownership stages of the 
family business (Gersick, Davis, McCollom Hampton, & Lansberg, 1997). For con-
trolling owner family firms, the need for board advice should typically be predomi-
nant. As the business transforms to a sibling partnership, we predict that a balance 
of board control, board mediation, and board advice is necessary. Finally, we pro-
pose that cousin consortiums benefit most from controlling and mediating boards. 
Additionally, we argue that the level of non-family management moderates the 
evolution of the board task needs. In summary, our conceptual model highlights 
the necessity for a contingent and dynamic perspective on the board.  
The paper provides two major contributions to the field. First, it extends the exist-
ing contingency approach (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004) by factoring in the divergent 
interests and priorities of family members. Possible divergent financial and non-
financial interests of family members have gained increased attention in recent 
years (Berrone et al., 2012), while the implications for the board remain understud-
ied (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2013), and there have been multiple calls to include 
more of the differences among family firms (Bammens et al., 2011; Sharma et al., 
2012; Siebels & zu Knyphausen-Aufseß, 2012). Second, we demonstrate that the 
ownership stage model (Gersick et al., 1997) is a suitable framework for explaining 
the typical changes in board task needs. Thus, we argue that board task needs 
are not only firm-specific but also time-specific, and thereby follow frequent calls in 
literature for a dynamic perspective on family firm boards (Bammens, Voordeck-
ers, & Van Gils, 2008; Ikäheimonen, Pihkala, & Ikävalko, 2013). 
The second paper is linked to the systematic literature review (first paper) by re-
sponding to the need for a more dynamic perspective on the board, which focuses 
on the evolution of the board over time. The conceptual paper proposes the own-
ership stages as a suitable concept that leads to changes in other factors that de-
termine board task needs. Additionally, the selection of the contingency factors is 
driven by the results of the systematic literature review.  
Introduction 
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The paper was published as an HHL working paper (No. 158) in August 2016 and 
is accessible on HHL’s website (www.hhl.de/publications). An earlier version of 
this manuscript was presented at the 19th Annual Interdisciplinary Conference on 
Entrepreneurship, Innovation, and SMEs (G-Forum) in Kassel in October 2015 
after passing a double-blind review process. G-Forum is the largest entrepreneur-
ship and innovation conference in Germany. Moreover, the paper was presented 
at a joint research colloquium at HHL Leipzig together with the Universities of Er-
langen-Nürnberg, Passau, and Marburg in January 2016. The colloquium involved 
detailed feedback from professors and research associates from related research 
fields. In June 2016, the paper was presented at the 16th European Academy of 
Management Conference (EURAM) in Paris after successfully passing a double-
blind review process. EURAM represents the leading conference on management 
research in Europe and centers on family business research as a separate re-
search track (strategic interest group).  
The paper is co-authored by Stephan Stubner. The review of existing literature 
was mainly conducted by the author of this dissertation. In the development of the 
propositions, both co-authors contributed equally to the identification and argu-
mentation on the proposed relationships. The development of the conceptual 
model extended over a period of one year and involved regular monthly exchang-
es on the viability and consistency of the propositions. The intensive exchange 
among the researchers led to an iterative process in the development of the final 
propositions. The author of this dissertation drafted the final manuscript, while 
Stephan Stubner contributed to the creation and revision of the structure of the 
paper.  
Self-Control Through Board Control: Formalized Governance in Controlling Owner 
Family Businesses 
The third paper provides an empirical analysis of the role of board control tasks in 
mitigating the self-control problems of controlling owners. The qualitative study 
challenges the common perception that controlling owners do not require and do 
not benefit from board control tasks (Nordqvist et al., 2014).  
Introduction 
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Board control refers to the monitoring of management actions and the firm’s per-
formance (Forbes & Milliken, 1999), based on arguments from agency theory 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Since controlling owner family businesses are charac-
terized by a consolidation of ownership and management in a single individual 
(Gersick et al., 1997), agency problems should typically not exist in these firms 
(Ang, Cole, & Lin, 2000). However, we argue that controlling owners may be sub-
ject to agency problems with themselves, which are also referred to as self-control 
problems (Thaler & Shefrin, 1981). Based on existing literature, the paper outlines 
that controlling owners are particularly prone to self-control problems due to pri-
vate ownership, owner representation in management, and altruistic motives 
(Lubatkin et al., 2005). To gain deeper insights into the subject, we use a multiple 
case study approach (Eisenhardt, 1989) composed of 13 German family SMEs. 
Overall, 19 interviews were conducted and analyzed along with other information 
on the firms. Based on the qualitative data, we show that controlling owners fre-
quently use board control as a self-governing mechanism to reduce the occur-
rence of self-control problems. Moreover, we propose that challenging and probing 
behavior of board members and formalized preparation of the controlling owner 
enhance the intended effect. Finally, we find trust and expertise to be favorable 
attributes of board members in this setting rather than independence. 
Our empirical study contributes to the research on family firm boards in three 
ways. First, we are among the first to provide empirical evidence on the role of 
board control in mitigating self-control problems of controlling owners in family 
firms. So far, the topic has mainly been investigated from a theoretical perspective 
(Bammens et al., 2011; Lubatkin et al., 2005). Second, the paper demonstrates 
that not only board advice but also board control can be a means to support the 
management. Thereby, we substantiate earlier propositions on the interrelated-
ness of board advice and control (Roberts, McNulty, & Stiles, 2005). Third, by em-
ploying a case study method, our study provides further insights into internal board 
processes. We thus respond to previous criticisms of an overreliance on in-
put/output models that aim to link structural board variables to firm performance 
(Bammens et al., 2011; Chrisman, Kellermanns, Chan, & Liano, 2010). 
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The paper links to the conceptual model on board task needs by focusing on one 
of the ownership stages, namely the controlling owner stage. The conceptual 
model proposes that the need for board control in these firms should typically be 
lower than the need for board control in the other ownership stages because of 
lower ownership dispersion. The empirical study outlines that although the relative 
need may be lower, there remains a certain necessity for board control, which is 
driven by the likely presence of controlling owner self-control problems. 
The paper has been accepted for publication in Corporate Ownership and Control 
(VHB-Jourqual 3: “C”) in November 2016, after successfully passing the review 
and feedback process. The paper is published in Volume 14: 2017. An earlier ver-
sion of this paper was presented in October 2016 at the 20th Annual Interdiscipli-
nary Conference on Entrepreneurship, Innovation, and SMEs (G-Forum) in Leipzig 
after successfully passing a double-blind review process. G-Forum is Germany’s 
largest entrepreneurship and innovation conference. Moreover, the paper was 
presented at the International Conference on Reporting, Investor Relations, Capi-
tal Markets – Challenges and Opportunities in Financial Communication in Leipzig 
in November 2016. 
Stephan Stubner has co-authored the paper. The author of this dissertation 
planned the research study, collected data through interviews, and analyzed the 
data. The co-authors drafted the manuscript in collaboration. Stephan Stubner fo-
cused on the structure and alignment of the paper to journal and conference 
standards and reviewed the manuscript language and content. The author of this 
dissertation drafted the content of the individual chapters, handled the journal 
submission process, and integrated reviewer feedback.  
Teaching Case Study ATB: Digital Disruption in the Manufacturing Industry 
The fourth paper deviates from the subject of the board of directors while remain-
ing focused on family SMEs. The teaching case study centers on the managerial 
challenge of the chief executive officer (CEO) of a small business that is subject to 
a potential disruptive innovation in the industry. 
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The subject of the case study is ATB, a small manufacturer of parking meters. The 
case study outlines the business model of the firm, which is focused on develop-
ing, producing, and selling physical parking meters, and provides an overview of 
the industry competitors. Subsequently, the case describes the potential threat to 
ATB from an increase in mobile parking providers. Mobile parking providers allow 
parking fees to be paid via smartphones, implying the potential obsolescence of 
parking meters. Typically, the new entrants to the industry also employ different 
business models. The teaching case confronts students with the question of 
whether and how ATB should react to the new technology and the associated new 
business models in the industry. Particularly, the case study provides students 
with learnings on disruptive innovation (Christensen, Raynor, & McDonald, 2015) 
and business models (Gilbert, Eyring, & Foster, 2012; Johnson, Christensen, & 
Kagermann, 2008), while providing the perspective of a small industry player. A 
teaching note complements the case study and provides guidance for instructors 
by suggesting possible assignment questions and reading material, preparing a 
teaching plan, and providing a case analysis. 
The case study contributes to management education by aiding instructors with 
the application of theoretical knowledge on disruptive innovation and business 
models by using a real-world example. Particularly, the case demonstrates that 
disruptive innovations are a potential threat not only to large firms but also to fami-
ly SMEs. These firms may be subject to specific resource constraints that hamper 
the application of general strategies in response to disruptive innovation, such as 
the acquisition of an entrant (Christensen et al., 2015). As a complement to the 
three research papers, the teaching case study illustrates the author’s ability to 
transfer academic research results to a format suitable for educational purposes.  
After several rounds of review and feedback, Ivey Publishing published the case 
study in October 2016 and subsequently promoted it as a featured new case in the 
strategy discipline. The case study is available for purchase by instructors world-
wide through Ivey’s online case database (www.iveycases.com) under product 
number 9B16M165. Stephan Stubner, the co-author, intends to use the case study 
in lectures for the Master of Science and MBA programs at HHL.  
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The author of this dissertation collected the required information for the case study 
through several interviews with the firm’s owner, analyzed the case, and drafted 
the manuscript. Moreover, the author of this dissertation incorporated the reviewer 
feedback from Ivey Publishing. Stephan Stubner contributed by creating the struc-
ture of the case study and by supporting the development of strategic alternatives 
as part of the teaching notes. 
In the following chapters, the four research papers are presented in their entirety. 
Subsequently, the dissertation and its contribution to the field are summarized and 
further avenues for future research based on the limitations of this dissertation are 
outlined. 
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2 Determinants of Boards in Family Firms: A Systematic Literature Review 
Research paper 1 
Author: Matthias Baumann 
 
 Abstract 2.1
The significant heterogeneity among family firms has emerged as a commonly 
accepted paradigm in the research field. This systematic literature review estab-
lishes how the heterogeneity affects the board of directors, an institution that typi-
cally forms the most important pillar in the formal governance system of family 
businesses. As one of the first, the review provides an overview on the family-
related factors that determine the board of directors’ tasks, composition, and pro-
cesses. The systematic analysis, clustering, and synthesis of previous research 
yields six main determinants that are specific to the boards of family firms, namely 
generational stage, family culture, family power, family experience, CEO family 
stakes, and director kinship ties. From a methodological perspective, a heavy reli-
ance on survey-based quantitative research can be observed in existing studies. 
For future research, I suggest stronger focus on the dynamic evolution of the 
board over time, an integration of alternative theories in addition to agency theory, 
as well as the use of qualitative research strategies, such as case study research, 
to understand the internal processes and evolution of family firm boards better. 
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 Introduction 2.2
Family ownership plays a major role in corporations worldwide (Astrachan & 
Shanker, 2003; Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000). Compared to publicly listed 
companies with a diverse shareholder structure, family firms place different de-
mands on their corporate governance system. The concentration of management 
and control in the hands of a limited number of family owners causes different 
agency conflicts and affects the firm’s resource requirements (Lane, Astrachan, 
Keyt, & McMillan, 2006). Thus, it is not surprising that the study of the board of 
directors, which often represents the most important aspect in the formal govern-
ance system of family firms, has emerged as a prominent topic (Bammens, Voor-
deckers, & Van Gils, 2011). 
Previous studies on boards in family firms often focus on analyzing the differences 
between family and non-family businesses (Chen & Nowland, 2010; Ward, 1988), 
thereby implicitly treating family firms as a homogenous group. However, the re-
sults of these studies indicate that the negligence of contextual factors can lead to 
ambiguous findings among the group of family firms. For instance, some authors 
found a positive relationship between the presence of outside directors on family 
firm boards and firm performance (Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Arosa, Iturralde, & 
Maseda, 2010), while other findings indicated the opposite (Klein, Shapiro, & 
Young, 2005). Considering that family businesses are a highly heterogeneous 
group with diverging interests and characteristics (Sharma, Chrisman, & Gersick, 
2012), these results may not be surprising. This literature review aims to address 
this heterogeneity and to provide an overview of the literature by focusing on dif-
ferences among the group of family firms. As Le Breton-Miller and Miller (2013, 
p. 1391) put it, these “differences […] are often as instructive as the general 
tendencies” among different types of organizations. The focus of this review is on 
the determinants of the board, since a clear understanding of the rationale behind 
different board designs can possibly contribute to explaining the mixed results in 
previous research (Jaskiewicz & Klein, 2007). Specifically, I answer the following 
research questions: 
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(1) Which family-related determinants underlying the composition, tasks, and 
processes of boards in family firms have been identified in previous litera-
ture? 
(2) What were the methods employed in generating the findings? 
(3) Which are the specific areas that deserve more attention for future re-
search? 
This review contributes to research on boards in family firms in three ways: First, 
compared to broader reviews on boards and corporate governance in family firms 
(Bammens et al., 2011; Siebels & zu Knyphausen-Aufseß, 2012), the review at 
hand specifically extracts the factors that distinguish family firms from one another. 
Thereby, focus shifts to the fact that one size does not fit all when it comes to fami-
ly firm boards (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004b). The restriction to a specific area of the 
board research, combined with a systematic approach in selecting the relevant 
articles, allows for a more comprehensive and in-depth examination of the litera-
ture. Second, the clustering and synthesis of the results provides researchers with 
an immediate overview of the important family determinants that need to be con-
sidered in future studies. Overall, six different family determinants are identified. 
Third, the literature review provides both broad-ranging and concrete suggestions 
for future research. It details specific areas that need to be filled in order to expand 
existing knowledge on family firms, and encourages future work in the field. 
The article proceeds as follows. The next section (2.3) provides a short summary 
of the main theories and board dimensions used in the research field. Subsequent-
ly, the research method that was used to identify the relevant articles on family-
related determinants is outlined in section 2.4. This is followed by a presentation of 
the findings in section 2.5. Section 2.6 provides a synthesis of the combined re-
sults for the family-related determinants. Finally, sections 2.7 and 2.8 detail areas 
for future research and conclude the literature review.  
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 Boards of Directors in Family Firms 2.3
2.3.1 Theoretical Background 
The following section briefly outlines the theories frequently employed during re-
search on boards in family firms: agency theory, stewardship theory, and the re-
source dependence theory (Bammens et al., 2011). The purpose is to provide a 
better understanding of the specific behavior of family firms and to lay the founda-
tion for the subsequent analysis of family-related determinants. 
Agency theory typically deals with the divergence of interests between managers 
and owners, i.e., managers following their own agenda rather than maximizing 
shareholder wealth (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In a family firm 
setting, the importance of the classical agency conflict may be lower due to the 
family’s high influence or representation in management (Arosa et al., 2010), yet 
other issues of moral hazard are likely to emerge and require control by the board 
of directors (Bammens et al., 2011). First, the high levels of power over the busi-
ness may allow the family to extract resources from the company at the expense 
of minority shareholders (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Possible mechanisms include 
excessive compensation for family members, exceptional dividend payments, or 
transactions with relatives that are not at arm’s length (Anderson & Reeb, 2004). 
Similarly, the pursuit of socio-emotional wealth (SEW) objectives (Berrone, Cruz, & 
Gomez-Mejia, 2012) may conflict with financial objectives and thus constitute an 
agency cost for minority shareholders (Arosa et al., 2010). Moreover, parental al-
truism may lead to a misallocation of company resources and unfavorable human 
resource practices (Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2004; Lubatkin, Schulze, Ling, & Dino, 
2005; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001). Parental altruism refers to the 
owner-managers’ willingness to privilege their descendants in the business, as 
well as the associated generosity with regard to incompetence, free-riding, or other 
wealth-diminishing activities of their children employed in the business (Schulze, 
Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003b). Finally, diverging interests among multiple family owners 
and the associated information asymmetries can cause additional agency issues 
in family firms (Bammens, Voordeckers, & Van Gils, 2008; Steier, 2001). 
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In contrast to agency theory, stewardship theory (Davis, Schoorman, & Don-
aldson, 1997) describes situations in which managers act in a pro-organizational 
manner and refrain from pursuing own interests that are detrimental to the share-
holders. This behavior can either be induced by high levels of intrinsic motivation 
of the manager (Manz, 1986) or by an environment of high organizational identifi-
cation and commitment to company goals (Albert, Ashforth, & Dutton, 2000). Such 
an environment can particularly be observed in family firms due to the importance 
of altruistic behavior, trust, emotional bonds, and family goals (Corbetta & Salvato, 
2004a). In situations of pro-organizational behavior, the board can focus on advis-
ing rather than controlling the management (Davis et al., 1997; Miller & Le Breton-
Miller, 2006). Stewardship theory can also be applied to the family’s relationship 
with minority shareholders. The strong identification of the family with the firm pos-
sibly makes family members act as stewards. Instead of trying to expropriate mi-
nority shareholders, they focus on the firm’s overall well-being and accordingly 
nominate and elect the board with suitable and competent candidates (Anderson 
& Reeb, 2004). 
Similarly, resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) is used to ra-
tionalize the advice function of the board. According to this theory, the access to 
and control of external resources are critical success factors for family firms. The 
board is seen as a means of gaining access to these resources (Fiegener, Brown, 
Dreux, IV, & Dennis, Jr, 2000a). For family firms in particular, the resources that 
are otherwise not available to the limited pool of family owners and managers are 
of high interest (Chen & Hsu, 2009).  
2.3.2 Board Dimensions 
Partly based on the theoretical perspectives, studies on boards in family firms typi-
cally focus on one or several board dimensions (Bammens et al., 2011). The fol-
lowing section shall provide an outline of the board dimensions that may be sub-
ject to family-related determinants. The purpose is to provide a framework for 
classifying and aggregating the findings of the literature review. 
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The first dimension, board tasks, frequently separates between control- and ad-
vice-related tasks of the board (Westphal, 1999). Board control is based on agen-
cy theory considerations and refers to the monitoring and disciplining of manage-
ment. Possible tasks for the directors include performance appraisals as well as 
the safeguarding of shareholder interests (Zahra & Pearce, II, 1989). Board ad-
vice, in contrast, highlights the supporting function of the board following argu-
ments from stewardship theory (Davis et al., 1997) and the resource dependence 
view (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Directors’ responsibilities include advising the 
management on strategy, establishing connections to external institutions, and 
providing support on intra-family conflicts (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004b; Voordeck-
ers, Van Gils, & Van den Heuvel, 2007). Occasionally, board mediation, i.e., the 
balancing of stakeholder interests (Bammens et al., 2008; Voordeckers et al., 
2007; Whisler, 1988), is mentioned as a separate board task in family firms. For 
the purpose of this literature review, I remain with the separation between board 
control and board advice because of the more prominent usage (Bammens et al., 
2011).  
Besides board tasks, the composition of the board is another common focus in 
research. In general, studies differentiate between family directors, affiliate direc-
tors (non-family, but dependent on the family or business), and outside directors 
(Jaskiewicz & Klein, 2007). Arguments based on agency theory typically favor 
larger boards with a higher ratio of outsiders that supervise the management. The 
independence of directors is expected to result in more objective judgments with 
regard to opportunistic behavior. In addition, outside directors can introduce new 
knowledge and networks (Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Corbetta & Salvato, 2004b; 
Gubitta & Gianecchini, 2002). In contrast, family directors and affiliate directors are 
supposed to be less suitable for control, but possess more firm-specific knowledge 
and demonstrate more commitment (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004a; Gubitta 
& Gianecchini, 2002; Jaskiewicz & Klein, 2007).  
The study of boards of directors has often been criticized for making “great infer-
ential leaps […] from input variables such as board composition to output variables 
such as board performance with no direct evidence on the processes and mecha-
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nisms which presumably link the inputs to the outputs” (Pettigrew, 1992, p. 171). 
The processes inside the board have therefore emerged as a third board dimen-
sion (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). The first process, effort norms, refers to the direc-
tors’ shared belief on how much effort each director is expected to contribute 
(Wageman, 1995). This includes the willingness to be attentive and participative 
during meetings, as well as adequate preparation for meetings (Forbes & Milliken, 
1999). The second process, cognitive conflict, refers to the level of disagreement 
on the tasks performed among the directors (Jehn, 1995). Cognitive conflict can 
be beneficial to board outcomes as it stimulates the consideration of different al-
ternatives and leads to a more critical investigation of management behavior 
(Forbes & Milliken, 1999). The third process, use of knowledge and skills, refers to 
the ability of the board to coordinate and make effective use of each director’s ex-
pertise. The integration of functional knowledge and firm-specific issues allow the 
board to execute its tasks more effectively (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). The following 
section will outline the research method used to identify the family determinants of 
board tasks, composition, and processes.  
 Research Method 2.4
This review follows the reference framework for systematic literature reviews as 
developed by Tranfield, Denyer, and Smart (2003). Thus, the review process is 
structured into three consecutive stages: (1) planning the review, (2) conducting 
the review, and (3) reporting and disseminating the insights. In applying these 
stages to the present study, previous high-quality reviews in the field of family 
businesses were used as references and for validation of the procedure (Hiebl, 
2013; Kontinen & Ojala, 2010; Mazzi, 2011; Suess, 2014).  
The first stage, planning the review, includes the identification of the need for the 
review, the development of a research question, as well as the construction of a 
brief overview of the main theories and concepts in the field (all stated in sections 
2.2 and 2.3). The first stage also requires the development of a review protocol to 
promote higher levels of objectivity and replicability (Tranfield et al., 2003). The 
review protocol explicitly outlines the steps undertaken as part of the search strat-
egy and the selection process for the articles.  
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First, a keyword search was conducted in six important databases for social sci-
ence research: EBSCO Business Source Complete, Scopus, Science Direct, 
PsycInfo, SocINDEX, and JSTOR.1 In order to be classified as relevant for the 
study, the articles had to include both a keyword on the family focus of the study 
(“family firm*” or “family business*” or “family compan*” or “family own*” or “family 
control*” or "family dominat*" or “family influence*”) and a keyword on the aspect of 
the board of directors ("board*" or "director*" or "chairman*"). The search was re-
stricted to peer-reviewed academic journals.2 Books and other forms of publication 
(e.g., conference papers) were excluded due to variability in the peer review pro-
cesses, and partly due to their limited availability (Jones, Coviello, & Tang, 2011). 
The initial keyword selection was based on the nature of the topic. To verify the 
appropriateness of the selected keywords, a manual scanning of all the abstracts 
of two journals was conducted. As suggested by Mazzi (2011) and Suess (2014), 
the Family Business Review and the Journal of Family Business Strategy were 
selected for the manual review, as they represent two of the most recognized jour-
nals in the field. The manual search verified the keyword selection outlined above. 
Second, a cross-referencing analysis was executed based on the preliminary se-
lection of articles. As the scanning of electronic databases often reveals only parts 
of the relevant literature (Randolph, 2009), the reference lists of the articles were 
screened for further relevant contributions. In addition, the Web of Science data-
base was used to identify articles citing the previous findings. 
The execution of the review, stage two, yielded a sample of 823 articles based on 
the database search. After eliminating duplicates, the titles and abstracts of the 
articles were scanned for relevance to the research question. In case of ambiguity, 
the articles were read in their entirety to verify their relevance to the review. The 
procedure resulted in a preliminary list of 16 articles. The subsequent application 
of the cross-referencing procedure revealed four additional articles, leading to a 
final sample of 20 articles that formed the basis of this literature review (see Table 
1). 
                                            
1
 The review includes all articles published until May 2015. 
2
 Peer-reviewed refers to all the journals that practice blind peer reviews, an editorial board peer 
review, or an expert peer review (EBSCO, 2014). 
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Table 1: Summary of the article selection process 
 
The third stage comprised of reporting insights from the review, as done in the 
sections that follow. First, the characteristics and methodologies of the articles are 
outlined on a meta-level, followed by a reporting of the article contents based on 
six clusters of family-related determinants: generational stage, family culture, fami-
ly power, family experience, CEO family stakes, and director kinship ties. The clus-
ters were developed in an iterative process. For this purpose, the main findings of 
each article were extracted and compiled in a comprehensive list (see Appendix, 
Table 12). Articles investigating similar variables were then combined to form pre-
liminary clusters. Subsequently, the remaining findings were assessed against the 
preliminary clusters and, depending on the degree of proximity in content, the 
scope of an existing cluster was extended or a new cluster was introduced. The 
process continued until all findings were allocated to non-overlapping clusters. In 
the selection of the cluster labels, reference to existing concepts was made as far 
as possible (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004b; Fiegener et al., 2000a; Gersick, Davis, 
McCollom Hampton, & Lansberg, 1997). It is necessary to point out that the review 
focused only on family-related determinants. Other factors that were found to in-
fluence the board such as firm size (Arnegger, Hofmann, Pull, & Vetter, 2014), firm 
diversification (Boone, Casares Field, Karpoff, & Raheja, 2007), and complexity of 
the business (Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2008) are not outlined, as they are not 
specific to family firms. 
 Findings on Family-Related Determinants 2.5
2.5.1 Article Characteristics and Methodologies 
As a first step, the articles were analyzed on a meta-level. Table 2 summarizes the 
bibliographical information of the 20 articles included in the review. As shown, the 
20 articles were published in 10 different academic journals, with the Family Busi-
Steps conducted in literature search Count of articles
Keyword-based database search 823
Automatic removal of duplicates by the database -145
Deselection of unambiguous articles based on tilte and abstract -641
Deselection of articles based on in-depth analysis of full article -21
Preliminary list of articles after database search 16
Execution of cross-referencing procedure based on preliminary list +4
Final list of selected articles 20
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ness Review and the Journal of Small Business Management being the most 
prominent outlets. This finding is in line with the journals’ high publication rates on 
family business articles (Debicki, Matherne, III, Kellermanns, & Chrisman, 2009). 
Most of the articles (75%) were published from 2002 onwards, while the publica-
tion frequency over the years shows a rather constant, yet not increasing, interest 
in the topic. Furthermore, the authorship across the articles is rather equally dis-
tributed, with only 8 of the 42 authors being involved in two articles and no author 
publishing more than twice.  
Table 2: Article distribution by journal and year 
 
Systematic literature reviews generally require a quality assessment of the studies 
during the selection process. In management research, the quality rating of the 
journal is often used as a substitute for a more in-depth analysis of the primary 
data, which is mostly not readily available (Tranfield et al., 2003). All articles in-
cluded in the review have a minimum rating of C according to the “Jourqual 3” 
ranking of the German Academic Association for Business Research (2015), 
thereby reflecting a sound level of academic rigor (see Table 2). The majority of 
the articles (85%) were published in a journal with a ranking of B and higher. 
The most commonly applied theoretical perspectives in the articles were agency 
theory (13 articles), stewardship theory (5 articles), and resource dependence the-
ory (4 articles). Approximately one-third of the articles (30%) did not make explicit 
references to any theory; these are mainly articles with an earlier publication date 
(see Table 3). In section 2.7, the implications of the theoretical focus on agency 
theory will be reflected on with regard to future research. 
Journal title Jourqual 3 1988 1991 1998 2000 2002 2004 2005 2007 2008 2010 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total
ranking
Administrative Science Quaterly   A+ 1 1
Corporate Governance: An International Review C 1 1 2
Entrepreneurship & Regional Development B 1 1 2
Entrepreneurship: Theory & Practice A 1 1 2
Family Business Review B 1 1 1 1 4
Journal of Banking & Finance A 1 1
Journal of Business Research B 1 1
Journal of Family Business Strategy C 1 1
Journal of Small Business Management B 1 1 1 1 4
Small Business Economics B 1 1 2
Total 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 20
Source of rankings: German Academic Association for Business Research (2015)
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Table 3: Overview on references to theory 
 
To answer the second research question on the methods that were used in gener-
ating the findings on family determinants, Table 4 presents a typology of the re-
viewed articles based on the research design. The majority of the articles followed 
a quantitative approach (17), while the remaining three articles were conceptual 
and did not include an empirical verification. None of the identified articles made 
use of a qualitative research design, such as case study methodology or inter-
views. The most prominent form of data collection was by survey. In fact, 14 stud-
ies relied on survey results that were generally based on the written responses of 
the companies’ chief executive officers (CEOs). Only the study of Zona (2015) 
tried to counteract possible single respondent biases (Huber & Power, 1985) by 
collecting data from both the CEO and the chairman. Surprisingly, the study was 
also the only one collecting data from a member of the board itself.3 The remaining 
three empirical articles relied on publicly available information from databases and 
company reports. The heavy reliance on surveys, conducted at a single point in 
time, also explains the low frequency of longitudinal research (two articles). 
                                            
3
 Not considering the possibility of the CEO simultaneously serving on the board in other studies.  
Author mentioned applied mentioned applied mentioned applied Further theory references
Anderson and Reeb (2004)    
Bammens et al. (2008)   Resource-based view
Chen and Nowland (2010)  
Collin and Ahlberg (2012)    Evolutionary psychology
Corbetta and Salvato (2004b)       Stakeholder theory, Network theory
Fiegener et al. (2000a)    
Fiegener et al. (2000b)    
Gnan et al. (2015)     
Jaskiewicz and Klein (2007)     
Le Breton-Miller and Miller (2013)
Leon-Guerrero et al. (1998)
Nordqvist et al. (2014)    
Pieper et al. (2008)    
Schwartz and Barnes (1991)
Van den Berghe and Carchon (2002)
Voordeckers et al. (2007)     Network theory
Ward and Handy (1988)
Westhead et al. (2002)
Yeh and Woidtke (2005)  
Zona (2015)  
Agency theory Stewardship theory Resource dependence theory
Determinants of Boards in Family Firms: A Systematic Literature Review 
26 
 
T
a
b
le
 4
: 
S
u
m
m
a
ry
 o
f 
th
e
 r
e
s
e
a
rc
h
 d
e
s
ig
n
s
 e
m
p
lo
y
e
d
 
 
S
a
m
p
le
 s
iz
e
C
o
u
n
tr
y 
o
f 
A
u
th
o
r 
(y
e
a
r)
Q
u
a
n
tit
a
tiv
e
C
o
n
c
e
p
tu
a
l
D
a
ta
b
a
s
e
S
u
rv
e
y
(f
ir
m
s
)
re
s
e
a
rc
h
Y
e
a
r
C
ro
s
s
-s
e
c
tio
n
a
l
L
o
n
g
itu
d
in
a
l
P
u
b
lic
y 
lis
te
d
P
ri
va
te
ly
 h
e
ld
n
o
t 
s
p
e
c
ifi
e
d
F
ir
m
 s
iz
e
a
In
fo
rm
a
n
t
A
n
d
e
rs
o
n
 a
n
d
 R
e
e
b
 (
2
0
0
4
)


4
0
3
U
S
A
1
9
9
2
-1
9
9
9


L
B
a
m
m
e
n
s
 e
t 
a
l. 
(2
0
0
8
)


2
8
6
B
e
lg
iu
m
2
0
0
2
/2
0
0
3


S
M
L
C
E
O
C
h
e
n
 a
n
d
 N
o
w
la
n
d
 (
2
0
1
0
)


1
8
5
H
K
, 
M
Y
, 
T
W
, 
S
G
b
1
9
9
8
-2
0
0
4


S
M
L
C
o
lli
n
 a
n
d
 A
h
lb
e
rg
 (
2
0
1
2
)


6
8
S
w
e
d
e
n
2
0
1
0


S
M
L
n
.a
.
C
o
rb
e
tt
a
 a
n
d
 S
a
lv
a
to
 (
2
0
0
4
b
)

F
ie
g
e
n
e
r 
e
t 
a
l. 
(2
0
0
0
a
)


2
3
6
5
U
S
A
1
9
9
5


S
M
C
E
O
F
ie
g
e
n
e
r 
e
t 
a
l. 
(2
0
0
0
b
)


3
0
7
0
U
S
A
1
9
9
5


S
M
C
E
O
G
n
a
n
 e
t 
a
l. 
(2
0
1
5
)


2
4
3
Ita
ly
2
0
0
0
/2
0
0
1


S
M
C
E
O
/ 
to
p
 e
xe
c
u
tiv
e
Ja
s
ki
e
w
ic
z
 a
n
d
 K
le
in
 (
2
0
0
7
)


3
5
1
G
e
rm
a
n
y
2
0
0
2


S
M
L
O
w
n
e
r
L
e
 B
re
to
n
-M
ill
e
r 
a
n
d
 M
ill
e
r 
(2
0
1
3
)

L
e
o
n
-G
u
e
rr
e
ro
 e
t 
a
l. 
(1
9
9
8
)


2
3
1
U
S
A
n
.a
.


S
M
L
M
a
n
a
g
e
r/
 o
w
n
e
r
N
o
rd
q
vi
s
t 
e
t 
a
l. 
(2
0
1
4
)

P
ie
p
e
r 
e
t 
a
l. 
(2
0
0
8
)


7
1
4
G
e
rm
a
n
y
2
0
0
2


S
M
L
n
.a
.
S
c
h
w
a
rt
z
 a
n
d
 B
a
rn
e
s
 (
1
9
9
1
)


2
6
2
U
S
A
n
.a
.


S
M
L
C
E
O
V
a
n
 d
e
n
 B
e
rg
h
e
 a
n
d
 C
a
rc
h
o
n
 (
2
0
0
2
)


3
2
5
B
e
lg
iu
m
n
.a
.


S
M
n
.a
.
V
o
o
rd
e
c
ke
rs
 e
t 
a
l. 
(2
0
0
7
)


2
1
1
B
e
lg
iu
m
2
0
0
3


S
M
C
E
O
W
a
rd
 a
n
d
 H
a
n
d
y 
(1
9
8
8
)


1
4
7
U
S
A
n
.a
.


S
M
L
n
.a
.
W
e
s
th
e
a
d
 e
t 
a
l. 
(2
0
0
2
)


2
7
2
U
n
ite
d
 K
in
g
d
o
m
1
9
9
5


S
M
L
n
.a
.
Y
e
h
 a
n
d
 W
o
id
tk
e
 (
2
0
0
5
)


2
5
1
T
a
iw
a
n
1
9
9
8


S
M
L
Z
o
n
a
 (
2
0
1
5
)


7
4
Ita
ly
2
0
0
9


L
C
E
O
 a
n
d
 c
h
a
ir
m
a
n
n
.a
. 
=
 n
o
t 
a
va
ila
b
le
a
 S
 =
 s
m
a
ll,
 M
 =
 m
e
d
iu
m
-s
iz
e
d
, 
L
 =
 la
rg
e
 (
a
c
c
o
rd
in
g
 t
o
 E
u
ro
p
e
a
n
 C
o
m
m
is
s
io
n
 (
2
0
0
3
),
 if
 n
o
t 
d
e
fin
e
d
 d
iff
e
re
n
tly
 b
y 
a
u
th
o
rs
; 
S
M
L
 in
 c
a
s
e
 o
f 
n
o
 r
e
s
tr
ic
tio
n
s
/ 
in
fo
rm
a
tio
n
)
b
 H
K
 =
 H
o
n
g
 K
o
n
g
, 
M
Y
 =
 M
a
la
ys
ia
, 
T
W
 =
 T
a
iw
a
n
, 
S
G
 =
 S
in
g
a
p
o
re
T
im
e
 f
ra
m
e
T
yp
e
 o
f 
s
a
m
p
le
 f
ir
m
s
D
a
ta
 c
o
lle
c
tio
n
A
rt
ic
le
 t
yp
e
Determinants of Boards in Family Firms: A Systematic Literature Review 
27 
 
Most frequently, data were gathered from the USA (six times) and Belgium (three 
times). Only two studies (Chen & Nowland, 2010; Yeh & Woidtke, 2005) relied on 
data from countries that are generally classified as emerging economies. Overall, 
data were collected from 10 different countries. As the legal framework and the 
national culture influence the design of the board (Corbetta & Montemerlo, 1999; 
Li & Harrison, 2008), the comparison of the findings should be executed with cau-
tion, particularly when tabulating differences between articles studying one-tier 
versus two-tier systems. However, preceding studies are able to argue for trans-
ferability of the results or (at least) of the general tendencies (Arnegger et al., 
2014). Regarding firm size and listing status of analyzed companies, in the first 
place, many authors did not clearly specify the characteristics of firms included in 
their study or impose restrictions on certain firm characteristics. Based on the 
available information, five studies clearly focus on small and medium-sized enter-
prises while two focused on large firms. The three articles relying on database in-
formation focused on publicly listed firms only, possibly due to better data availa-
bility. In general, a more detailed account of the sample characteristics may be 
useful in allowing for a better classification of the research results and in paying 
tribute to the high relevance of contextual factors (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004b; 
Ward & Handy, 1988).  
The implications of the methodological analysis for future research are outlined in 
section 2.7. Prior to that, the findings on the content of the articles are summarized 
in the following paragraphs according to the six identified clusters. 
2.5.2 Generational Stage 
The first cluster of papers explains the differences in the design of the board of 
directors based on the generational stage of the business. Generational stage re-
fers to the generation that controls and manages the business (Sciascia, Mazzola, 
& Kellermanns, 2014). Later generational stages are typically characterized by a 
higher degree of ownership dispersion (Nordqvist, Sharma, & Chirico, 2014). Ac-
cording to Gersick et al. (1997), three main stages in the lifecycle of a family busi-
ness can be distinguished, namely controlling owner (often first generation), sibling 
partnership (often second generation), and cousin consortium (third and later gen-
Determinants of Boards in Family Firms: A Systematic Literature Review 
28 
 
eration). Each stage is characterized by a different set of family attributes that in 
turn determines the governance needs of the business (Bammens et al., 2008). 
The literature review identified 11 articles that provided findings on the generation-
al influence on the board. Table 5 summarizes the research results for each board 
dimension. 
Table 5: Impact of generational stages on the board 
 
Nordqvist et al. (2014) argued that a board might not be necessary when the busi-
ness is managed by the controlling owner, as limited agency conflicts exist and 
informal structures can be used to seek advice. With regard to the tasks of the 
board, Bammens et al. (2008) found partial support for an increasing need for 
board control over generations. The increase is attributed to changes in the level 
of trust and task conflict. Due to fewer social interactions and looser relationships 
among family members over generations (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; 
Effect of higher
Board dimension generational stage Count Finding Author
Board existence Positive 1 Higher need/usage of board in later generational stages with Nordqvist et al. (2014)
lower levels of family involvement in managementa
Board tasks
Board control Positive 2 Higher in case of no dominant individual shareholder Van den Berghe and Carchon (2002)
Need increases over generations Bammens et al. (2008)
Board advice Convex 1 Need lower in 2nd generation (convex evolution) Bammens et al. (2008)
Board composition
Board size Positive 2 Larger in multi-generation companies Westhead et al. (2002)
Larger in case of no dominant individual shareholder Van den Berghe and Carchon (2002)
CEO duality Ambiguous 1 Higher likelihood in second generation family firms. Higher Van den Berghe and Carchon (2002)
likelihood in case of a dominant shareholder
Family directors Positive 4 Increase in number over generations Bammens et al. (2008)
Higher proportion in multi-generation firms Fiegener et al. (2000a)
Increase of family and mixed boards over generations Leon-Guerrero et al. (1998)
Higher ratio in case of no dominant individual shareholder; Van den Berghe and Carchon (2002)
higher ratio in 3rd generation
Other 1 Commited family members at beginning; representation Le Breton-Miller and Miller (2013)
of each family fraction in later generational stagesa
Outside directors Positive 4 Higher likelihood in 3rd or 4th generation Ward and Handy (1988)
Higher likelihood in 4th and subsequent generations Schwartz and Barnes (1991)
Higher likelihood in multi-generation firms Westhead et al. (2002)
Higher need in later generational stages with lower levels of Nordqvist et al. (2014)
family involvement in managementa
Negative 1 Lower ratio in case of no dominant individual shareholder Van den Berghe and Carchon (2002)
Convex 2 Lower likelhood in 2nd generation (convex evolution) Voordeckers et al. (2007)
Lower likelihood in 2nd generation (convex evolution) Bammens et al. (2008)
Other 2 Higher likelihood in case of nearing generational transition Voordeckers et al. (2007)
Experts at the beginning; increasing need for experienced, Le Breton-Miller and Miller (2013)
high-status, outsiders over generationsa
Board processes
Cognitive conflict Concave 1 Highest in sibling partnership stage (concave evolution) Zona (2015)
Use of knowledge Convex 1 Lowest in sibling partnership stage (convex evolution) Zona (2015)
and skills
a Finding based on conceptual article. No empirical verification.
Note: Dominant shareholder (one person owns more than 50%) interpreted as controlling owner stage.
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Steier, 2001), trust is argued to decrease and give way to conflicts over the equal 
representation of shareholder interests, which may in turn call for board control. In 
line with this result, Van den Berghe and Carchon (2002) proved that control is 
higher when ownership is shared rather equally among multiple owners. 
With regard to the need for advice from the board, Bammens et al. (2008) found a 
convex evolution (decrease in second generation, followed by a subsequent in-
crease). The authors argued that second generation family firms possess more 
family experience, i.e., tacit knowledge about the business due to the succession 
process (Astrachan, Klein, & Smyrnios, 2002), and thus have a lower demand for 
board advice. In third generation firms, the effect of family experience is assumed 
to be overcompensated by increasing levels of task conflict, as disagreements on 
goals and strategies among family members intensify (Kellermanns & Eddleston, 
2004), and require the board to act as an arbitrator. 
Most of the articles focused on the composition of the board. Two articles sug-
gested that the size of the board increases in later generations, possibly to deal 
with increased complexity (Van den Berghe & Carchon, 2002; Westhead, 
Howorth, & Cowling, 2002). Regarding the representation of family members on 
the board, most of the articles indicated an increase in number, respectively in ra-
tio, over the generations (Bammens et al., 2008; Fiegener et al., 2000a; Leon-
Guerrero, McCann, III, & Haley, Jr., 1998; Van den Berghe & Carchon, 2002). The 
main argument employed is the family’s desire to represent each family branch on 
the board to ensure fairness (Bammens et al., 2008; Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 
2013). Nevertheless, committed family members can also be valuable during the 
early stages of the business by providing the founder with resources and advice 
(Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2013). For sibling partnerships, senior family members 
on the board can help to reduce tensions (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2013). 
The picture on the inclusion of outside directors on the board is also fairly con-
sistent. Four studies supported the view that either the need for outside directors 
(Nordqvist et al., 2014) or the actual likelihood of an outside director increases 
over the generational stages (Schwartz & Barnes, 1991; Ward & Handy, 1988; 
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Westhead et al., 2002). In contrast, one study indicated a possible contrary rela-
tionship (Van den Berghe & Carchon, 2002). Nordqvist et al. (2014) claimed that in 
the controlling owner stage, the board may not be required to include external di-
rectors or exist at all as it serves mainly to enforce the controlling owner’s will. As 
the family moves on to a sibling partnership, a mixture of internal and external di-
rectors is recommended to deal with possible conflicts among owners and manag-
ers. Finally, the authors stressed the high importance of outsiders in the cousin 
consortium stage, as principal-principal conflicts could gain further relevance, 
thereby requiring mediating powers. Across all generational stages, a configura-
tion approach (Meyer, Tsui, & Hinings, 1993) that also considers the level of family 
involvement is suggested. Higher family involvement is generally linked to a lower 
need for outside directors (Nordqvist et al., 2014). Westhead et al. (2002) inter-
preted the greater likelihood of outside directors in later generational stages as a 
sign of better management, as non-executive directors are supposed to be able to 
offer more objective advice to the board (Fiegener et al., 2000a). In line with their 
results on board advice, Bammens et al. (2008) found a convex evolution for the 
likelihood of outside directors, explained by the higher levels of family experience 
in second generation firms that substitute for external knowledge and objective 
expertise from outsiders (Bammens et al., 2011; Johannisson & Huse, 2000). 
Likewise, Voordeckers et al. (2007) found that second generation firms are less 
likely to have an outside board. The authors also noted that a nearing generational 
transition increases the likelihood for an outside board. From a theoretical per-
spective, the nearing succession may lead to a power struggle among family 
members (Barnes & Hershon, 1994). In such a scenario, outside directors can be 
a suitable means of improving the board’s ability to arbitrate among the owners 
(Whisler, 1988).  
Le Breton-Miller and Miller (2013) provided a further perspective on outsiders by 
focusing on their backgrounds. They argued that family firms in different genera-
tional stages follow different socio-emotional wealth priorities (Berrone et al., 
2012), and thus have different requirements on the directors’ background. At the 
founder stage, they recommended experts and other small entrepreneurs on the 
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board to overcome the liability of newness (Miller & Friesen, 1984) and to support 
the founder’s will to pass the business on to the next generation. After the first 
succession, the authors proposed to include directors with good connections to the 
community to grow the business. For the cousin consortium stage, Le Breton-
Miller and Miller (2013) recommended to balance family representation with high-
status and experienced outsiders who can help the business to manage both ad-
ministrative and intra-family challenges that result from multiple owners with pos-
sibly diverging financial and socio-emotional wealth priorities. 
The literature review has identified only one article that investigated the impact of 
the family on board processes. Zona (2015) demonstrated how the processes on 
the board differ across the generational stages. He found that cognitive conflict is 
highest and the use of knowledge and skills is lowest, when board ownership re-
flects a sibling partnership. In the sibling partnership stage, the likelihood for cogni-
tive conflict is argued to be highest, as different (family) parties may possess di-
verging interests and are willing to openly express their disagreements. The re-
duced level of trust in this stage is supposed to affect the use of knowledge and 
skills negatively, as the willingness to cooperate and freely share all available in-
formation is reduced (Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003a). As the family business 
moves on to a cousin consortium, the potential for conflict is argued to decrease 
again, as the ownership situation rather mirrors that of institutional investors who 
follow aligned goals. Consequently, the potential for conflict reduces when direc-
tors are willing to cooperate further and share their expertise (Schulze et al., 
2003a).  
In summary, the articles outlined above demonstrated that the generational stage 
has a significant impact on nearly all aspects of the board. However, it needs to be 
noted that only four studies put the generational influence at the forefront of their 
research and reflect extensively on their findings and propositions (Bammens et 
al., 2008; Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2013; Nordqvist et al., 2014; Zona, 2015). Of 
these four studies, only two are empirical. Several of the studies included findings 
on the generation, without providing an (elaborate) theoretical explanation 
(Schwartz & Barnes, 1991; Ward & Handy, 1988). In order to gain robust results 
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on how the board evolves, further work is necessary (see section 2.7 on future 
research). 
2.5.3 Family Culture 
The second cluster of articles puts family culture at the forefront. Family culture is 
an important pillar in the relational governance system of family firms, and de-
scribes the value overlap between family and business, as well as the family’s 
commitment to the business (Astrachan et al., 2002; Pieper, Klein, & Jaskiewicz, 
2008). Family firms have the option to choose between contractual and relational 
governance mechanisms. Contractual governance refers to the use of formal 
mechanisms such as the board of directors to deal with agency conflicts between 
owners and managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). On the other hand, relational 
governance can act as an alternative measure to control the management and is 
based on social interactions and a shared vision among the family members (Mus-
takallio, Autio, & Zahra, 2002). Table 6 summarizes the research findings on family 
culture from the five articles identified in the literature review. 
Table 6: Impact of family culture on the board 
 
Pieper et al. (2008) investigated the decision to establish a board and found sup-
port for the substitution hypothesis between contractual and relational governance. 
Under high levels of family culture (Astrachan et al., 2002), used as a proxy for 
goal alignment between owners and managers, the likelihood for the existence of 
a board was found to be lower. Up to a certain level of complexity, family firms 
thus seem to be able to replace the often more costly formal control mechanism 
with social control. The adoption of a board of directors may thus not be recom-
Effect of higher
Board dimension family culture Count Finding Author
Board existence Negative 1 Lower likelihood for firms with high levels of family culture Pieper et al. (2008)
Board tasks
Board control Negative 2 Lower in case of persence of a family council Gnan et al. (2015)
Lower need in case of higher family culturea Corbetta and Salvato (2004b)
Board composition
Board size Negative 1 Smaller with increasing levels of family culture Jaskiewicz and Klein (2007)
CEO duality Positive Lower need for separation in case of higher family culturea Corbetta and Salvato (2004b)
Affiliate directors Positive 1 Increasing ratio with increasing levels of family culture Jaskiewicz and Klein (2007)
Outside directors Negative 3 Decreasing ratio with increasing family culture Jaskiewicz and Klein (2007)
Lower likelihood if focus on family-related objectives Voordeckers et al. (2007)
Lower need in case of higher family culturea Corbetta and Salvato (2004b)
a Finding based on conceptual article. No empirical verification.
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mendable for all family firms, particularly when adequate alternative social control 
mechanisms are available (Pieper et al., 2008). Going further, the use of formal 
control mechanisms may even be detrimental to the agent’s performance as it may 
be a sign of distrust (Falk & Kosfeld, 2006).  
Regarding the tasks of the board, two articles indicated that the need for board 
control (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004b) or the actual level of control (Gnan, Mon-
temerlo, & Huse, 2015) are lower in cases where family culture is more pro-
nounced. Corbetta and Salvato (2004b) argued that a strong family culture reduc-
es agency conflicts between owners and managers, and thereby lowers the re-
quirement for control. Gnan et al. (2015) highlighted the importance of family gov-
ernance institutions like the family council in lowering the board’s monitoring du-
ties. The family council is supposed to strengthen social interactions, unity, and 
commitment among family members (Mustakallio et al., 2002; Suess, 2014), re-
placing the need for more formal control via the board (Gnan et al., 2015).  
The four articles that provided findings on the impact of family culture on board 
composition showed a consistent picture. With increasing family culture, the board 
is supposed to be smaller (Jaskiewicz & Klein, 2007), demonstrate a higher ac-
ceptance of CEO duality (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004b), include more affiliate direc-
tors (Jaskiewicz & Klein, 2007), and show a lower reliance on outside directors 
(Corbetta & Salvato, 2004b; Jaskiewicz & Klein, 2007; Voordeckers et al., 2007). 
As family culture partly substitutes for the functions of the board, a smaller board 
size is argued to be sufficient (Jaskiewicz & Klein, 2007). Moreover, affiliate direc-
tors may be preferred as they receive more trust from the family due to their exist-
ing business relationship with the firm (Jaskiewicz & Klein, 2007). In contrast, the 
monitoring function of outside directors and the independence of the chairman do 
not seem to be in demand as the agency conflicts are supposedly lower (Corbetta 
& Salvato, 2004b; Jaskiewicz & Klein, 2007), and the substituting effect of family 
culture may mitigate the potential negative effects of dependent boards (Corbetta 
& Salvato, 2004b). Voordeckers et al. (2007) demonstrated that the prevalence of 
family-related objectives, such as family harmony and family employment (Shar-
ma, Chrisman, & Chua, 1997), over business-related objectives, such as profit 
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maximization and growth, decreases the likelihood for outside boards. In other 
words, the culture and harmony within the family seem to lower the preference for 
outside involvement.  
In summary, the five articles in this cluster underline the observation that family 
culture is an important factor to consider in board research. High levels of family 
culture have the potential to substitute the board or at least lower the necessity for 
outside directors and a larger board size. Due to the impact on the governance 
system, the results also confirm the importance of family culture as an element to 
categorize family firms in general (Astrachan et al., 2002).  
2.5.4 Family Power 
As demonstrated in section 2.3, the relationship to minority shareholders is an im-
portant driver of agency problems in family firms (Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Arosa 
et al., 2010; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Depending on the control and incentive 
structures, the controlling family may either be inclined to increase wealth for all 
involved shareholders or try to seek their own personal benefits at the expense of 
minority parties (Chen & Nowland, 2010; Yeh & Woidtke, 2005). The literature re-
view has identified five articles that investigated the relationship between family 
power, i.e., the level of family influence in ownership and management (Astrachan 
et al., 2002), and the board design (see Table 7). 
Table 7: Impact of family power on the board 
 
Effect of higher
Board dimension family power Count Finding Author
Board tasks
Board control Ambiguous 1 Need is higher when family has excess control rights. Need Chen and Nowland (2010)
is lower for higher levels of family ownership and family
involvement in the business.a
Board composition
Board size Negative 1 Smaller boards with higher levels of family powerb Corbetta and Salvato (2004b)
CEO duality Positive 1 Higher likelihood with increasing family powerb Corbetta and Salvato (2004b)
Family directors Positive 1 Higher ratio for higher levels of excess control rights. Effect Yeh and Woidtke (2005)
offset by higher levels of family ownership.
Outside directors Negative 3 Lower ratio in case of family member presence on the Anderson and Reeb (2004)
nominating committee
Lower ratio and diversity with increasing family powerb Corbetta and Salvato (2004b)
Lower likelihood with decreasing minority ownership Fiegener et al. (2000b)
a Need is evaluated based on the performance-maximising level of board control.
b Finding based on conceptual article. No empirical verification.
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Since minority shareholders mostly follow financial objectives, Chen and Nowland 
(2010) found that the need for board control decreases with higher levels of family 
ownership and family involvement in management. On the one hand, greater lev-
els of family ownership are expected to align the interests of the family and minori-
ty owners, thereby lowering the need for board control to deal with principal-
principal conflicts. On the other hand, family members in the business are argued 
to exercise control tasks and thereby mitigate the need for management control 
through the board. However, the authors also found a higher need for board con-
trol with increasing family power, in case the power is due to excess control rights 
(higher control than cash flow rights). In such a situation, the family is supposed to 
have higher incentives to exploit minority shareholders, increasing the need for 
board control from the perspective of minority shareholders. 
With regard to board composition, more family power is claimed to lead to smaller 
boards (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004b), a higher likelihood for CEO duality (Corbetta 
& Salvato, 2004b), a higher ratio of family directors (Yeh & Woidtke, 2005), and 
less outside director involvement (Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Corbetta & Salvato, 
2004b; Fiegener, Brown, Dreux, IV, & Dennis, Jr, 2000b). Corbetta and Salvato 
(2004b) argued that higher family power reduces the need for large and independ-
ent boards, as agency costs are supposed to be low due to a lack of goal conflict 
or diverging interest between owners and managers. The agency costs of minority 
owners are not considered in the article. In the presence of minority owners, Yeh 
and Woidtke (2005) provided evidence that families with excess control rights em-
ploy a higher ratio of family directors, possibly to expropriate minority owners. 
However, a higher level of family ownership offsets this effect. In another study, 
Anderson and Reeb (2004) demonstrated that families use their power in the nom-
inating committee to select less independent directors, supposedly to maintain 
control and discretion over the company’s resources. In contrast, minority owners 
with larger proportions of ownership were found to successfully pressure the man-
agement to add outside directors to the board to protect their financial interests 
(Fiegener et al., 2000b).  
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The articles underline that the level of family power influences the composition and 
functions of the board. In general, higher levels of family power lead to more de-
pendent boards, which supposedly exercise less control. As the study by Chen 
and Nowland (2010) demonstrated, this development may not be desirable for mi-
nority shareholders, in particular, when the family possesses excess control rights. 
The origin of family power thus plays an important role in determining its effect on 
the board. However, it should be noted that many of the studies in the literature 
review used family power as a measure to distinguish family and non-family firms, 
but did not use it further to explain the phenomenon of intra-family heterogeneity of 
the boards. 
2.5.5 Family Experience 
A further line of research highlights the influence of family experience on the board 
of directors. Family experience describes the tacit organizational knowledge that 
families accumulate during the evolution of the business (Astrachan et al., 2002; 
Bammens et al., 2008). Astrachan et al. (2002) suggested that the succession 
process and the number of working family members are the main drivers for family 
experience. The underlying rationale is that the discussions and the knowledge 
exchange among the involved family members foster the creation of business 
knowledge. The literature review has identified three articles that included aspects 
on family experience (see Table 8), though none of the articles focused on family 
experience as the main research object.  
Table 8: Impact of family experience on the board 
  
As outlined in the section on generational influence, Bammens et al. (2008) ex-
plained their finding of lower demand for board advice in second-generation firms 
Effect of higher
Board dimension family experience Count Finding Author
Board tasks
Board advice Negative 1 Lower need in 2nd generation (argued with family experience) Bammens et al. (2008)
Board composition
Board size Negative 1 Lower need for large board in case of higher family experiencea Corbetta and Salvato (2004b)
Outside directors Negative 2 Lower likelihood in case of more working family members Voordeckers et al. (2007)
Lower need for director diversity in case of higher family experiencea Corbetta and Salvato (2004b)
a Finding based on conceptual article. No empirical verification.
Note: None of the studies provided a direct measurement of family experience. 
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with increased level of family experience. The conceptual paper by Corbetta and 
Salvato (2004b) proposed that family experience positively affects the board’s ef-
fectiveness. In particular, the resource provision function of the board is argued to 
be more effective due to enhanced interactions between directors and competent 
family members. Consequently, higher levels of family experience are supposed to 
reduce the requirement for larger boards with more active and diverse directors. 
Thereby, family experience may (partly) compensate for family firms’ tendency to 
employ smaller and more homogenous boards. Similarly, Voordeckers et al. 
(2007) used the argument of family experience to explain their finding of a lower 
likelihood for outside boards in second-generation firms. Moreover, Voordeckers et 
al. (2007) found a negative relationship between the number of working family 
members and the likelihood of non-family directors. It is speculated that more 
working family members contribute to a higher internal knowledge base, which 
reduces the need for advice from outside directors. 
In conclusion, the three articles indicated a high likelihood that family experience 
affects the composition and tasks of the board. So far, however, no direct meas-
urement on the level of business knowledge in the family has been employed. The 
construct of family experience thus mainly provides a theoretical rationale to ex-
plain the results of the empirical studies on boards in family firms. Future research 
may want to utilize a more direct measurement to verify the assumed relation-
ships. 
2.5.6 CEO Family Stakes 
The determinants described in the previous sections deal with the characteristics 
of the entire family. In contrast, the following cluster of two papers focuses on a 
single individual, namely the CEO. Particularly for small firms, CEOs are often 
granted extensive influence over organizational outcomes and the structure of 
their firms’ governance systems (Castaldi & Wortman, Jr, 1984; Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1990). Consequently, the characteristics of the CEO and, in par-
ticular, his relationship to the family plays an important role in the composition of 
the board (Fiegener et al., 2000a, 2000b). Table 9 provides an overview of the 
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findings with regard to the family stakes of the CEO, that is, his embeddedness in 
the family and family business. 
Table 9: Impact of CEO’s family stakes on the board 
 
As the main authors on the topic, Fiegener et al. (2000a) highlighted the signifi-
cance of the CEO’s interests, which he may be able to assert directly or indirectly 
in the nomination process for new directors. On one hand, it can be reasonably 
assumed that the CEO is interested in directors who provide him with adequate 
advice and resources (Zahra & Pearce, II, 1989). On the other hand, the CEO may 
want to avoid directors who are inclined to exercise abundant control and restrict 
his managerial discretion (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). Depending on how 
strongly the conflicting interests are pronounced, the CEO may favor a different 
board composition. 
Regarding board size, the study by Fiegener et al. (2000a) provided mixed results 
on the impact of the CEO’s family stakes, with two of the measured variables 
showing a positive relationship to board size, and two variables showing the oppo-
site. On the one hand, it is argued that CEOs with close ties to the family prefer 
smaller boards to maintain the flexibility of following family goals besides business 
goals. In contrast, larger boards may be more equipped to deal with the increased 
complexity due to intra-family rivalries and the succession process. In summary, 
the impact of the CEO’s family stakes on board size cannot be clearly determined. 
In contrast, the finding on the board’s level of dependence is more consistent. With 
increasing ownership and family stakes, the involvement of family directors was 
observed to increase (Fiegener et al., 2000a), while the involvement of outside 
directors saw a decrease (Fiegener et al., 2000a, 2000b). Again, the willingness of 
the CEO to maintain his managerial discretion and follow family-related objectives 
Effect of CEO
Board dimension family stakes Count Finding Author
Board composition
Board size Ambiguous 1 Larger with more CEO relatives in the business and intention to Fiegener et al. (2000a)
pass the business to a family member. Smaller with increasing
ownership of CEO's relatives and family emergency CEO.
Family directors Positive 1 Higher ratio with increasing ownership and family stakes of the CEO Fiegener et al. (2000a)
and in case the CEO inherited the business
Outside directors Negative 2 Lower ratio with increasing ownership and family stakes of the CEO Fiegener et al. (2000a)
Lower likelihood if intention for intra-family transfer of leadership Fiegener et al. (2000b)
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is used as the main argument. In addition, a higher family ratio may also stem from 
the CEO’s intention to maintain his predecessor on the board (Fiegener et al., 
2000a), while outsiders are seen as a threat to promoting the family’s interests 
during the succession process (Fiegener et al., 2000b). 
The sum of the results shows that the CEO and the level of his embeddedness in 
the family have a significant influence on the composition of the board. However, 
compared to other determinants, such as the objectives of the family and pressure 
from external owners, the effect of the CEO’s stakes on board composition was 
found to be less significant (Fiegener et al., 2000b; Voordeckers et al., 2007). To 
make accurate predictions on the composition of the board, the CEO’s interests 
need to be studied in combination with other determinants.  
2.5.7 Director Kinship Ties 
Finally, the literature review revealed one study that analyzed the effect of kinship 
ties on the functioning of the board. Collin and Ahlberg (2012) reported that the 
family composition of the board, i.e., the genetic relationships among the family 
directors, influences the tasks performed by the board. The authors argued that 
the kinship relationships among the directors create nepotism, defined as a biased 
preference for kin (Nicholson, 2008), which in turn influences the behavior of the 
directors. In their exploratory study, the authors found indications that the level of 
closeness in the genetic relationships of the directors influences the emphasis of 
different board tasks and the board’s activity as a whole. The results are only in-
dicative and do not yet provide a coherent picture. Family firms are nevertheless 
advised to develop a strategy to manage nepotism in their governance system so 
as to avoid undesired outcomes (Collin & Ahlberg, 2012).  
Table 10: Impact of director kinship ties on the board 
 
Effect of director
Board dimension kinship ties Count Finding Author
Board tasks
Board control Ambiguousa 1 Negative relation of board control to share of 25%-related kin and to Collin and Ahlberg (2012)
family coefficient
Board advice Ambiguousa 1 Negative relation of  board advice to share of 12,5%-related kin; Collin and Ahlberg (2012)
negative relation of decision-making to share of 25%-related kin;
positive relation of conflict resolution to share of 12,5%-related kin
a Consistent relationship cannot be determined. For example, no resutls were found on 50%-related kin.
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 Synthesis of Results 2.6
The literature review identified six family-related determinants for boards of direc-
tors. The findings of the articles were grouped according to the six determinants, 
though one article could provide findings for several clusters. Table 11 provides an 
overview of the combined results for the six determinants. The relationships shown 
in the table are derived from weighing the findings of the previous sections.4 As it 
turns out, the findings contradict each other in very few instances, thereby facilitat-
ing aggregation of the research results. Moreover, the relationships derived should 
be interpreted as the likely behavior of the firms, without making inferences on the 
performance effects or suitability of the behavior. 
Table 11: Summary of the impact of family-related determinants on the board 
 
Generational stage emerged as the most prominent determinant in the literature 
review. Overall, later generations seem to opt for more independent and control-
ling boards. The multitude of non-linear findings demonstrate that a separation of 
multiple (generational) stages, as suggested by Gersick et al. (1997), is necessary 
to understand the evolution of the boards. The occurrence of the three determi-
nants, namely family culture, family power and family experience may not be sur-
prising, as the three factors were previously found as suitable ways to measure 
family influence and to distinguish family firms (Astrachan et al., 2002). The find-
ings show that families with more power tend to prefer boards that are more de-
pendent. The substituting effect of family culture and family experience seems to 
                                            
4
 Priority is given to the relationship direction with the highest frequency of findings. 
Board dimension Generational stage Family culture Family power Family experience CEO family stakes Kinship ties
Board existence Positive Negative
Board tasks
Board control Positive Negative Ambiguous Ambiguous
Board advice Convex Negative Ambiguous
Board composition
Board size Positive Negative Negative Negative Ambiguous
CEO duality Ambiguous Positive Positive
Family directors Positive Positive Positive
Affiliate directors Positive
Outside directors Positive/Convexa Negative Negative Negative Negative
Board processes
Cognitive conflict Concave
Use of knowledge Convex
and skills
a Findings on positive (4) and convex (2) relationships outweigh findings on negative (1) relationship.
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reduce the need for control and advice from the board. The importance of the 
three determinants is particularly outlined in the conceptual model of Corbetta and 
Salvato (2004b). As a further determinant, the CEO’s family stakes were also 
found to be important. As the CEO is more embedded in the family, he may push 
for more dependent boards, to facilitate the pursuit of family-related goals 
(Fiegener et al., 2000a). Finally, the kinship ties of directors have emerged as a 
last determinant, even though the existing results are only indicative thus far.  
The results for family determinants across board dimensions are fairly consistent. 
For instance, a negative relationship was suggested between family culture and 
board control. In line with that, family culture was found to be associated with more 
dependent boards, which are often claimed to exercise less control (Corbetta 
& Salvato, 2004b). The high consistency of the findings has two potential implica-
tions. First, it underlines the validity of the existing findings and the robustness of 
the results despite different research settings and variable selections in the stud-
ies. Second, it provides support for the main assumption of the literature review, in 
that the heterogeneity among the group of family firms does indeed have a distin-
guishable effect on the board.  
Finally, it should be noted that neither the board dimensions nor the identified de-
terminants should be regarded as independent. With regard to board dimensions, 
previous studies on boards provided empirical evidence for the interdependency 
between board composition, processes, and tasks (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). With 
regard to the determinants, the generational stage in particular is likely to have a 
significant effect on the other determinants. For instance, family experience is ar-
gued to be strongly driven by the accumulation of knowledge over generations 
(Astrachan et al., 2002; Bammens et al., 2008), and family culture may be particu-
larly pronounced in the concentrated ownership setting of an early generational 
firm (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2013). Thus, it can be assumed that mediating as 
well as moderating relationships exist between the different family-related deter-
minants. Corbetta and Salvato (2004b) made a first step in this direction with their 
conceptual model, but the empirical verification of the inter-influence between the 
determinants remains largely left for future research.  
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 Future Research 2.7
The third research question concerned areas for future research. Based on the 
systematic review of literature, it is possible to derive implications for future re-
search regarding directions and methodologies. The following section outlines the 
possible avenues, which center on three major suggestions: 
(1) Advance a dynamic perspective on the board. 
(2) Further the integration of additional theoretical perspectives. 
(3) Supplement refined quantitative studies with qualitative approaches. 
2.7.1 Dynamic Perspective 
This literature review revealed significant differences among boards between dif-
ferent generations in charge of the firm. To further develop a dynamic perspective 
on the board, I suggest refining the measurement of the ownership stages, explor-
ing the interrelatedness to other family determinants, and applying a more pro-
cess-oriented perspective. 
First, a closer look at existing studies reveals that besides two conceptual articles, 
only two empirical studies focused on the generational effect on the board of direc-
tors as a main determinant. Nonetheless, there is a multitude of secondary find-
ings in other articles. This may be partly because the number of the generation in 
charge is a frequently employed and straightforward measurable variable in family 
business surveys. The implications of the generation are often argued based on 
the increased ownership dispersion. However, the dispersion may not necessarily 
increase in later generations (Gersick et al., 1997). Therefore, I suggest that future 
studies on family firm boards should directly determine the ownership stage of the 
family business. Rather than representing an age variable, the ownership stage 
should represent the family relationships and complexity of ownership (Collin 
& Ahlberg, 2012; Westhead et al., 2002). Zona (2015) and Collin and Ahlberg 
(2012) took a first step in this direction by measuring the ownership dispersion and 
kinship relationships among the directors on the board, instead of relying on the 
number of the generation. Further approaches in this direction are suggested. 
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Second, future research should explore the relationships between the identified 
board determinants. For instance, it is frequently argued that family culture and 
family experience are related to the evolution of the family firm (Astrachan et al., 
2002; Bammens et al., 2008; Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2013). Future studies could 
thus investigate whether the ownership stages (Gersick et al., 1997) can serve as 
a meta-concept, i.e., whether it can explain much of the differences in other board 
determinants. By clarifying the interdependencies of the determinants among each 
other and in particular towards the ownership stages, future research should aim 
to develop a comprehensive view on the changes in the board. I expect that the 
ownership stages have the potential to explain much of the differences among the 
boards in family firms. 
Besides solving the measurement and interrelatedness issues, future research 
should apply a more process-oriented perspective on boards in family firms. Pre-
vious cross-sectional studies implicitly treated family firm boards as static, as only 
a single point in time was measured and analyzed (Fiegener et al., 2000a). In 
practice, however, the board should evolve in parallel to the business and the de-
velopment of the family. Regular modifications may hence be necessary to main-
tain the fit between the board and the governance needs of the family business 
(Nordqvist et al., 2014). In addition, the board choices over time are highly likely to 
build on one another, requiring a closer focus on the incremental changes that oc-
cur within the board (Fiegener et al., 2000a). By accepting a process-oriented view 
on family firm boards, several interesting questions for future research emerge. 
For instance, the factors that trigger a change in board composition might warrant 
an investigation. As illustrated by Voordeckers et al. (2007), a nearing generation 
transition may constitute an exemplary trigger and cause changes in board com-
positions. Following up on this insight, the question arises whether the change was 
initiated by the preceding generation to ensure oversight of the business activities 
after the succession process, or whether the new generation designed the board 
according to its own needs. Additionally, future research could explore the options 
families prefer when it comes to adapting their boards, ranging from composition 
changes to mere redirection of the board’s task focus. The existing findings show 
Determinants of Boards in Family Firms: A Systematic Literature Review 
44 
 
alterations in different board dimensions, but do not provide implications on the 
sequence and preference of changes due to their static perspective. 
2.7.2 Integration of Additional Theoretical Perspectives 
As outlined in section 2.5.1, agency theory constitutes the most important theoreti-
cal foundation for the articles in the review (applied in 65% of the articles), while 
stewardship theory and resource dependence theory occurred less than half that 
frequency. Consequently, the hypotheses and arguments in the articles show the 
prevalence of the control function of the board. This tendency is partly in contrast 
to the frequent recommendation to apply multiple theories and to take the advice 
function into account (Huse, 2005; Jaskiewicz & Klein, 2007). Given these in-
sights, this review recommends that future research on family firm boards should 
place a stronger focus on advice-related theories, such as resource dependence 
theory and stakeholder theory, and further evaluate the applicability of socio-
emotional wealth considerations. 
First, to pay tribute to resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), fu-
ture research on board determinants in family firms should apply more distinctive 
classifications of the directors. Instead of the insider/outsider classification, the 
occupational background of the directors should be a more important factor in de-
termining their provision of resources (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004b). Applying the 
classification of business experts (directors or officers of other firms), support spe-
cialists (lawyers, bankers, etc.), community influentials (politicians, university facul-
ty, clergy, etc.) and inside directors (current or former officers of the firm), as sug-
gested by Hillman, Cannella, Jr., and Paetzold (2000), could be a first step in this 
direction. Regarding family influence, the literature review found family experience 
as a possible determinant of the board’s advice function. However, no direct 
measurement on the level of business knowledge in the family has been employed 
thus far. Future research should thus investigate how the concept of family experi-
ence can be operationalized in board research and subsequently determine if and 
how the resource provision of the board differs with alternating levels of family ex-
perience. 
Determinants of Boards in Family Firms: A Systematic Literature Review 
45 
 
Besides the resource dependence theory, the stakeholder approach (Freeman, 
1984) could be another promising theoretical basis for family firm boards (Corbetta 
& Salvato, 2004b). So far, the approach has rarely been employed in previous 
studies (see Table 3). Following the stakeholder perspective, the board constitutes 
a place to build consensus among critical stakeholders, thereby stressing the me-
diating and conflict resolving function of the directors (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004b; 
Donaldson & Preston, 1995). In family firms, the diverging interests among differ-
ent family parties, in particular between active and non-active shareholders, as 
well as the relations to minority parties provide rich potential for conflict (Anderson 
& Reeb, 2004; Jaskiewicz, Schiereck, & May, 2006). The board could hence serve 
as a means of de-escalating these conflicts and ensuring the commitment of the 
involved parties to the commonly agreed goals (Bammens et al., 2011). However, 
it should be noted that Schwartz and Barnes (1991) recommended to not charge 
directors with conflict resolution tasks, so that their objectivity and focus on busi-
ness goals can be maintained. Reconciling both views, future research should first 
explore if and under what conditions the board is used as a mediating platform in 
family firms. This implies that the board task measurements are extended with 
items regarding board mediation. As a second step, it may then be determined 
whether the board is the right place for mediation or if other institutions, such as 
family councils, are better suited. Similarly, it may be interesting to see whether 
family firms indeed (partly) select their directors based on their mediating skills, as 
suggested by Le Breton-Miller and Miller (2013). 
The theories mentioned so far are, to varying degrees, applicable to family as well 
as non-family firms. Future research should thus consider whether family specific 
theories such as the socio-emotional wealth concept (Berrone et al., 2012) should 
be deployed more extensively to better understand the board determinants in fami-
ly firms. Le Breton-Miller and Miller (2013), for one, argued that socio-emotional 
wealth considerations influence the board composition. On the one hand, the fami-
ly is claimed to design the board in accordance with their SEW goals. On the other 
hand, the board can be a means to balance diverging SEW objectives among dif-
ferent family parties. As no study has so far empirically established the relationship 
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between SEW goals and board design, future research can follow this path. As 
SEW concerns are argued to be a highly relevant differentiator among family firms 
(Berrone et al., 2012), findings are not unlikely. Similar to findings on non-family 
managers (Vandekerkhof, Steijvers, Hendriks, & Voordeckers, 2015), SEW objec-
tives may also take on a moderating role for other determinants. 
2.7.3 Research Methods 
As a third pillar for future research, this section outlines the methodological impli-
cations based on the review findings. Besides the measurement issues discussed 
above, the following paragraphs highlight the importance of including board mem-
bers as additional survey respondents, to pay more attention to contextual factors, 
and to conduct qualitative research to obtain longitudinal data.  
The review of family-related board determinants revealed that the majority of find-
ings are based on data from surveys with CEOs as the single respondents. The 
strong focus on the CEOs presents two potential problems. First, due to the fre-
quently high level of emotional attachment to the firm and the family, the CEO may 
provide answers that bear the risk of at least partial distortion (Huber & Power, 
1985). Second, in particular, when it comes to board processes and the contribu-
tion of individual directors, the CEO may not possess adequate insights to provide 
accurate or sufficiently comprehensive information. Considering that board pro-
cesses are credited with high explanatory power for board effectiveness (Minichilli, 
Zattoni, Nielsen, & Huse, 2012), their measurement should be accorded a stronger 
weighting in future studies. To deal with these issues, future research should aim 
to include board members as survey respondents and, ideally, collect information 
from multiple informants. Zona (2015) is the only study in the review that surveyed 
separate persons for the dependent and independent variables, thereby providing 
a first step in this direction. 
Moreover, the review showed that not all studies provide elaborate information on 
the sample characteristics that would allow a precise classification and compari-
son of the research results (see section 2.5.1). Future studies should thus provide 
more detailed accounts of their research setting as well as pay more attention to 
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contextual factors that influence the research results (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004b; 
Ward & Handy, 1988). Important contextual factors include, for instance, the na-
tional legal and cultural setting as well as the listing status and size of the firms. 
On the former, cross-national research should be conducted to evaluate whether 
the national setting affects the relationship between families and their boards 
(Fiegener et al., 2000b; Voordeckers et al., 2007). In particular, it may be interest-
ing to see whether family firms exert different influences in one-tier and two-tier 
systems. The replication of the studies in different countries may also contribute to 
increase the generalizability of the research findings (external validity). In addition, 
future research samples should clearly distinguish between listed and non-listed 
family firms. In listed firms, the pressure from external stockholders and regulators 
may restrict the family’s discretion in using the board to follow family goals 
(Combs, 2008), which would in turn influence the research results. Similarly, the 
influence of the family on the board may vary between small and large firms 
(Voordeckers et al., 2007), asking for a clear classification of the firm sizes select-
ed in the research sample. 
Finally, the review discovered a lack of longitudinal studies that capture the evolu-
tion of the board in family firms (see also section 2.5.1) and that could help to veri-
fy the assumed causality among the employed variables (Leon-Guerrero et al., 
1998; Voordeckers et al., 2007). Gaining longitudinal data from survey research in 
this field can be difficult due to the need to collect multi-year data for extended pe-
riods of time. A frequently suggested alternative approach would be to conduct 
qualitative research on the board determinants (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004b; 
Fiegener et al., 2000b; Nordqvist et al., 2014; Westhead et al., 2002). Similar to 
other reviews on family business research (Frank, Kessler, Nosé, & Suchy, 2011; 
Kontinen & Ojala, 2010), the review at hand identified a lack of qualitative studies 
that provide in-depth insights into the complex processes inside the family. To bet-
ter understand the formation of the board of directors in family firms, the applica-
tion of a case study approach (Eisenhardt, 1989b) may be promising. Case study 
research enables the use of quantitative as well as qualitative data (Yin, 2009), 
and allows the inclusion of previous measures from survey research, while retain-
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ing the flexibility to factor in developments over time through interviews (Gephart, 
2004). As such, future research will be able to answer more of the how and why 
questions on specific family firm behavior (Kontinen & Ojala, 2010).  
To conclude the outlook on future research, Table 12 summarizes the three major 
areas that should gain specific attention from researchers in the field with regard to 
future studies.  
Table 12: Summary of directions for future research 
 
 Conclusion 2.8
The literature review aimed to identify the family-related determinants behind the 
board design in family firms. A systematic analysis of existing literature revealed 
six different determinants: generational stage, family culture, family power, family 
experience, CEO family stakes, and director kinship ties. Overall, the identified 
determinants show a high level of consistency in their influence across board di-
mensions, emphasizing their validity and supporting the view that boards are in-
deed subject to different levels of family firm influence. The heterogeneity among 
family firms emerged as a highly relevant factor, potentially being as important as 
the differences between family and non-family firms (Chua, Chrisman, Steier, & 
Rau, 2012). Therefore, the specification of ideal boards for family firms in early 
research (Ward & Handy, 1988) should be questioned. A more nuanced perspec-
tive, considering the specific requirements and goals of different types of family 
firms, appears to be necessary (Nordqvist et al., 2014). By pointing out the deter-
minants for board designs in family firms, this review also laid the foundation for 
research focusing on the performance implications of these decisions.  
Topic area Current status in research on family-determinants Implications for future research
Dynamic perspective
Measurement Frequent use of number of generation Measure ownership stage directly
Interrelatedness Six main family-related determinants identified Clarify applicability of ownership stage as meta-concept
Process-orientation Often static perspective on board Investigate board evolution and triggers for change
Theoretical perspectives
Resource dependence theory Limited implementation in empirical studies Include measures for family experience/ director background
Stakeholder theory Limited empirical and theoretical use Verify importance of mediating role of the board
Socio-emotional wealth Only conceptual argumentation of SEW influence Empirically verify SEW influence and interrelatedness
Research methods
Survey respondents Frequent use of CEO as single respondent Address board members and multiple respondents
Contextual factors Sample characteristics treated with minor importance Investigate context-specific differences of family influence
Qualitative research No qualitative studies; limited longitudinal studies Include qualitative research methods (e.g., case studies)
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That being said, the research on family determinants itself has not yet reached a 
saturation point. In particular, the application of the ownership stages as a poten-
tial meta-concept provides further interesting avenues for future research. So far, 
the evolution of the board and the triggers for change have not received sufficient 
attention. Separately, future research is also advised to broaden the scope of ap-
plied theories and to pay more attention to the resource provision of the board. 
The integration of relatively new concepts, such as the socio-emotional wealth 
perspective, also provides an interesting subject for future research. Finally, quali-
tative studies and a stronger focus on contextual factors can assist in improving 
the insights on the processes and implications of family influence on the board.  
By following these avenues, future research can contribute to a better understand-
ing of how and why family boards differ, while simultaneously enhancing the gen-
eral understanding of family-specific behavior. Considering the high importance of 
family firms in economies around the world (Astrachan & Shanker, 2003), these 
results are and will be of high relevance to academics, practitioners, and policy-
makers alike. 
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 Appendix 2.9
Table 13: Data extraction form for main results 
 Author(s) and year Journal 
Family  
determinant 
Main results on family determinants 
1 Anderson and Reeb 
(2004) 
Administrative Science 
Quarterly 
 Family power The presence of founding family members on the nominating 
committee negatively relates to the percentage of independ-
ent directors on the board.  
2 Bammens et al. 
(2008) 
Small Business Eco-
nomics 
 Generational 
stage 
 Family  
experience 
(1) Advice needs and the likelihood for outside directors 
decrease from the first to the second generation, and in-
crease again afterwards. Advice needs mediate the likelihood 
for outside directors.  
(2) Partial support for increase of control needs and number 
of family directors from one generation to the next. 
3 Chen and Nowland 
(2010) 
Corporate Governance: 
An International Review 
 Family power (1) The optimal (= performance-maximizing) level of board 
monitoring is higher when family owners have excess control 
rights.  
(2) The optimal level of board monitoring is lower at higher 
levels of family ownership and family involvement in the 
business. 
4 Collin and Ahlberg 
(2012) 
Journal of Family 
Business Strategy 
 Director  
kinship ties 
Indicative results that kinship relationships among directors 
affect the emphasis of different board tasks and the board 
activity as a whole. 
(1) Share of 25%-related kin negatively related to board 
control, decision-making, and total activity. 
(2) Share of 12.5%-related kin negatively related to board 
advice and positively related to board conflict. 
(3) Family coefficient negatively related to board control. 
5 Corbetta and Salva-
to (2004b) 
Family Business Re-
view 
 Family culture 
 Family power 
 Family  
experience 
Presentation of a contingency model on board tasks and 
board composition: 
(1) Family power is positively associated with board depend-
ence and negatively associated with board capital. 
(2) Family culture moderates the relationship between family 
power and board control. Higher family culture reduces the 
need for board dependence and positively affects the rela-
tionship between board dependence and board control.  
(3) Family experience moderates the relationship between 
family power and provision of resources. Higher family expe-
rience reduces the need for high levels of board capital (size, 
diversity, activity) and positively affects the relationship 
between board capital and provisions of resources. 
6 Fiegener et al. 
(2000a) 
Entrepreneurship: 
Theory & Practice 
 Generational 
stage 
 CEO family 
stakes 
The CEO and his affiliation with the family play a decisive role 
for boards: 
(1) Smaller board size for higher levels of ownership of CEO’s 
relatives and when an emergency CEO from the family is 
available. Larger board size with more CEO relatives in the 
business and an intention to pass the business to a family 
member.  
 (2) CEO’s ownership and family stakes are positively related 
to the ratio of family directors and negatively related to the 
outsider ratio.  
(3) Multi-generation firms (inheritor-CEOs) tend to have larger 
board representation of family directors. 
    (continued) 
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 Author(s) and year Journal 
Family  
determinant 
Main results on family determinants 
7 Fiegener et al. 
(2000b) 
Entrepreneurship & 
Regional Development 
 Family power 
 CEO family 
stakes 
(1) CEOs who intend to pass on the leadership inside the 
family are less likely to have an outside board. 
(2) Firms in which external owners hold a large equity share 
are more likely to have an outside board. 
8 Gnan et al. (2015) Journal of Small Busi-
ness Management 
 Family culture In firms with family councils, the monitoring role of the board 
of directors is significantly lower. 
9 Jaskiewicz and Klein 
(2007) 
Journal of Business 
Research 
 Family culture (1) The higher the level of goal alignment between owners 
and managers, the smaller the board. 
(2) The higher the level of goal alignment, the lower the 
percentage of outside board members. 
(3) The higher the level of goal alignment, the higher the 
percentage of affiliate board members. 
10 Le Breton-Miller and 
Miller (2013) 
Entrepreneurship: 
Theory & Practice 
 Generational 
stage 
The generational stage of a family firm affects the socio-
emotional wealth priorities, which in turn affect the composi-
tion of the board: 
(1) Controlling owner: Committed family members, local 
experts, and entrepreneurs. 
(2) Sibling partnership: Representatives of family fractions, 
seniors, and local community representatives. 
(3) Cousin consortia: Family representation and high-status/ 
experienced outsiders. 
11 Leon-Guerrero et al. 
(1998) 
Family Business Re-
view 
 Generational 
stage 
Number of family generations is positively related to the 
utilization of family boards and mixed boards of directors.  
12 Nordqvist et al. 
(2014) 
Journal of Small Busi-
ness Management 
 Generational 
stage 
(1) Controlling owner: With decreasing family involvement in 
management, the need for an active board of directors in-
creases to enforce the controlling owner’s will.  
(2) Sibling partnership: With decreasing family involvement in 
management, there is a need for a board composed of inter-
nal and external members to facilitate discussions. 
(3) Cousin consortium: With decreasing family involvement in 
management, there is a need for a board composed of inter-
nal and external members. The importance of the board is 
higher than in the other two stages, as the board is required 
to reduce information asymmetries. 
13 Pieper et al. (2008) Journal of Small Busi-
ness Management 
 Family culture Firms with high levels of goal alignment are less likely to have 
a board of directors (stewardship theory). Conversely, firms 
with low levels of goal alignment are more likely to have a 
board (agency theory). 
14 Schwartz and 
Barnes (1991) 
Family Business Re-
view 
 Generational 
stage 
Firms in the fourth and subsequent generations are more 
likely to have outside boards (boards with one member who is 
not family, friend, advisor, or employee). 
15 Van den Berghe and 
Carchon (2002) 
Corporate Governance: 
An International Review 
 Generational 
stage 
 (1) Boards in family firms with a dominant shareholder are 
characterized by higher independence, less family involve-
ment, higher likelihood of CEO duality, lower focus on man-
agement supervision, lower involvement in operational issues, 
smaller board size, and less activity (meeting frequency) than 
family firms with an equal shareholder structure. 
(2) Generational differences only with a minor effect on board 
composition: Higher meeting frequency and family member 
ratio in third generation and concave trend of CEO duality. 
    (continued) 
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 Author(s) and year Journal 
Family  
determinant 
Main results on family determinants 
16 Voordeckers et al. 
(2007) 
Journal of Small Busi-
ness Management 
 Generational 
stage 
 Family culture 
 Family  
experience 
(1) Nearing generational transition increases the likelihood for 
an outside board. Second generation firms are less likely to 
have outside boards. 
(2) A focus on family-related objectives compared to busi-
ness-related objectives decreases the likelihood for an out-
side board. 
(3) The number of working family members is negatively 
related to the likelihood for non-family directors.  
17 Ward and Handy 
(1988) 
Family Business Re-
view 
 Generational 
stage 
Firms with owners in the third or fourth generation are more 
likely to have outside boards (defined as boards with at least 
two outsiders).  
18 Westhead et al. 
(2002) 
Entrepreneurship & 
Regional Development 
 Generational 
stage 
Multi-generation companies have larger boards and a higher 
likelihood for a non-executive director (also excludes family 
members) employment than first generation companies.  
19 Yeh and Woidtke 
(2005) 
Journal of Banking & 
Finance 
 Family power (1) Board affiliation (with the family) is higher when negative 
entrenchment effects, measured by divergence of control and 
cash flow rights and CEO duality, are strong. 
(2) The effect is offset by positive incentives of high family 
ownership (>30%). 
20 Zona (2015) Small Business Eco-
nomics 
 Generational 
stage 
Generational stages affect the board processes: Cognitive 
conflict is highest and use of knowledge and skills is lowest in 
sibling partnerships (moderate levels of board ownership). No 
effect on effort norms.  
     
 
(, 2014)  
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 Abstract 3.1
More than a decade after the publication of Corbetta and Salvato (2004), we de-
velop an extension of the contingency approach to the boards of directors in family 
firms. We argue that the diverging interests among family members are not suffi-
ciently represented in existing contingency factors, and the existing static perspec-
tive on boards fails to emphasize the need for board adaptation over time. Conse-
quently, we develop an extended conceptual model of the relationships between 
ownership stages, contingency factors, and board task needs of family firms. Our 
propositions highlight the need for board adaptations to ownership stages and 
recognition of the importance of individual family member interests. Particularly, 
our theoretical considerations show that controlling owners have a strong need for 
board advice while the transition to a sibling partnership and cousin consortium 
gradually push the need for controlling and mediating activities to the forefront. 
The involvement of non-family managers is likely to moderate this development. 
Referring back to the initial contingency model, we propose that not only is one 
board unlikely to fit all family firms, but one board cannot be expected to fit the en-
tire life-span of a family firm. 
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 Introduction 3.2
This paper develops a contingency approach to board task needs of family firms 
and outlines the evolution of board task needs over the ownership stages. Despite 
classification under one heading, family firms are often considered a heterogene-
ous group with diverging characteristics and needs (Sharma, Chrisman, & Gersick, 
2012). Therefore, it may not be surprising that existing findings on the perfor-
mance implications of family firm boards are contradictory (Anderson & Reeb, 
2004; Klein, Astrachan, & Smyrnios, 2005). The development of wholesale pre-
scriptions is hindered by trade-offs between different board tasks (Adams & Fer-
reira, 2007) and the fact that the execution of superfluous tasks may be detri-
mental to performance (Falk & Kosfeld, 2006; García-Ramos & García-Olalla, 
2014). Corbetta and Salvato (2004) have addressed these insights in their devel-
opment of a contingency approach to family-related determinants of boards of di-
rectors. The authors demonstrate that the family firm’s power, experience, and 
culture (Astrachan, Klein, & Smyrnios, 2002) represent contingency factors that 
explain how and why board designs differ across different family firms. The au-
thors argue that family culture and family experience may partly substitute for the 
necessity to employ large, active, and independent boards (Ward & Handy, 1988).  
More than a decade after the publication of Corbetta and Salvato’s (2004) article, 
we provide an extension of the contingency model. Studies on family firms have 
increasingly highlighted the importance of considering financial and non-financial 
interests inside the family (Berrone, Cruz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012). A potential di-
vergence of interests potentially leads to family conflicts that, in turn, can affect 
firm performance (Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2004). The existing contingency 
model, however, rather treats the family as one block, despite the likely effect of 
the diverging interests on the board (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2013). We lack a 
clear understanding of how the diverging priorities determine board task needs. 
The necessity to adapt the existing list of contingency factors in this direction is 
supported by numerous calls to pay more attention to contextual factors and family 
firm heterogeneity than is found in the existing approaches (Bammens, Voordeck-
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ers, & Van Gils, 2011; Sharma et al., 2012; Siebels & zu Knyphausen-Aufseß, 
2012).  
Moreover, the existing model provides a static perspective on the board without 
emphasizing the need for adaptations over time, but these adaptations may be 
crucial for firm survival (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2013). Only between 30 to 50% 
of family firms reach the second generation and even less (10 to 12%) manage to 
persist until the third generation (Boos & Lenglachner, 2004). Several authors ob-
serve that the governance structures of family firms often insufficiently evolve in 
congruence with the development of the family business, thereby providing a po-
tential source for the decline (Steier, 2001; Van den Berghe & Carchon, 2002). 
Consequently, several authors call for a dynamic perspective on family firm boards 
(Bammens, Voordeckers, & Van Gils, 2008; Ikäheimonen, Pihkala, & Ikävalko, 
2013). 
This current article responds to these calls by providing an extended contingency 
perspective on family firm boards that incorporates dynamic elements and addi-
tional contingency factors. Particularly, we develop a conceptual model for the re-
lationships between ownership stages, contingency factors, and board task needs. 
Our theoretical considerations demonstrate that board task needs do change over 
the ownership stages (Gersick, Davis, McCollom Hampton, & Lansberg, 1997). 
While controlling owners typically have a strong need for board advice, the transi-
tion to a sibling partnership and cousin consortium gradually shift the need to 
board control and board mediation.  
Our article contributes to the research on family firms and their boards of directors 
in two ways. First, we bring the contingency approach back on the agenda for fu-
ture studies. By extending the initial list of contingency factors (Corbetta & Salvato, 
2004), we provide a more fine-grained prediction of board task needs, particularly 
with respect to diverging interests and priorities among family members. Our mod-
el thereby provides the potential to explain more of the variance in research on 
board determinants and board implications. Simultaneously, by focusing on board 
tasks, we implement recent findings concerning the behavior of boards of family 
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firms, that is, the tasks they perform are more important drivers of firm perfor-
mance than board composition (Basco & Voordeckers, 2015). Second, we con-
tribute to the existing literature by demonstrating that the ownership-stage model 
(Gersick et al., 1997) can provide a suitable basis to explain typical changes in 
board task needs because it can be linked to the majority of the contingency fac-
tors. Board task needs are thus not only firm specific but also time-specific. Con-
sidering that boards are partly path dependent, that is, more likely to reflect the 
requirements at their foundation rather than the current needs of the firm (Lynall, 
Golden, & Hillman, 2003), the necessity for constant evaluation and adaptation of 
board tasks cannot be underestimated. Our contingency approach outlines the 
importance of these adaptations. 
This article is structured as follows. First, we outline the board tasks and the un-
derlying theories (section 3.3). Subsequently, we develop a conceptual model that 
links the ownership stages to changes in contingency factors and board task 
needs. Based on the developed model, we predict the typical evolution of board 
task needs (section 3.4). Finally, we explain several limitations to the model (sec-
tion 3.5) and conclude the article (section 3.6). 
 Board Tasks in Family Firms 3.3
Our study focuses on the board task needs of family firms, that is, the tasks that 
the board of directors is expected to fulfill (Bammens et al., 2008; Huse, 2005). We 
build on the comprehensive literature review by Bammens et al. (2011) and differ-
entiate between board control, board mediation, and board advice tasks.  
Board control refers to the monitoring and supervising activities of the board 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983). This includes, for instance, the specification of manage-
ment responsibilities and budgets and the evaluation of management and compa-
ny performance (Van den Heuvel, Van Gils, & Voordeckers, 2006). The theoretical 
rationale for board control is based on agency theory. Agency theory postulates 
that the interests and risk preferences of managers and owners may diverge in 
certain situations, and managers make decisions that may not be in the best inter-
ests of the owners. The purpose of board control is to protect the interests of the 
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owners in these situations (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Conflicts 
of interest can occur not only between managers and owners but also between 
conflicting shareholder groups (principal-principal conflicts). In that case, board 
control prevents the expropriation of one shareholder group at the benefit of an-
other (Anderson & Reeb, 2004). In contrast to agency theory, stewardship theory 
postulates that managers act in a pro-organizational manner in cases where cer-
tain psychological antecedents are given. These antecedents include the manag-
ers’ identification with, and commitment to, the organization. The disciplining of 
managers through board control is assumed unnecessary in cases where the 
manager acts as a steward of the organization (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 
1997). 
As a second board task, board mediation reduces and prevents potential conflicts 
among shareholders by building consensus (Bammens et al., 2008; Voordeckers, 
Van Gils, & Van den Heuvel, 2007; Whisler, 1988). Sample tasks include the bal-
ancing of diverging viewpoints and supporting managing family employment and 
protocols (Basco & Rodríguez, 2009). A theoretical rationale for the mediating 
function of the board can be found in stakeholder theory. Stakeholder theory un-
derscores the importance of building consensus among the often competing inter-
ests of the firm’s stakeholders to strengthen cohesion and, ultimately, achieve the 
firm’s performance goals (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984; Luoma & 
Goodstein, 1999).  
As a third board task, board advice refers to the provision of expertise, knowledge, 
and network resources for the management of the firm (Johannisson & Huse, 
2000). The advice also concerns the formulation and ratification of strategy and 
the building of organizational reputation (Van den Heuvel et al., 2006). The ra-
tionale for board advice is mainly based on resource dependence theory. Re-
source dependence theory considers access to and control of external resources 
necessary for the firm to reach its goals (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The board can 
be one mechanism to secure these resources (Fiegener, Brown, Dreux, IV, & 
Dennis, Jr, 2000a). 
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Previous studies highlighted that a trade-off between different board tasks exists 
(Adams & Ferreira, 2007), and the execution of superfluous tasks may even have 
negative performance effects (Falk & Kosfeld, 2006; García-Ramos & García-
Olalla, 2014). To determine the necessary tasks, depending on the ownership con-
text, we employ a contingency perspective. Contingency theory argues that there 
is no optimal course of action for all organizations. Instead, the performance of an 
organization is dependent on the fit between the organizational design and related 
context variables (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Drazin & Van de Ven, 1985; Hofer, 
1975). Applied to the board of directors, we argue that the tasks performed by the 
board must align with the specific family ownership context. 
 Development of a Conceptual Model 3.4
3.4.1 Definition of the Model Components 
The initial model by Corbetta and Salvato (2004) suggests the employment of the 
three dimensions of the widely used F-PEC scale (Astrachan et al., 2002; Klein et 
al., 2005) - family power, family experience, and family culture - as contingency 
factors. We follow this suggestion with several modifications. First, we consider 
two of the sub dimensions of family power separately. The extent of family versus 
external ownership and the extent of family versus non-family management are 
interpreted as two separate factors.5 By employing the subscales separately, we 
make use of the granted leeway by its proponents (Astrachan et al., 2002), while 
aiming to disentangle the different effects that both factors may have on board 
task needs. Second, we replace family culture with goal alignment. Corbetta and 
Salvato (2004) argue that family culture determines whether managers may act as 
stewards, as opposed to agents of the owners. The concept of family culture in 
this context serves as a proxy for goal alignment (Pieper, Klein, & Jaskiewicz, 
2008). Because goal alignment directly targets the relationship between owners 
and managers and has been referred to by agency and stewardship theorists alike 
(Jaskiewicz & Klein, 2007), we employ the term in our study to be theoretically 
precise. 
                                            
5
 The third subscale of family power, family representation in governance, is excluded because it is 
linked to board composition, which affects board task performance rather than board task needs. 
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Third, we introduce the family’s shared vision as a further contingency factor. 
While the F-PEC dimensions mostly consider the family as a homogenous entity, 
recent discussions on governance have underscored the importance of studying 
the potentially diverging goals of individual family members (Le Breton-Miller 
& Miller, 2013). Similarly, the literature stream on family conflicts highlights the 
relevance of interactions between separate family members of the business 
(Frank, Kessler, Nosé, & Suchy, 2011; Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2004). Consider-
ing that the viewpoints of family members may not always align, we propose the 
extent of a family’s shared vision as an additional contingency factor for board task 
needs (Mustakallio, Autio, & Zahra, 2002). The last component of the F-PEC 
scale, family experience, is adopted without modifications. Family experience tar-
gets the firm-specific knowledge of family owners and managers (Astrachan et al., 
2002).  
The five contingency factors provide an exhaustive representation of the relation-
ships among family owners who have the potential to affect the board task needs 
of the family business. The selected contingency factors cover the relationships of 
family owners towards external owners (external ownership), towards other family 
owners (family’s shared vision), towards family managers (goal alignment), to-
wards non-family managers (non-family management), and towards the business 
operations (family experience). Our conceptual model, therefore, centers on the 
family owners while the relationship to other owners, management, and business 
operations are considered. We follow early writers in the field, who argue that 
ownership, management, and business operations are determinants of the board 
(Huse, 1994; Ward & Handy, 1988). Figure 2 provides an overview of the selected 
contingency factors. 
Figure 2: Proposed contingency factors 
Contingency factor  Focus on relationship between 
External ownership  Family owners and external owners 
Family’s shared vision  Family owners and family owners 
Goal alignment  Family owners and family managers 
Family experience  Family owners and business operations 
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Non-family management  Family owners and non-family managers 
 
 
 
Moreover, we demonstrate that board task needs change over time and follow re-
cent theoretical remarks on the need for board adaptations over time (Le Breton-
Miller & Miller, 2013; Nordqvist, Sharma, & Chirico, 2014). In their seminal work, 
Gersick et al. (1997) suggest a three-stage model of ownership structure changes 
in family firms. Each stage has essential differences in many attributes of the fami-
ly business. The controlling owner stage is characterized by consolidated owner-
ship in the hands of a single individual, often the founder. In the sibling partnership 
stage, the shareholding is usually split among two or more siblings. Finally, cousin 
consortiums constitute the most complex form of ownership because of a further 
separation of ownership among multiple family branches with varying business 
involvement (Ward, 2004). We adopt this classification because of its widespread 
use in family firm research (Eddleston, Kellermanns, Floyd, Crittenden, & Crittend-
en, 2013; Sciascia, Mazzola, & Kellermanns, 2014). In the following sections, we 
outline how the contingency factors evolve over the ownership stages and how 
this, in turn, affects board task needs.  
3.4.2 Evolution of External Ownership 
Following agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and stakeholder theory (Don-
aldson & Preston, 1995), we argue that the extent of external ownership, that is, 
ownership that is not in the hands of the controlling family, affects the need for 
board control and board mediation and increases over the ownership stages. The 
term external ownership, in this context, covers non-family shareholders as well as 
minority family shareholders that have weak kinship and social ties to the control-
ling family. As this contingency factor does not affect the firm’s internal resources, 
no linkage to the need for board advice is proposed (Pfeffer, 1972). 
External owners are argued to follow predominantly financial objectives and suffer 
from potential expropriation by the controlling family (Anderson & Reeb, 2004; 
Faccio, Larry, & Young, 2001). On the one hand, the family may directly extract 
resources from the company through excessive compensation, special dividends, 
or related-party transactions (Anderson & Reeb, 2004; DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 
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2000). On the other hand, the family’s pursuit of socio-emotional wealth objectives, 
that is, objectives that aim to enhance the “affect-related value that a family de-
rives from its controlling position in a particular firm” (Berrone et al., 2012, p. 259) 
may lead to the misallocation of resources from the viewpoint of external owners. 
In both cases, the value of the external owners’ shareholding is diminished. To 
prevent this situation, external owners call for appropriate control mechanisms as 
they anticipate the expropriation attempt. To maintain the goodwill of their inves-
tors, family owners are expected to accept the need for increased board control 
(Fiegener, Brown, Dreux, IV, & Dennis, Jr, 2000b). Otherwise, the external owners 
may not provide capital in the first place, or they may request higher premiums in 
return for the capital (Almeida & Wolfenzon, 2006). Following agency theory, the 
prevalent principal-principal conflict can, as one alternative, be reduced by board 
of director controlling activities (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Yeh & Woidtke, 2005). 
Through supervision and monitoring, the board highlights and limits family behav-
ior that decreases shareholder wealth (Arosa, Iturralde, & Maseda, 2010; Yeh 
& Woidtke, 2005). As demonstrated empirically by Fiegener et al. (2000b), greater 
external ownership is positively related to the likelihood of outside directors in 
small firms, which is interpreted as a means for minority owners to increase board 
control. In summary, we propose the following: 
Proposition 1a: The higher the level of external ownership, the greater the 
need for board control.  
Moreover, increased external ownership may require board mediation to reduce 
conflict between shareholder groups. Consistent with stakeholder theory (Don-
aldson & Preston, 1995), the board may assist the business in bridging the inter-
ests of external and family owners and build consensus between the two groups 
(Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2004). For the family, the board may highlight the bene-
fits of increased professionalization in the business (Dekker, Lybaert, Steijvers, & 
Depaire, 2015). For example, this may include the development of guidelines for 
the employment of family members based on competencies rather than kinship 
(Carlock & Ward, 2001; Lubatkin, Schulze, Ling, & Dino, 2005). For external own-
ers, recommendations for measures to limit expropriation exposure, such as fre-
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quent dividend payments, may be given to reduce the corporate wealth available 
to insiders (Faccio et al., 2001; Luoma & Goodstein, 1999). By outlining possible 
ways to combine the interests of external and family owners, the board can con-
tribute to avoid conflict among the involved owners (Whisler, 1988). In summary, 
the following proposition is developed. 
Proposition 1b: The higher the level of external ownership, the greater the 
need for board mediation. 
In controlling owner family firms, the business is central to the owner’s occupa-
tional and private life. Maintaining (sole) control is often a fundamental desire that 
overrides outside influences, even if growth targets must be sacrificed (Gómez-
Mejía, Takács Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007; 
Nordqvist et al., 2014). The situation is likely to change as the business is handed 
to the next generation and ownership is separated across multiple owners in a sib-
ling partnership. On the one hand, family members may attempt to sell their 
shares to follow their own business ventures in other areas or satisfy their lifestyle 
aspirations (Gersick et al., 1997). On the other hand, the business may need to 
attract external shareholders to achieve growth targets necessary to support the 
increased number of family members that rely on the business (Sonfield & Lussier, 
2004). In the cousin consortium stage, the tendency for external ownership may 
intensify due to further dispersion of ownership. From an empirical perspective, 
ownership dispersion has been found to negatively correlate with the amount of 
capital inside the family (Klein, 2000), thereby supporting the theoretical consid-
erations. Consequently, we suggest the following proposition. 
Proposition 1c: External ownership increases from the controlling owner 
stage to the sibling partnership stage and further increases from the sibling 
partnership stage to the cousin consortium stage. 
3.4.3 Evolution of the Family’s Shared Vision 
As a second contingency factor, the extent of shared vision among the members 
of the (controlling) family influences the board tasks. The concept of a shared vi-
sion describes the collective understanding of the family owners to manage wealth 
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as a group rather than individually and agreement on the firm’s future and objec-
tives (Mustakallio et al., 2002; Uhlaner, Matser, Berent-Braun, & Flören, 2015). 
Based on agency (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and stakeholder theory (Donaldson 
& Preston, 1995), we argue that the extent of the family’s shared vision affects the 
need for board control and board mediation. We propose no effect on board ad-
vice, as the available resources of the firm remain unchanged (Pfeffer, 1972). 
Over the ownership stages, we propose a decline in the shared vision. 
Agreement on a shared vision is of high significance for family firms. Once the le-
gitimate interests of the owners are not represented sufficiently, family harmony 
and business operations may be disrupted (Gersick et al., 1997). The lack of con-
sensus among owners may paralyze organizational functioning (Miller, Burke, & 
Glick, 1998) and negatively affect decision quality and decision commitment (Mus-
takallio et al., 2002) because the owners are more concerned with internal dis-
putes than with business prospects. Ultimately, the prevalence of high levels of 
conflict can lead to a decline in company performance or even the demise of the 
business (Harvey & Evans, 1994; Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2004).  
In case the family does not find a common denominator, family owners may have 
an increased desire to supervise the activities of the management to prevent an 
escalation of conflicts (Bammens et al., 2008). The aim is to avoid one family 
branch using the vacuum of a shared vision to realize their interests and exploit 
other family owners, similar to a minority owner situation (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
Moreover, family managers may avoid debates on the firm’s orientation with their 
relatives and, instead, address important subjects behind the scenes (Miller et al., 
1998), thereby raising suspicion among the involved parties. This, in turn, lowers 
the willingness of non-employed owners to provide blank check endorsements 
(Gersick et al., 1997). Board control can avoid the escalation of such conflicts and 
highlight behaviors that are not beneficial to the company (Höppner, 2006). There-
fore, the following proposition is suggested. 
Proposition 2a: The lower the extent of the family’s shared vision, the great-
er the need for board control. 
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In addition to the need for control, the extent of the family’s shared vision can also 
affect the need for board mediation (Lester & Cannella, Jr, 2006; Ward, 1988; 
Whisler, 1988). Following stakeholder theory (Donaldson & Preston, 1995), the 
board can balance the competing interests of family members, build consensus, 
and develop a shared vision to which all family members agree and commit 
(Bammens et al., 2011; Carlock & Ward, 2001). Concerning the interests of the 
family members, the board can be a suitable mediating party, particularly in cases 
where the board is accepted as an objective and trusted institution among all in-
volved parties (Lester & Cannella, Jr, 2006; Ward, 1988). The more the family 
struggles to define a shared vision independently, the greater the need for board 
support through mediation. Summarizing the above, the following proposition is 
suggested. 
Proposition 2b: The lower the extent of the family’s shared vision, the great-
er the need for board mediation. 
In the controlling owner stage, the interests of the owner are paramount because 
of the owner’s authority in the business (Kelly, Athanassiou, & Crittenden, 2000) 
and the owner’s often dominant position within the family (Tagiuri & Davis, 1992). 
Other family members are likely to accept these interests or at least be reluctant to 
openly question the prevailing opinion (Beckhard & Dyer, Jr, 1983; Kellermanns 
& Eddleston, 2004). Thus, a shared vision among the owners, in case several ex-
ist, should be given.  
As the business develops into a sibling partnership, diverging viewpoints are ex-
pected because each family branch is likely to favor different firm objectives. For 
example, non-employed owners may envision a business that focuses on high 
dividends to support their lifestyle or to fund other business ventures (Gersick et 
al., 1997). On the other hand, employed siblings may value future employment in 
the business for themselves and their children, more than the short-term distribu-
tion of funds (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2013). Since the interests concern financial 
and non-financial objectives, such as socio-emotional wealth considerations, di-
verse interests may be difficult to combine (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2013). Addi-
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tionally, family members often inherit the business instead of purposefully choos-
ing to be an investor. Family member interests, and their approach in asserting 
these interests, may not always follow purely economic principles (Lansberg, 
1999). Moreover, existing rivalries among siblings may shift the focus from coop-
erative behavior to a culture of blocking each other’s actions (Miller, Steier, & Le 
Breton-Miller, 2003). Once the divergence of opinions becomes overly excessive, 
the goal of developing and achieving a common vision becomes increasingly diffi-
cult (Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2004). Owing to the potential strength of the pref-
erences of each family branch, the potential benefits of moderate conflict, such as 
comprehensiveness and extensiveness of decisions, may recede into the back-
ground (Miller et al., 1998). In summary, we consider that the likelihood of a 
shared vision decreases as the business moves to a sibling partnership. 
Once the business has reached the cousin consortium stage, this trend is ex-
pected to amplify. Particularly, the expectations concerning dividend payments 
may diverge as the company’s ability to provide sufficient funds for an increasing 
shareholder base diminishes (Lansberg, 1999). Gersick et al. (1997) claim that 
families at this stage resemble nothing less than political structures because of the 
multitude of different interests that become increasingly difficult to combine. Addi-
tionally, social interactions among family members are likely to decrease, which 
complicates the development of a shared vision (Mustakallio et al., 2002). Social 
interactions reduce information asymmetries, contribute to an understanding of 
conflicting viewpoints, and through shared languages and shared narratives en-
hance the capability to find a joint solution (Carlock & Ward, 2001; Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal, 1998). Particularly, non-employed family members may be subject to an 
attenuation of their social interactions in the cousin consortium stage because they 
do not benefit from interaction at the business level and may be confronted with 
reduced geographical proximity (Gersick et al., 1997; Mustakallio et al., 2002). 
Consequently, as the level of social interaction decreases at the cousin consortium 
stage, the development of the family’s shared vision is further aggravated. In 
summary, we suggest the following proposition. 
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Proposition 2c: The extent of the family’s shared vision decreases from the 
controlling owner stage to the sibling partnership stage, and further de-
creases from the sibling partnership stage to the cousin consortium stage. 
3.4.4 Evolution of Goal Alignment 
The previous sections focused on conflict among owners. In the following section, 
we analyze the effect of goal alignment, that is, the extent to which the goals of 
family managers and family owners overlap. Following stewardship theory (Davis 
et al., 1997), we argue that a higher level of goal alignment reduces the need for 
board control and that goal alignment declines over the ownership stages. As goal 
alignment does not affect the consensus among shareholder groups and the firm’s 
available resources, no linkage to the need for board mediation and board advice 
is proposed (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Pfeffer, 1972). 
Stewardship theory (Davis et al., 1997) describes a model by which managers act 
in the best interests of owners because managers derive greater utility from pro-
organizational behavior than individualistic, self-serving behavior. The assump-
tions of stewardship theory are in contrast to agency theory, which postulates di-
vergence of interests and self-serving manager behavior. Whether managers act 
as stewards depends on the level of goal alignment, which, in turn, is driven by 
certain psychological antecedents. Among these antecedents are the manager’s 
identification with the organization and the manager’s commitment to organiza-
tional goals (Davis et al., 1997). Goal alignment is argued to (partly) substitute for 
board control tasks (Pieper et al., 2008). The underlying rationale is that managers 
act in a pro-organizational manner based on their own motivation and, thus, do not 
need to be controlled. Pro-organizational behavior, in turn, is assumed to satisfy 
the demands of the owners, for instance, through the positive effects on firm per-
formance (Davis et al., 1997). Moreover, the effect of goal alignment can also spill 
over to other employees in the company. Previous research has shown the rele-
vance of emotional contagion in work groups (Barsade, 2002) and the strong influ-
ence of leaders, in this case, the family, on employee commitment (Rhoades & 
Eisenberger, 2002). Employees’ observations of and experience with the family 
manager’s commitment to organizational goals can cause a similar affective re-
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sponse (Zahra, Hayton, Neubaum, Dibrell, & Craig, 2008), which decreases the 
need for a controlling board. The theoretical considerations are supported by em-
pirical findings on the negative effect of family culture on board existence (Pieper 
et al., 2008) and on the outsider ratio (Jaskiewicz & Klein, 2007). In both studies, 
family culture was used as a proxy for goal alignment and argued to substitute the 
need for control (Jaskiewicz & Klein, 2007; Pieper et al., 2008). In summary, the 
following proposition is suggested: 
Proposition 3a: The higher the level of goal alignment between owners and 
managers, the lower the need for board control. 
In the controlling owner stage, goal alignment should be strongly pronounced. The 
owner-manager, often the founder, has the option of implementing his values in 
the organization without the requirement to make significant compromises. 
Through the design of business plans and policies, the owner-manager can en-
sure that his values are reflected in the company (Carlock & Ward, 2001). The 
value overlap is likely to result in a high level of identification with the business and 
a strong emotional bond with the organization (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2013). In 
combination with financial dependence on the company’s success (Höppner, 
2006), the owner-manager can reasonably be assumed to show high levels of 
commitment to the organization. This commitment may also be driven by altruistic 
motives, that is, the family members’ inclination to work for their kin rather than for 
their own welfare only (Becker, 1991; Lubatkin et al., 2005; Schulze, Lubatkin, & 
Dino, 2003a). Therefore, the level of goal alignment should be high at this stage. 
As the business transforms to a sibling partnership, the values of the founder often 
remain deeply imprinted in the company’s culture, posing a challenge for the new 
generation in adapting the business to their expectations (Sonfield & Lussier, 
2004). The ability of family managers to identify with the business is less in a sib-
ling partnership because the business is subject to the influences of the previous 
generation and the potential influence of other owners of the current generation. 
Moreover, the benefits of pro-organizational behavior, that is, dividends or in-
creases in share price, are shared among multiple owners (Gersick et al., 1997). 
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The commitment of an individual family manager to work for the benefit of all may, 
therefore, be lower. As identification and commitment decline, the level of goal 
alignment should decrease.  
Transition to the cousin consortium stage has the potential to further lower the lev-
el of organizational goal alignment. Each family branch may possess a different 
set of expectations as to the values and priorities that the business should follow. 
Particularly, owners that are not managers may consider the business a financial 
investment (Lubatkin et al., 2005). Due to the dispersed ownership, an increasing 
number of viewpoints must be integrated. As a result, family managers’ identifica-
tion with the organization is likely to decline. Moreover, as the dispersion of own-
ership increases and multiple nuclear families are involved, the social bonds 
among family members typically diminish (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2013). The 
commitment of family managers to behave in a way that maximizes value for all 
shareholders should decrease. Additionally, the reduced importance of altruistic 
motives because of weaker kinship ties may reduce commitment to the organiza-
tion (Lubatkin et al., 2005). In summary, the decline of identification with, and 
commitment to the organization are likely to reduce the level of goal alignment, 
leading to the following proposition.  
Proposition 3b: Goal alignment decreases from the controlling owner stage 
to the sibling partnership stage and further decreases from the sibling part-
nership stage to the cousin consortium stage. 
3.4.5 Evolution of Family Experience 
As a fourth contingency factor, family experience affects the board of directors 
(Corbetta & Salvato, 2004). Family experience describes the tacit organizational 
knowledge that family firms accumulate and can pass from one generation to the 
next (Astrachan et al., 2002; Bammens et al., 2008). Based on resource depend-
ence theory (Pfeffer, 1972), we argue that family experience reduces the need for 
board advice. Relationships to board control and board mediation are not pro-
posed as family experience does not change the alignment and balancing of the 
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interests of the involved parties (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Eisenhardt, 1989). 
As the ownership stages ensue, an increase in family experience is suggested. 
As outlined earlier, resource dependence theory (Pfeffer, 1972) considers the 
board a suitable means to secure external resources and knowledge for the firm 
through the directors (Fiegener et al., 2000a; Pfeffer, 1972). The knowledge pro-
vided by the board is particularly valuable in supplementing the knowledge of the 
management team (Huse, 1990). Family experience addresses the tacit organiza-
tional knowledge of family owners and family managers (Astrachan et al., 2002). 
Compared to explicit knowledge, tacit knowledge is difficult to codify or formalize 
and is highly context specific (Teece, 1998). In family firms, tacit knowledge can 
provide a strategic advantage, particularly in cases of successful integration and 
coordination of a firm’s resources and capabilities (Cabrera-Suárez, De Saá-
Pérez, & García-Almeida, 2001; Grant, 1991). Combining both aspects, the more 
extensive the family experience, the lower the need for complementary know-how 
from the board (Arosa et al., 2010; Bammens et al., 2008; Corbetta & Salvato, 
2004). The need for board advice should particularly decrease with regard to firm-
specific knowledge (Bammens et al., 2011). In summary, we propose the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 4a: The greater the level of family experience, the lesser the 
need for board advice. 
Typically, the controlling owner is also the founder of the family business (Gersick 
et al., 1997); thus, the owner may not be able to benefit from knowledge transfer 
from previous generations. Rather, the founder must accumulate knowledge as to 
how to successfully lead the company independently. The context-specificity of 
relevant tacit knowledge makes direct knowledge transfer or replication from other 
businesses difficult (Cabrera-Suárez et al., 2001). In summary, the extent of family 
experience is limited at this stage.  
In the transition to a sibling partnership, a significant amount of the knowledge is 
assumed to be transferred to the next generation for several reasons. First, the 
preceding generation has a high level of motivation to mentor and support their 
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successors to maintain the family heritage (Fiegener, Brown, Prince, & File, 1996). 
Second, close kinship ties and frequent interactions between a predecessor and a 
successor lead to early exposure of the successor to the business, which facili-
tates the successor’s absorptive capacity (Szulanski, 1996). Third, the possibility 
of organizational arrangements such as executive apprenticeships, supportive top 
management teams, and a strong corporate culture further increase the likelihood 
of successful knowledge transfer (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006). In addition to 
the transfer from previous generations, successors can add their knowledge based 
on academic and experiential training and refine the knowledge through the 
course of business (Cabrera-Suárez et al., 2001). As a result, firms in the sibling 
partnership stage possess increased amounts of family experience (Astrachan et 
al., 2002).  
Similar processes are likely to occur in the transition to a cousin consortium, alt-
hough the rate of knowledge accumulation slows down (Corbetta & Salvato, 
2004). Owing to the reduced interaction and intimacy among the different family 
members at this stage, knowledge transfer is less efficient (Szulanski, 1996). 
Moreover, previous generations may have already acquired much of the organiza-
tional rituals, leaving fewer opportunities for additional contribution to the family’s 
experience (Klein et al., 2005). Summarizing the above paragraph, we propose the 
following proposition.  
Proposition 4b: The level of family experience increases from the controlling 
owner stage to the sibling partnership stage and further increases from the 
sibling partnership stage to the cousin consortium stage, whereby the for-
mer increase is more significant.  
3.4.6 Moderating Influence of Non-Family Management 
Although family management constitutes the most common form of management 
of family firms, a significant proportion of family businesses make use of varying 
degrees of non-family management (Klein, 2000). We argue that a higher ratio of 
non-family managers weakens the relationships between the other contingency 
factors and the board task needs. 
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First, we argued that higher levels of external ownership increase the need for 
board control and mediation. The higher the representation of family in the man-
agement, the less burdensome, and more likely the misappropriation of resources 
will be for the benefit of the family (Fiegener et al., 2000a). In turn, non-family 
managers may have a lower tendency to favor one shareholder group over the 
other because of missing kinship ties and a lack of direct personal benefit from the 
expropriation (Lubatkin et al., 2005). We thus propose that the need for board con-
trol and mediation increases to a lesser extent. Second, lower levels of shared 
vision among family owners were argued to increase board mediation and control. 
We propose that the effect is less pronounced in cases of non-family manage-
ment. Non-family managers can often provide a more rational perspective in dis-
cussions (Sonfield & Lussier, 2009) and are assumed to work professionally to-
wards efficiency and profit goals (Dyer, Jr., 1989). The risk that a lack of shared 
vision paralyzes the organization should be lower, compared to a situation with 
emotionally involved family managers.  
Third, we argued that higher levels of goal alignment reduce the need for board 
control (Pieper et al., 2008). In contrast to family managers, non-family managers 
do not act based on the same stewardship motives. Non-family managers are so-
cialized differently because their organizational and occupational experiences are 
not solely based on the family business (Block, 2011; Dyer, Jr., 1989). Thus, iden-
tification with and commitment to the business should be lower. Moreover, altruis-
tic motives should become less frequent because of missing kinship ties (Schulze, 
Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003b). In summary, we propose that the substituting effect on 
board control is weaker with higher levels of non-family management. Fourth, we 
argued that family experience reduces the need for board advice. Compared to 
family managers, non-family managers do not benefit from inherited tacit organiza-
tional knowledge in the specific family firm (Astrachan et al., 2002). Instead, non-
family managers bring their own knowledge, often based on formal education pro-
grams and experience gained from employment in other firms (Block, 2011; Dyer, 
Jr., 1989). The effect of family experience on board advice needs, particularly con-
cerning firm-specific knowledge, should thus be weaker in cases where non-family 
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managers lead the firm. Summing up the preceding arguments, we suggest the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 5: Non-family management moderates the relationships be-
tween the four contingency factors – external ownership, family’s shared vi-
sion, goal alignment, and family experience - and the board task needs 
such that the relationships weaken with an increasing ratio of non-family 
managers. 
3.4.7 Aggregation of the Propositions 
The previous sections developed several propositions for the relationships be-
tween ownership stages, contingency factors, and board task needs. Figure 3 
combines the propositions in a comprehensive conceptual model. The aggregated 
view shows that several contingency factors and a dynamic perspective are nec-
essary to determine the board task needs of a family business. 
Figure 3: Conceptual model of the evolution of board task needs 
 
Next, we predict the evolution of each board task need based on an aggregation of 
the propositions developed in the preceding sections. Figure 4 portrays the arche-
typal evolution of the three board task needs, while separation between family and 
non-family management is established. 
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Figure 4: Typical evolution of board task needs 
 
In the controlling owner stage, the need for board control and board mediation is 
likely to be relatively low. This result is not surprising because agency conflicts 
with external owners are typically not present (Sonfield & Lussier, 2004), high lev-
els of goal alignment substitute for controlling activities (Pieper et al., 2008), and 
agreement on a shared vision is straightforward (Kelly et al., 2000). In contrast, 
board advice needs are great reflecting a low level of family experience (Astrachan 
et al., 2002). In the sibling partnership stage, a balanced requirement for all the 
three board tasks is expected. Decreasing family ownership in combination with 
the lower likelihood of a shared vision (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2013) leads to a 
stronger need for board control and board mediation. Moreover, goal alignment 
between managers and owners begins to decrease at this stage, requiring in-
creased board control. The need for board advice is lower than in the previous 
stage because of the benefits of family experience (Astrachan et al., 2002). This 
trend is likely to continue in the transition to a cousin consortium. While the need 
for board advice decreases further, control and mediating activities are of increas-
ing importance. At this stage, the extent of external ownership is likely to increase 
and the multitude of different family branches complicates the agreement on a 
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shared vision (Gersick et al., 1997). Additionally, goal alignment declines further at 
this stage (Lubatkin et al., 2005). In case of non-family management, the men-
tioned effects are pronounced to a lesser extent, that is, the evolution of the board 
tasks are partly smoothed over the ownership stages. This finding substantiates 
the importance of separating family and non-family management (Nordqvist et al., 
2014). 
In summary, controlling owners typically rather need an advising board while 
cousin consortiums may require a board that focuses on controlling and mediating 
activities. Sibling partnerships require a balance in board tasks. The significant 
differences between the stages indicate the importance of applying a dynamic 
perspective to the board (Bammens et al., 2008; Bonn & Pettigrew, 2009). In addi-
tion to the three archetypes of ownership stages, our model allows a fine-grained 
prediction of board task needs. For instance, cousin consortiums that make exten-
sive use of family meetings may substitute for mediation at the board level be-
cause the meetings contribute to collective cognition and action among family 
members (Habbershon & Astrachan, 1997; Suess, 2014). The effect can be pre-
dicted from the conceptual model through the associated increase in the family’s 
shared vision. A similar effect may emerge if the family invites outsiders, who are 
respected by all parties and act as mediators, to shareholder meetings. On the 
other hand, a controlling owner who decides to sell part of his shares at an early 
stage to finance growth may require greater board control and board mediation 
from the beginning to attract potential investors. The effect on board task needs 
can be predicted based on the increase in external ownership in the model. In 
summary, the three archetypes do not dispute the fact that substantial heterogene-
ity exists among the firms in each stage. 
So far, existing empirical evidence for comparison is scarce. Bammens et al. 
(2008) measured the evolution of board control and advice needs depending on 
the generation in charge of management. The generation in charge of manage-
ment may serve as a rough estimate for the ownership stages in our model. The 
results show an increase in board control, which is, however, not significant, and a 
convex evolution of board advice (possibly constituting a combination of board 
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advice and mediation in our model) over generations. The results can be seen as 
initial empirical tendency that the predictions of our contingency model are viable. 
 Limitations of the Model 3.5
It is necessary to consider several limitations when interpreting the findings of our 
model. First, the contingency factors center on the family owners, implicitly assum-
ing constant demands from the business over time. To determine the board task 
needs of a specific firm, the demands and evolution of the business require con-
sideration (Lynall et al., 2003). For instance, Huse and Zattoni (2008) show that a 
change in a firm’s life-cycle stage from growth to crisis shifts the need from board 
advice to board control. Other business-related determinants, such as firm size 
(Arnegger, Hofmann, Pull, & Vetter, 2014), firm diversification (Boone, Casares 
Field, Karpoff, & Raheja, 2007), or business complexity (Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 
2008) affect the tasks required of the board. These factors are relevant for family 
and non-family firms and exist in parallel with the family-related contingency fac-
tors. If the characteristics of the business change, the board task needs are also 
likely to change.  
Second, except for the kinship ties to the family, the personality and characteristics 
of management are not part of the conceptual model and are thus assumed to be 
constant. To determine the board task needs for a specific family firm, factors such 
as ability, education, or management integrity may need to be considered. For in-
stance, family managers with a high level of education may require a lower level of 
board advice because they can partly substitute for the board’s resources through 
their cognitive abilities (Voordeckers et al., 2007). The background of the CEO 
may also determine the management philosophy. For instance, an involvement-
oriented philosophy may induce stewardship behavior in the organization and, 
thus, decrease the need for board control (Davis et al., 1997).  
Third, the conceptual model must be interpreted considering the national legal sys-
tems and cultural framework (Corbetta & Montemerlo, 1999; Li & Harrison, 2008). 
Possible restrictions or necessities due to legal regulations must be considered 
depending on the firms studied (Charkham, 2008). For instance, the German legal 
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system requires certain control tasks to be performed and documented by the 
board. The differences in board control over the ownership stages may be less 
significant. Nevertheless, we consider that the general trends should hold true 
across legal systems because of the discretion that firms have in using their 
boards in addition to fulfilling formal legal requirements (Nadler, 2004). 
 Conclusion 3.6
In this article, we extend the existing contingency approach on family firm boards 
(Corbetta & Salvato, 2004). Compared to the existing model, we consider more of 
the diverging priorities of the family and respond to previous calls for a more dy-
namic perspective on board task needs (Bammens et al., 2008; Ikäheimonen et 
al., 2013). For this purpose, relationships between the ownership stages of the 
family business, contingency factors, and board task needs are established.  
Partly based on the dimensions of the F-PEC scale (Astrachan et al., 2002), we 
selected external ownership, the family’s shared vision, goal alignment, family ex-
perience, and non-family management as contingency factors to comprehensively 
capture the family-related determination of board task needs. Considering that all 
factors could be related to the board task needs, a contingency approach is indeed 
necessary to cope with the heterogeneity among family firms. Particularly, the fam-
ily’s shared vision highlights the importance of considering potential diverging in-
terests among the group of family owners (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2013). More-
over, we demonstrated that the contingency factors change over the ownership 
stages of the family business, which verifies the demand for a dynamic perspec-
tive on family firm boards. From an aggregate perspective, our model allows the 
prediction of the typical board task evolution. For firms in the controlling owner 
stage, the need for advice should be at the forefront to support management while 
sibling partnerships benefit most from a board that provides a balance between 
controlling, mediating, and advising activities. For cousin consortiums, the need for 
control and mediation is paramount. Additionally, non-family management is an 
important moderating variable underscoring its previously highlighted importance 
for governance (Nordqvist et al., 2014). 
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As our model is conceptual, we consider that a promising avenue for future re-
search is the empirical testing of our model. The majority of the proposed con-
structs have undergone first attempts at operationalization in previous studies and 
provide a reasonable likelihood for successful measurement (Astrachan et al., 
2002; Basco & Rodríguez, 2009; Basco & Voordeckers, 2015; Mustakallio et al., 
2002; Van den Heuvel et al., 2006). In addition to providing evidence for the sug-
gested propositions, empirical studies may help to explain the relative importance 
of the proposed contingency factors and their effect on business and manage-
ment-related determinants. We expect that the consideration of the interplay be-
tween all determinants will explain more of the variance in board tasks of family 
firms. Moreover, future research can build on our conceptual model and define 
how the identified task needs can be effectively fulfilled in each ownership stage. 
Minichilli, Zattoni, Nielsen, and Huse (2012) provide initial answers to this question 
by highlighting the importance of board processes and, to a lesser extent, board 
composition. Although multiple studies on the performance effect of boards have 
been conducted, the majority lack consideration of contextual family factors 
(Bammens et al., 2011; Siebels & zu Knyphausen-Aufseß, 2012). The contingency 
factors identified in our model provide a basis for more promising attempts in the 
future. 
In summary, our conceptual model supports a contingency approach and a dy-
namic perspective on family firm boards. Referring to the initial contingency model 
developed by Corbetta and Salvato (2004), we propose that not only one board is 
unlikely to fit for all family firms, but one board cannot be expected to fit for the 
entire lifetime of a family firm. Consequently, family owners and their advisors can 
benefit from frequent evaluation of their governance system that considers current 
needs. 
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 Abstract 4.1
Our study examines the role of board control tasks in mitigating self-control prob-
lems in controlling owner family businesses. We challenge the common perception 
that controlling owners do not require and use board control because of the con-
centration of ownership and management in a single individual. We argue that 
self-control problems, that is agency problems with oneself, have often been over-
looked by existing studies on the relevance of control tasks. By using a multiple 
case study design, we demonstrate that controlling owners frequently use board 
control as a self-governing mechanism and develop several propositions on favor-
able board processes and compositions. Rather than independence, we propose 
that controlling owners should select their board members based on trust and ex-
pertise. Moreover, we propose that probing and challenging behavior by board 
members in combination with the controlling owner’s willingness to prepare in a 
formalized manner support the reduction of self-control problems. 
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 Introduction 4.2
Traditionally, family firm researchers have highlighted the importance of board 
control tasks in mitigating agency problems arising from conflicts between owners 
and managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), between family and non-family owners 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2004), and among the group of family owners (Bammens, 
Voordeckers, & Van Gils, 2008). However, small and medium-sized family enter-
prises (family SMEs hereafter) are often characterized by a large overlap between 
ownership and management, up to the point where both roles are concentrated in 
a single individual (Gersick, Davis, McCollom Hampton, & Lansberg, 1997; Van 
den Heuvel, Van Gils, & Voordeckers, 2006). Such controlling owners are typically 
not confronted with the highlighted agency problems (Ang, Cole, & Lin, 2000), and 
board control has thus frequently been argued to be neither beneficial nor neces-
sary for controlling owner family businesses (Nordqvist, Sharma, & Chirico, 2014). 
We show with our study that board control can nevertheless be beneficial in such 
situations because of the mitigating effect on the self-control problems of the con-
trolling owner.  
Self-control problems emerge from the tendency of individuals to favor instant 
gratification despite the potential negative consequences for their overall long-term 
welfare (Thaler & Shefrin, 1981). For instance, a controlling owner may, con-
sciously or unconsciously, refrain from conducting an inevitable strategic change 
to avoid compromising on his familiar customer base (Ward, 1988) or from critical-
ly assessing the performance and competence of family employees, thereby 
threatening the long-term prospects of the firm (Kets de Vries, 1996). Lubatkin, 
Schulze, Ling, and Dino (2005) highlighted that controlling owners may be particu-
larly exposed to these problems, as their powerful position reduces the regulating 
effect of external capital and labor markets. Multiple authors have provided indirect 
evidence of the self-control problems of controlling owners and the associated in-
crease in agency costs (Steijvers & Voordeckers, 2009; Xiang, Worthington, & 
Higgs, 2014). With the exception of Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, and Buchholtz 
(2001), however, agency costs resulting from self-control problems have mostly 
been omitted from empirical studies on board control in family firms. Consequent-
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ly, multiple researchers pointed out that more research is needed to verify the 
board’s role in mitigating self-control problems (Bammens, Voordeckers, & Van 
Gils, 2011; Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2004). 
Building on this gap in the understanding of family firm boards, we utilized a quali-
tative case study approach, involving 13 German family SMEs, to provide more 
insights into the value add of board control for controlling owners. We find that 
controlling owners frequently use board control as a self-governing mechanism 
with the aim to reduce self-control problems. Moreover, we identified several con-
tingencies, such as a probing and challenging behavior of the board members as 
well as the owner’s willingness to prepare for board meetings in a formalized man-
ner, that support this mechanism. Finally, based on our empirical observations, we 
propose that trust and expertise, rather than independence, may be favorable at-
tributes of board members in this setting. 
With this study, we contribute to family firm and board research in three ways. 
First, we contribute to the literature by providing empirical insights into a subject 
that has with one exception only been covered from a theoretical perspective. In 
particular, the suggestion that board control may serve as a remedy to self-control 
problems (Schulze et al., 2001) lacks empirical support despite the prominence of 
self-control problems in family firms (Bammens et al., 2011). Second, our empirical 
results further blur the theoretical distinction between board control and board ad-
vice. Roberts, McNulty, and Stiles (2005) demonstrated that the provision of board 
advice allows board members to become more familiar with the firm, thereby en-
hancing the effectiveness of board control. Conversely, our study highlights the 
beneficial effects of control tasks as a form of managerial support. Typically, stud-
ies associate managerial support with advice-related tasks (Zattoni, Gnan, & 
Huse, 2015). Similarly, we highlight that trust and expertise, which have previously 
been associated with the provision of board advice (Jones, Makri, & Gomez-Mejia, 
2008), are also relevant for board control in the specific setting of controlling own-
ers. Third, our study focuses on the processes associated with board control in 
controlling owner family businesses. Previous studies of family firm boards have 
been criticized for an overreliance on input/output models that aim to link structural 
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board variables directly to firm performance in large quantitative datasets. Due to 
partly inconsistent findings, numerous calls to explore the effects of board pro-
cesses have been made (Bammens et al., 2011; Chrisman, Kellermanns, Chan, & 
Liano, 2010). By employing a case study method, we demonstrate, for instance, 
that probing and challenging by board members fosters board control as a self-
governing mechanism. A similar result has been found for publicly traded non-
family corporations, in which probing and challenging behaviors were argued to 
increase control effectiveness and accountability of management (Roberts et al., 
2005). Despite their powerful position, controlling owners thus seem to create an 
environment for themselves that resembles many aspects of board control in the 
case of external management. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.3 presents an over-
view of the theoretical foundations of the study and examines the role of agency 
costs, self-control problems, and board control in controlling owner family busi-
nesses. Section 4.4 describes the research method and design. Section 4.5 pre-
sents our key findings and develops propositions on the self-governing role of 
board control. Section 4.6 discusses these results, and we conclude with some 
limitations and possible future research avenues in section 4.7. 
 Theoretical Foundations 4.3
Early supporters of agency theory predicted zero or almost zero agency costs in 
family firms because of the overlap between ownership and management (Ang et 
al., 2000; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In particular, family 
managers were argued to factor in the interests of their kin when making firm deci-
sions. Board control would thus only be relevant in the case of non-family man-
agement to monitor management actions (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Karra, 
Tracey, & Phillips, 2006) and even be detrimental to the performance of family 
managers, as control may be interpreted as a sign of distrust (Falk & Kosfeld, 
2006). 
However, recent literature argues that family firms are subject to a unique set of 
additional agency problems (Bammens et al., 2011). The presence of (non-family) 
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minority shareholders, for instance, can lead to agency problems, as the owning 
family’s dominant position may allow the extraction of resources from the company 
at the expense of other shareholders (Anderson & Reeb, 2004). Similarly, the 
family’s pursuit of non-financial objectives may conflict with the often purely finan-
cial objectives of minority owners (Chrisman et al., 2004). Minority owners may 
thus demand appropriate control mechanisms as a prerequisite for the provision of 
capital (Almeida & Wolfenzon, 2006; Anderson & Reeb, 2004). 
In addition, the family itself can be a source of agency problems as ownership dis-
persion increases. In particular, family firms that have evolved into a sibling part-
nership or cousin consortium may be confronted with a divergence of interests 
among different family members (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2013; Schulze, Lubat-
kin, & Dino, 2003a). In particular, non-employed owners may call for board control 
to ensure that their interests are taken into account by the management (Bam-
mens et al., 2008). 
The three agency situations mentioned above should typically not be applicable for 
controlling owners. Lubatkin et al. (2005) proposed that controlling owners may, 
however, be subject to agency problems with themselves, also referred to as self-
control problems. Following Thaler and Shefrin (1981), the understanding of self-
control problems requires a multi-self-model of man. Within an individual, the con-
flict between a farsighted planner and a myopic doer is argued to lead to decisions 
that are detrimental to long-term welfare. The problems arise as individuals partly 
lack foresight and are not fully disciplined in their behavior. As a result, individuals 
may choose instant gratification despite the negative impact on their overall wel-
fare.  
Self-control problems may be particularly pronounced in family firms with a control-
ling owner for three reasons. First, private ownership allows the controlling owner 
to act mostly independent of other shareholders. Compared with publicly traded 
firms, privately held firms are not subject to pressure from capital markets, which 
are supposed to provide continuous feedback on firm performance and may act as 
a regulating force (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Second, direct representation in man-
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agement grants owners the right to almost freely decide over the use of the firm’s 
assets without having to justify their decisions to other governance institutions or 
individuals (Carney, 2005). Third, parental altruism may drive self-control prob-
lems. Parental altruism describes the tendency of controlling owners to provide 
employment or other privileges to their offspring that they would otherwise not be 
granted. Such altruism may change the incentive structure in the firm, as remu-
neration is no longer primarily based on merit but also on kinship ties (Schulze, 
Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003b). 
As outlined by Lubatkin et al. (2005), self-control problems may expose the firm to 
the agency costs of moral hazard, hold-up, and adverse selection (Alchian & 
Woodward, 1988). By giving space to the myopic doer, the controlling owner may 
omit necessary actions or make decisions that lead to misappropriation of the 
company’s resources, while not foreseeing the long-term consequences of his be-
havior. This lack of self-control may lead to decisions that hamper the controlling 
owner’s welfare as well as the welfare of those who depend on him or her 
(O'Donoghue & Rabin, 2000). Put differently, the controlling owner consciously or 
unconsciously free rides on his or her own company (moral hazard). Further, the 
lack of self-control may also lead to agency costs related to other stakeholders of 
the firm. For instance, the high degree of power allows the controlling owner to 
force other agents (for example, minority owners or employees) to accept ex post 
changes to agreements that are not in the best interests of the agents (hold-up). In 
turn, the exposure of other agents to the powerful position of the controlling owner 
may drive them to seek additional compensation through free riding or shirking 
(moral hazard). Finally, the preferential treatment of family members as well as 
capricious behavior of the controlling owner may hamper the firm’s reputation in 
the labor market, thereby leading to an unfavorable effect on the pool of applicants 
(adverse selection). Figure 5 summarizes the addressed relationships. 
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Figure 5: Self-control problems of controlling owners 
 
These negative consequences may, however, not necessarily materialize for all 
controlling owners. According to behavioral economics literature, individuals are 
often aware of self-control problems and therefore establish appropriate self-
governing mechanisms such as the voluntary establishment of rules and guide-
lines and the introduction of incentive and monitoring schemes (O'Donoghue 
& Rabin, 2000; Thaler & Shefrin, 1981). In this respect, the board of directors has 
been suggested as a potential self-governing mechanism (Schulze et al., 2001). 
By governing their own behavior, controlling owners may thus mitigate or eliminate 
the emergence of self-control problems (Lubatkin, Ling, & Schulze, 2007). Alt-
hough controlling owners typically have the power to limit the actual influence of 
the board, board control can prevent self-control problems, as controlling owners 
may be assumed to want the approval of their friends and peers and thus also of 
the board members (Chrisman et al., 2004). Specifically, in small businesses, 
board control may increase the owner’s awareness of important managerial as-
pects such as formal planning (Johannisson & Huse, 2000). Similarly, the board 
can overcome the potential negative effects of intuitive decision-making by forcing 
the owner to reflect on the biases and heuristics with which he or she may be con-
fronted (Van den Heuvel et al., 2006). Finally, board control may also promote be-
havior considered just and fair by both family and non-family members (Lubatkin et 
al., 2007). 
The empirical verification of the board’s role in mitigating the self-control problems 
of controlling owners is, however, still in its infancy (Bammens et al., 2011). Schul-
ze et al. (2001) aimed to validate their assumptions on self-control problems by 
Agency costs
 Moral hazard
 Hold-up
 Adverse selection
Private ownership
Owner-management
Parental altruism
Controlling owner’s 
self-control problems
Source: Lubatkin et al. (2005)
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investigating the effect of outside board member representation and average 
board tenure on sales growth. Contrary to their expectations, they found a nega-
tive relationship for the former and a positive relationship for the latter, indicating 
no contribution by the board to mitigate self-control problems. However, the au-
thors did show that independent board structures can have a positive effect when 
coupled with other governance practices. Similarly, other practices associated with 
board control such as the necessity to draft strategic plans were found to positively 
influence firm performance. Xiang et al. (2014) and Steijvers and Voordeckers 
(2009) also provided evidence that controlling owners in family firms may indeed 
be confronted with self-control problems and agency costs, but did not investigate 
the role of the board in mitigating such problems. 
 Research Method 4.4
The majority of studies of boards in family firms adopt large samples in publicly 
traded family firms (Bammens et al., 2011), which complicates the allocation of 
board control to specific sources of agency problems. Moreover, in quantitative 
studies of privately held family firms, the development of scales for the different 
sources of agency problems is difficult to operationalize (Chrisman et al., 2004). 
To add to our understanding on board control, this study thus used a qualitative 
case study approach (Eisenhardt, 1989). Qualitative approaches represent an un-
derutilized research methodology in family firms (Fletcher, De Massis, & Nordqvist, 
2016). The multiple case study design applied in this study enabled us to go be-
yond the mere studying of board variables and instead target the processes and 
relationships inside the boardroom, thereby staying close to the empirical phe-
nomenon in its specific context (Yin, 2009). The difficulty of obtaining data on 
boards in family firms because of the tendency to remain private further supported 
the application of a multiple case study design, as it allowed the collection of pri-
vate information (Steier & Miller, 2010). 
4.4.1 Context and Sampling 
As the context for our study, we chose German family SMEs in the legal form of 
stock corporations. In Germany, stock corporations require a two-tier governance 
system with a mandatory supervisory board. Compared with the Anglo-American 
Self-Control Through Board Control: Formalized Governance in Controlling Owner Family Businesses 
105 
 
one-tier system, the German system demands the clear separation of members 
and tasks between management and the supervisory board. The legal form of 
stock corporations is still a rather scarce phenomenon among German SMEs (that 
is, firms with usually less than 500 employees), although the dispersion is rising 
(Helm, 2004). 
This context is particularly valuable for answering our research question for two 
reasons. First, the legal obligation of a board in stock corporations forces the con-
trolling owner to actively consider whether and to what extent he or she aims to 
permit board control. Even the decision to opt out of board control by establishing 
a mere “rubber-stamp board,” namely a board that provides the legally necessary 
approval without any scrutiny (Lansberg, 1999, p. 31), may be assumed to follow a 
deliberate process of evaluation. Consequently, we expect the perceptions of the 
interviewees to be well grounded, as they are legally forced to look into board con-
trol. Second, we expect self-control problems to be more relevant in smaller firms 
because of the greater level of discretion of the controlling owner (Chrisman et al., 
2004). The extensive influence of the controlling owner on organizational out-
comes as well as on the structure of the firm’s governance system in smaller firms 
should make the specific governance challenges more readily observable 
(Fiegener, Brown, Dreux, IV, & Dennis, Jr, 2000). 
To select our cases, we followed a theoretical rather than a statistical sampling 
logic by choosing cases that provided the potential to enhance our theoretical un-
derstanding (Eisenhardt, 1989). First, a list of all stock corporations in the federal 
state of Bavaria with concentrated ownership was extracted from the ORBIS data-
base. The purpose of this regional restriction was to enhance the approachability 
of informants. Following the recommendation of Leblanc and Schwartz (2007), we 
approached firms formally using direct mailing and informally by targeting gate-
keepers. In sum, 23 firms were interviewed to understand their ownership and 
governance structures. The purpose of this first explorative step was to gain in-
sights into the context, refine the methodology, and access private information on 
the firms. In the second step, the sample was reduced to 13 firms to exclude firms 
that did not meet our selection criteria. We excluded firms that were managed 
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solely by non-family managers (three firms), did not meet our definition of family 
businesses (three), or had left the controlling owner stage (four). For the purpose 
of this study, we defined a family business as “a business governed and/or man-
aged with the intention to shape and pursue the vision of the business held by a 
dominant coalition controlled by members of the same family or a small number of 
families in a manner that is potentially sustainable across generations of the family 
or families” (Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 1999, p. 25). Allocation to the controlling 
owner stage required the majority of ownership and control rights to be concen-
trated in one individual. We interpreted the definition rather broadly and included 
cases in which the controlling owner has factual majority, as the other sharehold-
ers do not exercise significant ownership authority (Gersick et al., 1997).6 In sum, 
we regard the 13 cases as adequate to generate theory while not suffering from a 
data overload (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
4.4.2 Data Collection and Data Analysis 
For each case, we collected data from multiple sources and by using multiple data 
collection tools (Eisenhardt, 1989) in the period from September 2015 to April 
2016. Predominantly, we obtained data through semi-structured interviews with 
each controlling owner. Before each interview, all available information about the 
firm and interviewee was collected from secondary data sources such as company 
publications, newspaper articles, and ORBIS database records. At the beginning 
of each interview, the purpose of the study was explained and the confidentiality of 
the given information was ensured. The interview questionnaire covered the own-
ership, management, and governance-related aspects of the firm, while the majori-
ty of questions focused on the tasks, processes, composition, and importance of 
the board. The majority of the interviews were conducted in person at the respec-
tive companies and were combined with a plant or office visit. To maintain con-
sistency, all interviews were conducted by the same author. They were all taped 
and transcribed, expect for two cases in which recording was denied and the pro-
tocol was created based on notes directly after the interview. 
                                            
6
 Extended definition applies to Cases E, K, and L. 
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As shown in Table 14, in six cases, a second interview with a board member was 
arranged to triangulate our data collection process and verify the statements of the 
first interview (Yin, 2011). The fact that both interviewees usually did not contradict 
each other and provided similar judgments of the respective situations supported 
our aim of providing a reliable data basis for our analysis. Besides the interviews, 
each controlling owner completed a quantitative questionnaire on the extent to 
which different tasks are executed by the board (task performance). The question-
naire followed the suggestion of Zattoni et al. (2015) and required the rating of 5 
control and 6 advice tasks on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 to 5 (see Table 
15). This scale has already undergone empirical verification and it corresponds to 
the theoretical arguments for both tasks (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). 
Table 14: Sample characteristics and data collection 
 
Subsequently, the data were analyzed in a two-stage process. First, in-depth case 
write-ups were drawn and analyzed to increase our familiarity with each case and 
discern emerging themes in the data (within-case analysis). These write-ups also 
ensured a structured analysis of the data as well as consolidated the different data 
sources used (De Massis & Kotlar, 2014). In the second step, the cases were ana-
lyzed on a cross-case basis (Eisenhardt, 1989). For this purpose, recurring as-
pects in the cases that could be related to board control and self-control were 
grouped into multiple themes, which were then examined by reflecting the findings 
against the existing literature. In doing so, we moved back and forth between the 
empirical data and theory several times in an iterative process (Kuckartz, 2014). 
Legal Ownership Interviews Other data sources
Case Sector forma Employees Revenue Family Manager Generation # Organizational roles Field visits Documents
A Service AG 140 15 m€ 100% 100% 1st/2nd 1 Controlling owner 1 15
B Manufacturing SE 560 120 m€ 100% 50% 5th/6th 2 Controlling owner, Board member 1 15
C Service AG 240 15 m€ 95% 95% 1st 2 Controlling owner, Chairman 1 9
D Service AG 250 85 m€ 67% 63% 1st/2nd 2 Controlling owner, Chairman 1 8
E Manufacturing AG 370 145 m€ 61% 30% 1st 2 Controlling owner, Chairman 1 19
F Manufacturing AG 40 5 m€ 100% 100% 1st 2 Controlling owner, Board member 1 6
G Manufacturing AG 560 90 m€ 100% 100% 1st 1 Controlling owner - 8
H Manufacturing AG 120 30 m€ 100% 100% 1st/2nd 2 Controlling owner, Board member 1 11
I Service AG 110 25 m€ 90% 73% 1st 1 Controlling owner 1 5
J Manufacturing AG 130 10 m€ 60% 50% 3rd/4th 1 Controlling owner 1 13
K Manufacturing AG 70 25 m€ 100% 37% 1st/2nd 1 Controlling owner 1 4
L Manufacturing AG 20 5 m€ 89% 35% 1st 1 Controlling owner 1 5
M Manufacturing AG 300 110 m€ 100% 100% 3rd 1 Controlling owner - 8
19 11 126
a AG = Aktiengesellschaft (stock corporation); SE = Societas Europaea
b m€ = million Euro
Sizeb
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For both analysis steps, we used MAXQDA qualitative data analysis software and 
spreadsheets to organize the data and link them with emerging themes. For sev-
eral aspects, we provide a rating to offer a synoptic view of the characteristics of 
each firm to allow for a more straightforward comparison and analysis, while fur-
ther empirical evidence is provided in the adjacent quotes. To increase reliability, 
we recruited a research assistant to read all interview transcripts and provide an 
additional blind evaluation of the ratings and themes. The results were then com-
pared, showing an inter-rater agreement of 93.2 percent and a Cohen’s kappa of 
0.859, which is considered to be almost perfect agreement (Cohen, 1960; Landis 
& Koch, 1977). All discrepancies were discussed until a common view was 
reached. 
 Findings 4.5
Our findings are reported in three parts. The first part illustrates that controlling 
owners do indeed use control tasks as a self-governing mechanism. The second 
part focuses on the board processes identified as being particularly valuable for 
enhancing the effect of board control on self-control problems. Finally, we describe 
our findings on the composition of boards in the controlling owner set-up. 
4.5.1 Board Tasks 
We first analyzed the extent to which different tasks are performed by the boards 
in our sample. In the majority of cases, controlling owners reported a strong board 
focus on tasks that are generally classified as control-related (see Table 15). In 
addition to providing advice, the boards thus also seem to control. For instance, in 
Case D, all 5 questioned control tasks are relevant or very relevant, which rein-
forced the controlling owner’s conclusion that he “was certainly controlled, no 
question” (CO, Case D). The variation among the cases demonstrates that the 
legal framework grants a certain amount of discretion to the firms on how intense 
board control is realized. In Cases A and M, the owners opted to only fulfill the le-
gal requirement and established a “condensed and reduced version of the board 
that mainly exists for formal reasons” (CO, Case M). By contrast, the other 11 
cases, to varying degrees, showed a stronger execution of control tasks, leading 
to the following observation: 
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Observation 1a: The boards in controlling owner family businesses often 
perform control tasks that exceed formal legal obligations. 
Table 15: Board task performance 
 
The fact that board members can be elected and deselected at any time by the 
shareholder assembly creates a special situation for controlling owners. While the 
board is supposed to supervise the manager, the enforcement of the control may 
be hindered by the manager’s simultaneous role as a shareholder. The awareness 
of the limited enforceability is a theme that emerged with great regularity in most of 
the cases studied (see Table 16). As one controlling owner stated, “I am the owner 
of the shares, which means I can basically do what I want” (CO, Case H). Typical-
ly, board members can only be “demanding” and provide “recommendations” (CO, 
Case D), but not enforce a decision on the controlling owner. The powerful posi-
tion of the controlling owner towards the board is thus not merely a legal circum-
stance; the controlling owner and board members alike recognize it. Three cases 
provided an exception (Cases E, K, L), as the controlling owners perceived the 
presence of other shareholders as sufficient to grant the board a certain level of 
enforcement. Hence, 
Observation 1b: Controlling owners as well as board members are typically 
aware of the limited enforceability of board control in controlling owner family 
businesses.  
Board task A B C D E F G H I J K L M
Control tasks
The extent to which the board:
▪ Is involved in following up and reassessing investments 1 3 4 5 5 4 3 5 4 n 4 5 3
▪ Sets the CEO remuneration 3 4 5 5 5 3 5 5 1 4 5 5 5
▪ Is active in controlling and evaluating strategic decisions 3 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 3 1
▪ Establishes plans and budgets for the firm's activities 1 2 1 4 2 3 5 2 1 1 2 4 1
▪ Keeps itself informed about the financial position of the firm 3 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 3 4 4 4
2,2 3,4 3,6 4,6 4,2 4,0 4,6 4,4 3,0 3,0 4,0 4,2 2,8
Advice tasks
The extent to which the board
▪ Provides advice on management issues 3 3 3 5 4 5 5 5 5 2 4 3 2
▪ Provides advice on financial issues 3 3 1 4 3 5 5 5 4 2 4 3 2
▪ Provides advice on technical issues 1 2 1 4 2 1 4 2 1 3 3 2 1
▪ Provides advice on market issues 2 2 3 4 3 3 4 2 1 2 3 2 1
▪ Initiates strategic proposals 3 4 3 5 3 4 5 5 1 3 4 3 3
▪ Makes decisions on long-term strategy 3 3 3 4 3 3 5 5 1 4 3 3 3
2,5 2,8 2,3 4,3 3,0 3,5 4,7 4,0 2,2 2,7 3,5 2,7 2,0
Items rated on a Likert-scale ranging from 5 = fully applies to 1 = does not apply; n =  no answer provided
Case
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This observation might lead one to assume that board control is not beneficial and 
mainly perceived as a formal burden by controlling owners, as in Cases A and M. 
However, the remaining 11 cases showed a more positive evaluation of control 
tasks (see Table 16). Board control was perceived as valuable as it (i) acts as a 
mirror for the manager in front of which he or she needs to justify him- or herself 
(Cases E, F, G, K, L), (ii) prevents managers from becoming blind to organization-
al processes and issues outside of daily business (Cases B, D, F, G, J, K), and (iii) 
forces the manager to have a four-eye principle on important decisions (Cases C, 
D, E, F, G, H, I, J). These reasons suggest that the benefits of board control stem 
less from the actual contribution of board members and more from the obligation 
of the controlling owner to scrutinize and review his or her own behavior. Given 
this limited enforceability, control constitutes de facto a “voluntary self-obligation” 
(CO, Case I) of the controlling owner. Therefore,  
Observation 1c: Controlling owners in family firms typically perceive board 
control as valuable as it forces them to reflect on their own actions and de-
cisions.  
Table 16: Enforceability and evaluation of board control tasks 
 
Enforceability of board control 
 
Evaluation of board control 
Case Rating Sample quotes/ evidence 
a
 
 
Rating Sample quotes/ evidence 
a
 
    
    
A Low Decisions are made by the controlling owner 
alone. [CO] 
 Negative The board is mainly seen as a burden to fulfill the legal 
requirements. [CO] 
B Low “I can only raise a warning finger. But still. 
Somehow the owner has to want it” [BM] “I 
actually do not feel controlled. Whether this is 
good or bad remains to be seen, of course.” 
[CO] 
 Positive “But he also only has his experience from here. Blind-
ness to organizational processes is thus inevitable. 
Same for me. […] I will try to work in this direction. Of 
course, I do not want to be controlled by the board. On 
the other hand, it is the job of the board. I would wish 
the board to have more expertise and play a more 
active role.” [CO] 
C Low “You do not have a choice. We once intended to 
dismiss the controlling owner. There was anoth-
er board member and asked whether we have 
gone completely crazy. You cannot dismiss the 
sole shareholder.” [BM] 
 Positive “Because the structure of a stock corporation and the 
seriousness in board composition, which includes the 
selection of knowledgeable board members, relieves 
an enormous amount of pressure from the CEO or 
management in their decision making. […] And the 
whole legal form of stock corporation is very supportive 
as it includes the establishment of this governance 
body.” [CO] 
D Low “But it can only be relatively demanding. It can 
only provide recommendations. Indeed, it 
cannot do more in my situation. […] If you 
always have the possibility to exchange the 
board - I like that as the main shareholder. That 
is very pleasant.” [CO] 
 Positive “I knew every single number and took all chances to 
look behind the scenes.” [BM] “And it is very interesting 
to step back for a couple of hours and to discuss two or 
three of the topics. […] But it is not that I had a nega-
tive feeling due to this control.” [CO] 
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Enforceability of board control 
 
Evaluation of board control 
Case Rating Sample quotes/ evidence 
a
 
 
Rating Sample quotes/ evidence 
a
 
     (continued) 
E High “But none of us would act against our own 
conviction and support something that we 
believe is not correct. We just do not do it.” [BM] 
"Select and withdraw board members as we like 
– with the expectations that we have and that 
the financial community has, this would be 
absolute hara-kiri. And the board members 
know this.” [CO] 
 Positive “I think it is very important to have someone who holds 
a mirror up to you and accompanies everything critical-
ly. Life experience and management experience are 
crucial for that. And they all have seen businesses rise 
and decline. In this respect, it is good to have sparring 
partners.” [CO] 
F Low “There were also cases, of course, where I said 
I do not care. I just do it the way I want.” [CO] “If 
he owns 100 percent of the shares, the board 
cannot do anything.” [BM] 
 Positive “On the one hand, there is some healthy pressure for 
me, which is not bad […] in principle, it is like a mirror 
for me and a possibility to discuss important questions 
[…] when there are important decisions, I can get 
reassurance […] It was better for the company from an 
economic viewpoint. I have not seen it on my own, 
because I was too close” [CO] 
G Low “Of course, it would be possible, under these 
circumstances, to establish a board that only 
exists on paper and rubber stamps decisions.” 
[CO] 
 Positive "A critical questioning from the outside, a monitoring 
from the outside – I would call it a benevolent mirror of 
a third party – is not bad in my opinion because you 
typically tend to become blind to organizational pro-
cesses over time […] you do not question yourself 
critically to the same extent anymore, you maybe do 
not necessarily create the same regulations for your-
self. […] It was essential for us to have a functioning 
board in front of which we can reflect our decisions.” 
[CO] 
H Low “I am the owner of the shares, which means I 
can basically do what I want.” [CO] “As he owns 
all the shares, he certainly has the power to 
say, if you only establish silly regulations, then I 
will kick you out.” [BM] 
 Positive The board “feels responsible that the questions will be 
answered or have been answered. […] I was the sole 
decision-maker and the sole person responsible for 
many years. I now feel more comfortable and trust the 
board members. I am totally happy with the board.” 
[CO] 
I Low “Actually not. Actually, I decide that together 
with my brother.” [CO] 
 Positive “We have now set ourselves clear rules in the em-
ployment contracts, regarding acquisitions and invest-
ments in other companies as well as budgets for 
example […] you can call it a self-obligation […] The 
board only has advantages. In the background, you 
need someone, besides the banks, to review every-
thing, to have a four-eye principle.” [CO] 
J Low The control of the firm is in the hands of the 
controlling owner because of his majority share-
holding. The actual influence of the board is 
limited. [CO] 
 Positive The controlling owner perceives the board as a good 
way to get some distance to daily business and take on 
a strategic perspective. The board is perceived as 
useful to discuss and review important issues in front 
of a group of people. The control is also argued to be 
important from a psychological perspective as it is 
necessary to work in consent and reflect on own 
decisions. [CO] 
K High “My brother, who is on the board as a share-
holder and wants to be there, […] he exercises 
control towards me […] and then we vote on the 
board.” [CO] 
 Positive “Certain aspects, which you forgot during daily busi-
ness, come back on the agenda […] And if you have to 
present in front of some experts, then it is also a good 
challenge for yourself.” [CO] 
L High “Control in the sense of control takes place and 
has to take place. […] if the control would not 
take place, the board would neglect his duties 
and the board members would be personally 
liable.” [CO] 
 Positive “And what I personally consider as very useful is that 
the board meetings, which take place regularly, force 
me to conduct kind of an internal audit, which I proba-
bly would not do if the meetings would not exist.” [CO] 
M Low  “As the majority shareholder, I should be able to 
do it anyway. But I will still try to speak to the 
others and select the new board member in 
mutual agreement.” [CO] 
  Negative 
 
“It is simply a governance body that you are required to 
have as a stock corporation. We fulfilled the formal 
requirements and used it as a platform for what we 
would need to do anyway. […] In the situation of a sole 
shareholder, I think it would de facto not be neces-
sary.” [CO] 
Self-Control Through Board Control: Formalized Governance in Controlling Owner Family Businesses 
112 
 
 
Enforceability of board control 
 
Evaluation of board control 
Case Rating Sample quotes/ evidence 
a
 
 
Rating Sample quotes/ evidence 
a
 
a
 [CO] = Quote of the controlling owner [BM] = Quote of the board member 
Observations 1a–1c imply that board control can indeed serve as a self-governing 
mechanism for controlling owners. Contrary to the common perception (Gómez-
Mejía, Takács Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007), most 
of the controlling owners in our sample are willing to share part of the firm’s control 
with outsiders by accepting board control despite the awareness that their power-
ful position grants the possibility to limit board control. When comparing the re-
ported benefits of board control in our cases to the argumentation on the emer-
gence of self-control problems (see section 4.3), a large overlap can thus be ob-
served. In public non-family firms, capital markets may mirror the activities of 
managers by providing instant performance feedback (Fama & Jensen, 1983), 
more frequent changes in the executive suite may prevent organizational blind-
ness (Tsai, Hung, Kuo, & Kuo, 2006), and the clear separation of ownership, man-
agement, and governance institutions may ensure the four-eye principal on im-
portant decisions (Lubatkin et al., 2005). Board control in our cases often aimed to 
fulfill similar targets. Controlling owners thus seem to employ board control to 
“simulate” the benefits of public non-family ownership and thereby overcome po-
tential self-control problems in their firms. This requires that boards do not act as 
mere “rubber-stamp boards” (Lansberg, 1999, p. 31), but engage in controlling 
activities. Our observations correspond to the previous suggestion that boards can 
be used to mitigate self-control problems (Schulze et al., 2001). Summarizing the 
above, we propose the following: 
Proposition 1: By acting as a self-governing mechanism that forces the con-
trolling owner to reflect on his or her own actions and decisions, board con-
trol can reduce the self-control problems of controlling owners. 
4.5.2 Board Processes 
Our case studies also revealed further insights into how self-governance is actual-
ly achieved. Two themes appeared as potential contributing behaviors, one relat-
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ing to the controlling owner and one relating to board members. We assume that 
the behaviors from both sides are not independent, but rather reinforce each other. 
Starting with the controlling owner, we observed that the willingness to prepare for 
board meetings and to do so in a formalized manner plays a crucial role (see Ta-
ble 17). Many of the controlling owners perceived it as valuable to “consciously 
compile and prepare the respective information” (CO, Case G) for these meetings. 
This includes, for instance, the written analysis of investment projects in the pro-
cess of seeking board approval, the preparation of multi-year planning to define 
the company’s strategy, and the updating and presentation of performance figures. 
Such formal preparation ensures that the controlling owner is forced to invest time 
and effort before the meeting to “intensively deal with the numbers” (CO, Case K). 
Owners must also go through past developments and future plans once more for 
themselves, thereby opening the possibility to gain new insights even before meet-
ing with board members. As one controlling owner stated, “The most valuable as-
pect for us as management is actually the obligation to regularly prepare for the 
meetings, for the questioning” (Case L). 
These observations concur with current research findings on the performance con-
tribution of formalization, such as drafting strategic plans (Mazzola, Marchisio, & 
Astrachan, 2008; Schulze et al., 2001). The underlying rationale is that self-control 
problems are reduced because of the disciplining function of the plans as well as 
the preceding process of data gathering (Schulze et al., 2001). Based on our ob-
servations, we propose a similarly beneficial effect of board control when the con-
trolling owner prepares for the meetings seriously and applies a sufficient degree 
of formalization. Hence, 
Proposition 2: The controlling owner’s commitment to preparation and formali-
zation strengthens the positive effect of board control on the reduction of self-
control problems. 
Moreover, we observed that probing and challenging behavior of board members 
was typically viewed as being highly beneficial (see Table 17). As one controlling 
owner summarized, the “board fulfills its control function by asking questions as 
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well as by demanding answers” (CO, Case H). For the controlling owners we in-
terviewed, scrutiny by the board was perceived as enhancing the reflection of their 
own actions. The board not only demanded a justification of past and current de-
velopment reflected in the firm’s reporting but also targeted the substantiation of 
decisions on investment projects, for example, by demanding “sample calcula-
tions” (CO, Case F) as well as challenged the firm’s strategic orientation and fo-
cus. In contrast to board advice, such probing and challenging behavior by board 
members did not appear to contribute mainly by bringing in new knowledge and 
expertise from the outside (Johannisson & Huse, 2000), but rather forced the con-
trolling owner to reflect on his or her own decisions. The probing of the board was 
viewed to induce a “reflection” and “reconsideration” (CO, Case C) of important 
issues by the management. Board members also demanded aspects to be worked 
out in more detail and “presented at the next board meeting” (BM, Case E). Similar 
to the benefits of preparation for board meetings, new insights mainly appeared to 
stem from the controlling owner’s self-reflection rather than the overt intervention 
of board members. Thus, the limited enforceability of board control because of the 
overlap between ownership and management (see section 4.5.1) does not seem 
to hamper the positive effects of this probing and challenging behavior. Moreover, 
the questioning of the controlling owner often laid the platform for input by board 
members, thereby establishing a linkage to board advice. 
The relevance of this probing and challenging behavior corresponds to the findings 
on board effectiveness in publicly traded firms. For instance, Roberts et al. (2005, 
p. 19) demonstrated that “challenge and questioning – getting the executive to ac-
count for their conduct – is the most effective means of intervention and influence.” 
Moreover, the expectation of board scrutiny was found to increase the quality of 
CEOs’ preparation (McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999), which, according to our findings, 
enhances the self-control of the controlling owner. Similarly, multiple studies have 
highlighted that the effort of the board members, including critical questioning, 
supports the fulfillment of board tasks (Zattoni et al., 2015; Zona & Zattoni, 2007). 
Our study thus builds on these findings by demonstrating that similar behavior is 
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relevant for the self-governance of the controlling owner, leading to the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 3: Probing and challenging behavior by board members towards 
the controlling owner strengthens the positive effect of board control on the 
reduction of self-control problems. 
Table 17: Board processes supporting the self-governing effect 
Process Case Sample quotes/ evidence 
a
 
Preparation & formalization (controlling owner)  
 
B “And you have to say that the CEO is very transparent in his presentations. He doesn’t deliver just a shortened version 
of the profit and loss account.” [BM] 
 E “It is definitely a useful contribution that the board demands the CEO to simply explain, prepare, and present strategic 
topics and review them critically against the background of his own experiences.” [BM] 
 G “Preparation for board meetings helps you consciously compile and prepare the respective information […] Starting from 
the respective reporting structures, onto the respective corporate meetings and regulations regarding investment plan-
ning, approval processes, and similar issues; none of these issues would typically be questioned critically [without the 
board]. This also includes the development of multi-year planning, strategic discussions, and the reflection of the man-
agement team, which would typically not occur to the same extent.” [CO]. 
 I “For us, it is mainly relevant that we have to update the financial figures, meaning the forecasts from our consulting 
work, and that we discuss the business trends based on the profit and loss account, cash flow statement, and other 
ratios.” [CO] 
 J The controlling owner regards the meetings as very important as they provide the possibility to review the pros and cons 
of decisions once again and thereby reflect on the decisions. [CO] 
 K “And of course the preparation for board meetings, the obligation to intensively deal with the numbers yourself, to check 
everything in detail at least once a quarter […] It is very useful to prepare yourself accordingly. That’s good. That’s 
definitely something that delivers value.” [CO] 
 L “The most valuable aspect for us as management is actually the obligation to regularly prepare for meetings, for the 
questioning and for getting challenged.” [CO] 
Probing & challenging (board members)  
 B “We receive quarterly reports. I work through them. And after I have received them – one or two weeks later – I call 
management and ask my questions.” [BM] “He addresses the topics that attract his attention and which he maybe does 
not like.” [CO] 
 C “He asks critical questions. Questions that make you think and reflect. The board, from a business perspective, really 
often asks critical questions […] And when the board says sentences like this, then an active manager reconsiders the 
topic.” [CO] 
 D “We took this very seriously […] This includes the reporting and critical questioning of the numbers and trends on the 
supply as well as on the market side.” [BM] 
 E “That was a topic where we said we want to know more. How do you do it? How is it backed up? How can you ensure 
that it is feasible considering the liability of the organization? And then they immediately said okay, we will check. And 
then it was presented at the next board meeting.” [BM] 
 F “And when he realizes that there are bigger differences, then he asks questions and asks whether it has a special 
reason. Are we able to catch it up or what is happening there? […] for instance, they want a sample calculation, based 
on a product. How does it work that the material cost ratio declines and value creation increases?” [CO] 
 G The board “in a very, very streamlined manner critically challenges, from a leadership perspective, from a strategy 
perspective as well from an implementation perspective, whether the strategic goals are adequately fulfilled and correct-
ly implemented.” [CO] 
 H “The board fulfills its control function by asking questions as well as by demanding answers. It can not only ask ques-
tions and not care, but it feels responsible that the questions will be answered or have been answered. […] The board 
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asks questions […] You have to provide evidence.” [CO] 
 I “And we receive critical questions once we do not achieve our revenue targets mid-year or at the bottom line, the EBIT 
targets, for example, could not be achieved. This is than critically challenged.” [CO] 
 J “Through critical questioning, the board prevents you from getting on the wrong track.” [CO] 
 K “But they also ask critical questions. They provide questionnaires and other things that have to be filled out.” [CO] 
 L “As long as we stay within the target figures, there is less activity. Once we are out of the target figures, there is a lot of 
activity […] once we send out the preliminary numbers, we already provide the explanations, saying you will probably 
ask this, that is why you already get those two documents attached.” [CO] 
a
 [CO] = Quote of the controlling owner [BM] = Quote of the board member 
4.5.3 Board Composition 
In the final section, we report our findings on the composition of the studied 
boards. First, we categorized all board members in each case according to their 
affiliation with the controlling owner, separating board members with familial ties, 
friendship ties, and business ties (other than the board membership itself) and in-
dependent directors (see Table 18). 
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Table 18: Board composition 
 
Except for Case G, all the cases were dominated by affiliated board members. In 
Case G, the focus was merely “to have a qualified composition” and the selection 
of board members aimed to follow an objective “balanced scorecard” (CO, Case 
G). In the remaining cases, the controlling owners tended to opt for board mem-
bers from within their known circle of people rather than choosing independent 
outsiders. The majority of interviewees argued that such an affiliation ensures trust 
between both parties, which in turn was perceived as a prerequisite for the board’s 
Board member background Board member affiliation Perceived importance of trust
Case Occupationa Resourceb Family Friend Business Indep. Rating Sample quotes/ evidencec
A Tax advisor SS X High
Consultant SS X
Student O X
B Business owner  I X High
Consultant SS X
Politician CI X
C Tax advisor SS X High
Manager BE X
Professor CI X
D Business owner  BE X High
Lawyer SS X
Professor CI X
E Manager  BE X Low
Manager BE X
Professor CI X
F Engineer  O X High
Accountant O X
Tax advisor SS X
G Professor  CI X Low
Professor CI X
Manager BE X
Manager BE X
Clerk (E) O X
Mechanic (E) O X
H Tax advisor  SS X High
Banker SS X
Manager BE X
I Manager  BE X High
Dentist O X
Consultant SS X
J Lawyer  SS X High
Factory manager O X
Ceramicist O X
K Business owner  I X Low
Business owner BE X
Business owner BE X
L Banker  SS X Low
Banker SS X
Business owner BE X
M Business owner I X High
Business owner I X
Shop manager O X
29% 26% 24% 21%
a (E) = Employee representative 
b I = Insider, BE = Business Expert, SS = Support Specialist, CI = Community Influential, O = Other
c [CO] = Quote of controlling owner [BM] = Quote of board member
"I think I have found someone, who I believe is loyal and correct 
in that situation. As I have said, I think that is more important 
than the qualification, which he also needs, of course." [CO]
Controlling owner aims for board members whom he can trust, 
so that decisions can be made and implemented on short 
notice. [CO]
"We see each other often. We talk about everything. They are 
informed about everything and trust is certainly there as well." 
[CO]
"All our board members are in office for more than 5 years now 
and it definitly is a position that requires a lot of trust." [CO]
"He is demanding because we know each other very well. He 
cannot be demanding just because he is a board member in 
that situation." [CO]
"It is very useful to differentiate here. And we do that. I 
purposefully do not play the friendship card. We differentiate 
that very clearly." [BM]
"We know each other well enough. Everything is open. We also 
personally know each other very well." [BM]. "But I did not want 
to select out of necessity, as it is a sensitive position." [CO]
Selection of board members based on expertise rather than 
social ties. [CO] "Whom do we need to have a qualified 
composition?" [CO]
Controlling owner wishes for less family involvement on the 
board and aims for a more critical viewpoint provided by 
outsiders. [CO]
The relationship towards the board members is kept 
professional and board meetings take place in very formalized 
way. [CO]
"We need a chairman whom we can trust." [CO] "We know 
each other good enough. He normally listens to our reasons." 
[BM]
"The human factor is an essential aspect. Searching a board 
member through a headhunter, that would be an absolute no-
go." [CO]
Trust towards board members is considered important. 
Controlling owner wants to ensure that the ultimate decision 
rests with him and is not blocked by the board. [CO]
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work. The independence of board members was not evaluated as important, pos-
sibly because control is ultimately unenforceable. As one controlling owner stated 
about a board member, “He is demanding because we know each other very well. 
He cannot be demanding just because he is a board member in that situation” 
(Case D). As outlined earlier, board control mostly represents a voluntary self-
restriction of the controlling owner, thereby demanding a climate that induces the 
controlling owner to share information openly. Rather than undermining board con-
trol, the close relationship may thus benefit the self-governing role of board con-
trol. In sum, we observed that the “human factor is an essential aspect” (CO, Case 
I). In four of the cases (Cases E, G, K, L), the importance of trust and social ties 
was perceived to be less important and instead a more professional attitude to-
wards board members was favored. The relevance of trust thus seems to vary ac-
cording to the preferences of the controlling owner. 
Existing studies of boards in family firms have highlighted the beneficial role of 
trust with regard to board advice (Bammens et al., 2011). Trust is defined as the 
willingness “to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expecta-
tion that the other will perform a particular action […], irrespective of the ability to 
monitor or control that other party” (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995, p. 712). 
Jones et al. (2008) argued that social ties form the basis for interpersonal trust 
towards board members, which in turn makes family businesses more receptive to 
receiving board advice. Similarly, Lester and Cannella, Jr (2006, p. 762) argued 
that “trust is central to family business relationships involving advice and counsel, 
because families tend to guard their privacy, and are very careful with whom they 
share confidential information.” We contend that trust also plays an important role 
for board control in the given setting, as it fosters the controlling owner’s willing-
ness to accept and support board control. In summary, we propose the following: 
Proposition 4: The selection of affiliated board members supports the devel-
opment of trust between the controlling owner and board members, thereby 
strengthening the positive effect of board control on the reduction of self-
control problems. 
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Lastly, we report our findings on the expertise of board members. Following the 
popular classification of Hillman, Cannella, Jr., and Paetzold (2000), we catego-
rized board members based on their background into insiders, business experts, 
support specialists, community influentials, and a group with a supposedly lower 
potential of resource provision that could not be allocated (other). The low occur-
rence of insiders is driven by the fact that executives are not permitted to be board 
members in the German legal system. In the majority of the cases, directors were 
allocated to the business experts and support specialists categories. Although 
controlling owners seemed to generally favor highly affiliated boards, they also 
paid considerable attention to the background of board members in most cases, 
reflected by the fact that only around one-fifth of board members fell into the “oth-
er” category. 
Previous studies have primarily linked the expertise of board members to the pro-
vision of board advice (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2005; Jones et al., 2008). We pro-
pose that the expertise of board members is likewise necessary to reap the bene-
fits of board control as a self-governing mechanism. First, a higher level of exper-
tise may incline the controlling owner to take the board seriously and thus engage 
in the control process. As one controlling owner insisted, such expertise forces him 
to “- family business or not – regularly confront [himself] with such a critical mirror” 
(Case G). Second, a higher level of expertise should also improve the effective-
ness of the performed control tasks. For instance, the probing and challenging be-
havior identified in section 4.5.2 should be better founded and may direct the con-
trolling owner towards additional aspects by asking the “right” questions. As high-
lighted by one controlling owner, “management as well as the board members 
should generally be very knowledgeable people. There should be no teacher-
student relationship, but they know on a level playing field which explosive poten-
tial their questions carry and which expectation their questions raise” (Case C). 
Based on these observations, we propose the following: 
Proposition 5: The expertise of board members strengthens the positive effect 
of board control on the reduction of self-control problems. 
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 Discussion 4.6
The findings of our empirical study suggest that controlling owners do indeed em-
ploy board control as a self-governing mechanism. In combination with the theoret-
ical considerations of Lubatkin et al. (2005), the rationale for this behavior can be 
attributed to agency theory and the potential self-control problems of controlling 
owners. Figure 6 provides an overview of the developed propositions of our study 
and integrates them into a post-analysis framework. In brief, we find that board 
control in the majority of cases is employed as a self-governing mechanism with 
the aim of reducing self-control problems and that certain board processes and 
compositions strengthen this effect. Therefore, we lend further credibility to the 
existing theoretical concept of self-control problems in family firms, while providing 
additional insights into the role of the board of directors. As indicated by the be-
havioral economics literature, controlling owners seem to be at least partly aware 
of the self-control problems they are facing (O'Donoghue & Rabin, 2000; Thaler 
& Shefrin, 1981). Therefore, the previous assumption that board control is not 
necessary and not used by controlling owners (Nordqvist et al., 2014) can, at least 
for our sample, be questioned. On the one hand, the divergence of our results may 
be because agency problems with oneself have gained insufficient scholarly atten-
tion. On the other hand, the divergence may be because controlling owners vary 
substantially in their pursuit of non-financial goals, which includes the desire to 
remain in unrestricted control of their firm (Zellweger, Nason, Nordqvist, & Brush, 
2013). In summary, we show that when the advantage of staying in full control is 
lower, controlling owners might more readily consider employing a functioning 
board. 
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Figure 6: Board control as a self-governing mechanism for controlling own-
ers  
 
It is difficult to verify our results against previous empirical studies as empirical 
evidence on the board’s role in reducing the self-control problems of controlling 
owners is limited (Bammens et al., 2011). As outlined before, Schulze et al. (2001) 
did not find an effect of outside board member representation and board tenure on 
sales growth, presumably indicating no role of the board in reducing self-control 
problems. Our study bears the potential to provide an explanation for this finding 
on board composition. We demonstrated that the independence of board members 
may not be an important aspect of board member selection because of the limited 
enforceability of board control. Rather, affiliation and trust may strengthen the in-
tended effects of board control. Consequently, outsider status as well as tenure 
should not be significant predictors of firm performance. In broader terms, our find-
ings correspond to the positive findings on the degree to which increased formali-
zation measures such as strategic planning reduce agency costs (Chrisman et al., 
2004; Schulze et al., 2001). Our findings also concur with those of a previous 
study of stock corporations among German SMEs, which found a high level of sat-
isfaction with the choice of legal form as well as with the mandatory supervisory 
board, although no separation between board control and advice was made 
(Helm, 2004). In summary, our results can be integrated into previous works in this 
field. 
Agency costs
 Moral hazard
 Hold-up
 Adverse selection
Private ownership
Owner-management
Parental altruism
Controlling owner’s 
self-control problems
Source: Adapted from Lubatkin et al. (2005) based on case study results (dotted lines)
CO = Controlling owner, BM = Board members
Board control
Board processes
 CO: Preparation & formalization
 BM: Probing & challenging
Board composition
 Affiliation & Trust
 Expertise
P2 P4
P1
P3 P5
Self-Control Through Board Control: Formalized Governance in Controlling Owner Family Businesses 
122 
 
 Conclusion 4.7
This article clarified the role of board control in controlling owner family business-
es. Based on agency theory, we outlined several sources of potential agency con-
flicts for family firms and identified the self-control problems of controlling owners 
as an important driver of agency costs, resulting from private ownership, owner–
management overlap, and parental altruism. Based on a multiple case study de-
sign that examined 13 family SMEs in Germany, we demonstrated the relevance 
of board control as a self-governing mechanism that forces the controlling owner 
to reflect on his or her own actions and decisions and thereby supports the reduc-
tion of self-control problems. In addition, we developed further propositions on 
board processes and composition that are likely to strengthen the effect. We pro-
pose that trust and expertise, rather than independence, are favorable attributes of 
board members and that probing and challenging behavior by the board in combi-
nation with the owner’s willingness to prepare in a formalized manner enhance the 
effect of board control in this setting. 
Despite the advantages of our case study approach, our study has several limita-
tions. First, the restriction to 13 cases and one national setting may bear the risk of 
idiosyncratic results that lack generalizability to other contexts. Where possible, 
this risk was minimized through the application of established principles on rigor 
case study research, such as theoretical sampling, data triangulation, and iteration 
with the literature (Eisenhardt, 1989). Second, we did not include the costs associ-
ated with board control, including the remuneration of board members, or the con-
trolling owner’s opportunity costs of the time invested in preparing and attending 
board meetings. Despite the perceived positive evaluation of the board by control-
ling owners, the costs associated with this governance mechanism may outweigh 
its benefits. Considering the legal obligation for a board in our setting, part of these 
costs may, however, be inevitable in any case. Third, our study was conducted in 
a German two-tier governance system that legally demands the formal fulfillment 
of control tasks. Hence, our observations may only represent the response to a 
legal requirement. However, the comparison of the extent of task performance 
across firms (see Table 15) showed a substantial amount of discretion for firms. 
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Moreover, previous studies (Fiegener et al., 2000) have argued that boards mostly 
composed of family members may be suitable for minimizing control and establish-
ing a “rubber-stamp board” (Lansberg, 1999, p. 31). As these compositions were 
rarely observed in our cases, we argue that the reasons for board control cannot 
merely be found in the legal system. 
Future researchers could extend our work by deepening the insights gained and 
providing further evidence for our propositions. In particular, we suggest that an 
observation of actual board meetings or even a “one of the lads” study that in-
cludes the direct involvement of the researcher (Huse & Zattoni, 2008) could be an 
appropriate research design to better understand internal behaviors such as the 
self-reflection process of the controlling owner. Moreover, future research could 
examine the performance effects of board control for controlling owners. Previous 
quantitative studies have often made “great inferential leaps” (Pettigrew, 1992, 
p. 171) from structural board variables to firm performance, thereby possibly failing 
to account for the underlying drivers of the discovered effects (Zona, 2015). We 
thus recommend future works include board processes and sample a single family 
business type, such as controlling owner family businesses, to enable a better al-
location of the findings to specific agency problems. 
Finally, we note some practical implications of our findings. Given that German 
SMEs are rarely obliged to establish a board, our study indicates the advantages 
for controlling owners to (voluntarily) use formalized governance mechanisms. In 
practice, an advisory board equipped with the necessary rights and taken seriously 
by the controlling owner may be a suitable option for family firms in other legal 
forms than stock corporations. Because board control can help the controlling 
owner exploit his or her potential while limiting the occurrence of self-control prob-
lems, our findings add to the body of evidence addressing the skepticism of con-
trolling owners towards increased professionalization. 
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 Abstract 5.1
The case deals with ATB, a small family business in Germany that had focused on 
the production of parking meters for several decades. End of 2015, ATB was see-
ing a threat to its existing business due to the rise of mobile parking providers. 
Consumers could now use their smartphone to pay for parking, thereby potentially 
making parking meters obsolete. The case centers on the managerial challenge 
whether ATB should take the rise of new entrants seriously and whether ATB 
would need to adjust its business model. The case provides learning opportunities 
for undergraduate or MBA students studying strategy, business models, and dis-
ruptive innovation. In particular, the case shows that disruptive innovation and digi-
tal disruption are not only relevant for large firms but also for small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs). These firms are often confronted with resource con-
straints that make it difficult to apply established countermeasures to disruption, 
such as acquiring a new entrant. 
 
For copyright reasons, the research paper is excluded from this published version 
of my dissertation. 
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6 Conclusion 
 Contribution of the Dissertation 6.1
As outlined in the introduction of this dissertation, research on family firm boards 
has evolved over the recent decades towards a more nuanced understanding of 
the factors that influence boards. While early work in the field was often based on 
practitioner experiences (Mathile, 1988; Ward, 1988; Whisler, 1988), the new mil-
lennium brought a wave of quantitative board studies in search of the ideal board 
design (Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Klein, Shapiro, & Young, 2005). More recently, 
family firm researchers have started to reconcile the partly divergent results of ear-
lier studies by stressing and investigating the differences in boards between differ-
ent family firms (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2013; Nordqvist, Sharma, & Chirico, 
2014). This dissertation covered conceptual and empirical insights in this direction 
of research. Figure 7 provides an overview of the research findings of each paper.  
Figure 7: Summary of the dissertation findings 
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Result: Existing findings in literature can be clustered into six main family-related
determinants of the board, namely generational stage, family culture, family
power, family experience, CEO family stakes, and director kinship ties. Future
studies should investigate the dynamic evolution of the board over time, extend
the scope of theories, and vary the research methods employed.
Result: A contingency approach on the board that factors in the divergence of
interests inside the family is necessary. There is a strong need for adaptations to
the board tasks over the ownership stages. While controlling owners typically
have a stronger need for board advice, the transitions to a sibling partnership
and cousin consortium gradually shift the need to board control and mediation.
Result: Controlling owners frequently use board control as a self-governing
mechanism to mitigate self-control problems. Probing and challenging behavior
of the board members and formalized preparation of the controlling owner
support the effect. Moreover, trust and expertise, rather than independence, are
favorable attributes of the board members in this setting.
Result: The entrance of mobile parking providers has the potential to lead to a
disruptive innovation to manufacturers of parking meters. The case indicates that
family SMEs may be subject to specific resource constraints due to their size,
which hampers the implementation of typical response strategies to disruptive
innovation, such as the acquisition of the entrant.
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From an academic perspective, the individual papers contribute to board research 
in family firms in several ways, which are recapitulated as follows. First, the sys-
tematic literature review provides a synthesis of the existing knowledge on family-
related determinants of the board. The clustering of the results into six major de-
terminants provides an immediate overview of factors that may need to be consid-
ered in future studies. Moreover, the review provides broad and specific recom-
mendations on promising directions for future research. Second, the conceptual 
paper contributes to the field by extending the existing contingency approach 
(Corbetta & Salvato, 2004). The consideration of often divergent interests among 
family members (Berrone, Cruz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012; Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 
2013) allows for a more comprehensive understanding of board task needs among 
different family firms. Moreover, the conceptual model shows that the ownership 
stages (Gersick, Davis, McCollom Hampton, & Lansberg, 1997) could explain 
much of the differences in board task needs and that a dynamic perspective on 
board task needs is required. Third, the empirical study is among the first to pro-
vide evidence of the utilization and effect of board control in mitigating self-control 
problems of controlling owners. We provide insights on a specific type of family 
firm, which allows more consistent results than a study of an entire group of family 
firms. Additionally, the paper blurs the theoretical distinction between board control 
and board advice by underlining the benefits of board control as a form of mana-
gerial support. The qualitative study contributes to the field by detailing processes 
inside the board that enhance the effect of the board tasks. Board processes have 
often been omitted in earlier empirical studies on boards (Bammens, Voordeckers, 
& Van Gils, 2011). 
From a practitioner perspective, the individual papers contribute to the field in mul-
tiple ways. First, the systematic review demonstrates to practitioners the multitude 
of factors influencing board design. In developing recommendations for specific 
family firms, practitioners should consider the unique characteristics of the owner-
ship situation. Second, the conceptual model emphasizes that board task needs 
are not only firm specific but also time-specific. Previous research has shown that 
boards are often path-dependent, that is, they are likely to reflect the needs at their 
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foundation rather than the current needs of the business (Lynall, Golden, & Hill-
man, 2003). Constant evaluation and adaption of the board should thus be a priori-
ty for practitioners. Third, our empirical study highlights the benefits of board con-
trol for controlling owner family businesses. Our study aims to contribute to mitigat-
ing the existing skepticism of controlling owners in using the board instead of 
merely establishing “rubber-stamp” boards, that is, boards that give approval with-
out any scrutiny (Lansberg, 1999, p. 31). Through professionalization of their gov-
ernance system, controlling owners can exploit the benefits of their powerful posi-
tion while reducing self-control problems. For firms other than stock corporations, 
advisory boards equipped with control rights that are taken seriously may provide 
similar benefits. 
The fourth paper contributes to research beyond the area of the board of directors 
but is linked to the three other research papers by its focus on family SMEs. The 
paper contributes to the research on family firms through a teaching case study for 
management education. Instructors can use the case study to illustrate the practi-
cal implications of disruptive innovation and business models to future academics 
and practitioners in the field. In particular, the case shows that the resource con-
straints of SMEs can hinder the application of wholesale strategies in response to 
disruptive innovation (Christensen, Raynor, & McDonald, 2015). 
 Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 6.2
The main objective of this dissertation was to gain further insights on the influence 
of family firm heterogeneity on the board of directors. As outlined in the previous 
section, several important contributions in this direction could be made. Despite 
the advantages of the chosen research strategy, the dissertation is subject to sev-
eral limitations that may build the starting point for future studies in the field. 
The systematic literature review, by its very nature, outlines the gaps in existing 
literature that should deserve increased attention. For instance, the literature re-
view found that that studies on the evolution of the board, those that explore the 
utilization of different theories in addition to agency theory, and those that employ 
qualitative research methods are required. The literature review itself is subject to 
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limitations resulting from the systematic process in selecting literature. The focus 
on peer-reviewed, English-speaking academic journals causes the risk of omitting 
research findings that are published elsewhere or not yet published. On the other 
hand, the restriction in the literature selection ensures higher levels of objectivity 
and replicability (Tranfield, Denyer, & Smart, 2003). In addition, I aimed to mitigate 
the risk of omitting important aspects through the attendance of multiple research 
conferences on the topic that covered current research findings and projects. 
The second paper, which develops a contingency approach on the board task 
needs, provides a suitable basis for future studies. The conceptual model involves 
several constructs that have undergone first attempts for an operationalization in 
previous empirical studies (Astrachan, Klein, & Smyrnios, 2002; Mustakallio, Autio, 
& Zahra, 2002). An empirical study could be the next step in verifying the devel-
oped propositions and gain further insights into the relative importance of the pro-
posed contingency factors. So far, the findings of the paper are based on concep-
tual considerations and have not yet been empirically tested. However, the con-
ceptual work provided strong support for the change of board tasks over the own-
ership stages and the relevance of contingency factors based on the synthesis of 
existing family firm literature. The model provides a holistic overview on multiple 
relationships, which may not have become apparent in a focused empirical study 
that centers on single relationships. 
With respect to the study on board control in controlling owner family firms, we 
suggest that observations of actual board meetings or a “one of the lads” study, 
that is, a study in which the researcher is part of the board (Huse & Zattoni, 2008), 
would complement the interview-based data used by us. In addition to further veri-
fying our data, these studies could provide more insights into the internal board 
processes that are assumed highly influential for the performance implications of 
the board (Zona, 2015). Moreover, our study did not include the costs associated 
with board control. Despite the perceived positive evaluation of the board by con-
trolling owners, the costs may outweigh the benefits in some cases. Future re-
search may thus consider not only targeting the benefits but also the direct and 
indirect costs of executing board control in the controlling owner setting. Finally, 
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the study we conducted provides insights on a specific type of family firm, namely 
the controlling owner family firm. These insights are likely to be not as relevant for 
other family firms, which are subject to different types of agency conflicts (Lubat-
kin, Schulze, Ling, & Dino, 2005). Future studies should target these different 
types of family firms to provide additional evidence on the effects of family firm 
heterogeneity.  
In summary, this dissertation represents a further building block in the understand-
ing of the governance and management of family firms. The mixed approach, 
which included different research methods for each of the papers, proved to be a 
useful strategy to generate new insights that are strongly grounded in existing lit-
erature, at the same time enhancing the knowledge on the board of directors on a 
conceptual as well as empirical level. In particular, the decision in favor of a quali-
tative empirical study based on in-person interviews enhanced the understanding 
of the underlying behavior of family firms. The short quantitative questionnaire on 
board tasks (Zattoni, Gnan, & Huse, 2015), which accompanied our qualitative 
interviews, demonstrated the dilemma of quantitative research on the topic. While 
the results allowed for a straight-forward measurement of board tasks and a com-
parison between the different firms, the results did not reveal the reasoning behind 
the observed tasks. In the controlling owner setting, based on our interview data, 
we found that agency problems with oneself, i.e. self-control problems, are the 
dominant driver, rather than the typically assumed agency problems with other 
parties. Therefore, I regard the decision for a qualitative study adequate in answer-
ing the research question of my dissertation and in creating further knowledge on 
the influence of family firm heterogeneity on the board of directors. 
The fourth paper of this dissertation, which targets the managerial challenge of a 
family SME, differs from the other three research papers, as it was designed to 
provide a teaching case for undergraduate or MBA students. The paper is limited 
by its focus on a single family firm and a single respondent. More intensive re-
search projects are necessary in the future to substantiate our initial findings and 
transfer the case material into the framework of an academic research paper. 
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Overall, as existing knowledge on family firms is far from reaching a saturation 
point (Sharma, Chrisman, & Gersick, 2012), further work in the field is indispensa-
ble. Based on the results of my dissertation, I strongly believe that qualitative stud-
ies in particular are necessary to further enhance the knowledge on family firms. 
The heterogeneity among different types of family firms and the tendency of many 
family firms to remain private (Steier & Miller, 2010), support the necessity for re-
search strategies that cover the context and characteristics of the studied family 
firms and that establish closer relationships to the research subject. These re-
search strategies may require additional efforts from the researcher, but with the 
widespread occurrence of family firms, the results of this dissertation and the po-
tential insights of future studies should be of great relevance to academics, family 
firm practitioners, and policymakers. 
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